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Foreword and Acknowledgements
This book is the outcome of a project carried out within the auspices of the
Swedish Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi). The mission of Delmi, which
was set up as a government committee, is to serve as a bridge between social
science research, on the one hand, and public debate and policy-making, on
the other. The initial motivation for this book was the idea that Delmi would
benefit from analyses of the experiences of other initiatives and projects aimed
at linking research to public debate and policy-making processes, not only in
other countries, but also in international settings. The work on the book thus
became an important tool for Delmi in terms of self-reflection and self-
evaluation, serving as a sounding board for critical reflections of the work of
the committee.
The idea for this book project came from Kristof Tamas, who then engaged
Joakim Palme and Martin Ruhs as co-editors. These three editors had once
been brought together by a politician, the late Jan O. Karlsson, who in so
many ways was dedicated to the mission of bringing research closer to policy-
making, not least as co-chair of the Global Commission for International
Migration and, before that, as Minister of Migration. We are happy that his
successors as Ministers of Migration have shared his engagement in research.
As Minister, Tobias Billström was responsible for setting up Delmi as an
independent committee—which we, also in retrospect, believe was a wise
decision. Later, his successors as responsible ministers, Morgan Johansson
and Heléne Fritzon, have continued to support the work of the committee.
We see this support as being part of a quest formore knowledge and respect for
the value of pursuing this work in an independent format.
The source of inspiration for this anthology was a book published in 1993
by Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy.
George examined US foreign policy strategies and explored ways to bridge the
gap between the two cultures of academia and policy-making. He advised
policy-makers to reinforce their use of academic knowledge while inviting
scholars to produce more policy-oriented knowledge. This piece of advice is
also useful for the study of migration and integration, and the relations
between academia, media/public opinion, and policy-makers. Over the past
couple of decades, the notion that policy-makers should rely on research to
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form evidence-based policies has been challenged. Liberal democratic govern-
ments are increasingly feeling threatened by the rise of populist parties.
Academic knowledge and expert views are increasingly being questioned by
post-truth advocates.
Our overall concern is the question of how we could help in bridging
the gaps between academic research and media/public opinion, academic
research and government policies, and government policies and public
debate. What are the opportunities and pitfalls of trying to produce policy-
relevant research? What lessons can be learnt from past experiences of efforts
to use research to inform public debate and policy-making processes? These
are highly timely and topical questions in a large number of countries across
the world.
We are very grateful to all the chapter authors for their contributions. We
are pleased that we could gather and persuade such a knowledgeable group of
scholars and practitioners from Europe and beyond to contribute to this book.
The contributors have a wealth of knowledge and experiences with linking
research to public and policy debates on migration and integration across a
wide range of different institutional settings and countries.
We would also like to extend our gratitude to the Royal Swedish Academy of
Letters, History and Antiquities (Vitterhetsakademien), who provided generous
financial support for a workshop in May 2017 which enabled this book’s
contributors to gather in Stockholm. This workshop proved exceptionally
helpful for facilitating discussions among our contributors and for shaping
the book in a way that makes it appealing to a wide-ranging audience, includ-
ing academics, policy-makers, civil society and media, and the general public.
We would also like to thank the following commentators who provided
very helpful discussions of the draft chapters presented at the workshop:
Alessandra Venturini, Kerstin Brunnberg, Tom Nuttall, Michele Levoy, Eskil
Wadensjö, Bernhard Perchinig, Peter Webinger, and Johan Hassel.
The editors have benefited greatly from the support of the Delmi secretariat
throughout the project. Associate professor Henrik Malm Lindberg has, in
many ways, been an important engine for the project and his input has
been extremely valuable. Dr Constanza Vera-Larrucea has provided a stream
of useful comments about the various chapters in this volume that greatly
improved a number of the contributions, not least our own. We are also
grateful for the support of Dr Erik Lundberg and Dr Sara Thalberg.
We would like to acknowledge the excellent support from Oxford Univer-
sity Press, not least by Adam Swallow who believed in the book project—his
enthusiasm has been truly appreciated and has spurred us forward—and by
Katie Bishop who helped us complete the project. Keith Povey has done an
excellent and expedient job as copy-editor, for which we are truly grateful.
Elakkia Bharathi did a great effort in helping us finalize the book.
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International migration and integration are among the greatest challenges
of our time. Well-balanced policies can make a great deal of difference to
promoting the considerable benefits and positive outcomes that migration
can generate while, at the same time, reducing any potential risks and adverse
consequences. Wise policies are not designed by default, which is why it is so
important to feed knowledge into policy-making processes. We hope that the
theoretical reflections, case studies and policy analyses in this book will be
helpful in building more and stronger bridges across research, public debate
and policy-making processes on migration, integration, and related public
policies.
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Introduction
Making Linkages Between Research, Public
Debates, and Policies on International
Migration and Integration
Martin Ruhs, Kristof Tamas, and Joakim Palme
Evidence-based Policy-making versus Post-truth Politics?
International migration and integration are among the most important and
controversial public policy issues in many high-income countries. The global
economic downturn in the late 2000s and the sharp increase in the number of
refugees and other migrants making their way to Europe in 2015 have inten-
sified what, in many countries, were already highly charged debates about the
impacts of immigration on the host economy and society. Concern about
immigration has been a major driver of the rise of Donald Trump in the
United States, Britain’s referendum vote to leave the European Union, and
the growing support for right-wing populist parties across various European
countries.
Public debates and policy-making on migration and integration are often
ill-informed and based on myths, rather than facts. The common lack of
evidence in debates and policy-making is frequently lamented, but not partic-
ularly surprising. Personal beliefs and public opinion onmigrants and refugees
can clearly be shaped by a range of different factors that have little or nothing
to do with facts, data, and evidence, such as the frequency of actual contact
withmigrants, perceived competition and threats from immigration, education,
age, and the media (e.g. OECD 2010; Blinder 2011). Similarly, policy-making
on migration can be influenced by a range of interests, institutions, and ideas
which may or may not be based on realities of the scale, processes, causes, and
effects of migration (e.g. Boswell et al. 2011; Hampshire 2013). Third, while
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advances in measurement and research have generated important insights
about migration and integration, there are important limits to the existing
data and analyses. The available ‘evidence base’ is characterized by consi-
derable gaps and mixed results around key migration issues (such as the
impact of immigration on diversity and solidarity among residents of the
host country—see, e.g., Demireva 2015). All this means that there are many
reasons why facts, data, and research may—and, in practice, often do—play
a relatively minor role in public debates and policy-making on migration
and integration.
The disconnect between migration policy debates and migration realities
has encouraged many people, including policy-makers in many countries, to
advocate more ‘evidence-based’ debates and policy-making. This approach
stresses the need for ‘rational’ and ‘depoliticized’ migration and integration
policies that are based on data and knowledge, rather than on anecdotes, fears,
and misperceptions about migration and integration. A wide range of initia-
tives have been launched in different countries, including ‘independent
expert committees’ that provide policy advice and recommendations to gov-
ernments (see, e.g., Martin and Ruhs 2011) and ‘fact-checkers’—that is, indi-
viduals or organizations that check the factual accuracy of, for example, media
reports and/or politicians’ speeches on migration and integration (see, e.g.,
Graves and Cherubini 2016). While the impacts and effectiveness of these
initiatives have varied, it is clear that, since the turn of the millennium, their
presence has grown in many countries. Until recently, it seemed, at least
superficially, that a desire for more evidence-based policy-making had become
the norm in many countries.
Recent political events and developments have complicated this picture—
for example, the sense of ‘crisis’ in many European countries sparked by
the inflows of refugees and other migrants since 2015, the UK’s referendum
vote to exit the European Union, and the election of Donald Trump as US
President. Many populist parties that have grown in strength across Europe in
recent years have been openly critical of the roles of evidence and ‘experts’,
who are often portrayed as representing elite views rather than the interests of
‘the people’ (see Boswell 2018). In the UK, high-profile figures of the campaign
to leave the European Union (‘Vote Leave’) explicitly rejected the usefulness of
‘experts’ in public policy debates and policy-making. In early June 2016,
Michael Gove, a Conservative Cabinet Minister at the time, declared that
‘people in this country have had enough of experts’ and Gisela Stuart, a
Labour MP and Vote Leave campaigner, argued that ‘there is only one expert
that matters, and that’s you, the voter’.1 At the same time, the rise of Donald
Trump in the United States was accompanied by an apparent increase of a
similar scepticism about the role, motivations, and usefulness of so-called
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‘experts’ in public debates and policy-making. The Economist called Trump a
‘leading exponent of “post-truth” politics—a reliance on assertions that “feel
true” but have no basis in fact’.2While scepticism about the role of research and
experts in public policy-making is not new, proponents of the idea of a general
shift towards ‘post-truth politics’ suggest that the status of ‘facts’ in public
debates and policy-making processes has been fundamentally transformed in
the twenty-first century. Davies (2016) suggests that, as politics has become
more adversarial and the number of providers of ‘facts’—a contested notion
and concept—has expanded rapidly, ‘rather than sit coolly outside the fray of
political argument, facts are now one of the main rhetorical weapons within it’.
Both ideas—‘evidence-based policy-making’ and ‘post-truth politics’—are,
to a considerable extent, caricatures of much more nuanced and messy real-
ities of what are typically highly politicized processes of (de)linking data/
research, public debates, and policy-making. Evidence-based arguments and
approaches to policy-making are never free of subjective decisions and nor-
mative judgements about, for example, what exactly constitutes ‘evidence’
(and who decides on that issue), how to separate ‘reliable’ from ‘unreliable’
data and analysis, what to do about processes and effects that are hard or
impossible to measure and so on. At the same time, while there are clearly
many recent (and older) examples of public policy debates and policy-making
processes in different countries that pay little or no attention to facts and
evidence, the much-hyped shift to an ‘age of post-truth politics’ is clearly not
inevitable, ubiquitous, or necessarily permanent. Perhaps more than ever
before, there is a need to study and understand how and why data, facts,
and research affect—or do not affect—public debates and policy-making in
different countries and contexts. This clearly (and obviously) requires consid-
eration of how data and research relate to the politics of public policies and to
the characteristics of processes of policy-making and implementation, all of
which can, and often do, vary across countries and over time.
Aims and Contributions of this Book
This book explores the interplay between social science research, public
debates, and policy-making in the area of international migration and inte-
gration. It has three core aims. First, the book seeks to contribute to the
conceptualization and theorization of the potential relationships between
research, public debates, and policy-making on migration and integration
(Part I of the book, comprising Chapters 2–4). In doing so, it explicitly builds
on existing research in this field, including the rapidly growing number of
studies that investigate the links between social science research and public
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policy in general (e.g. Bastow et al. 2014), as well as the smaller number of
analyses that focus on the research–policy nexus in the specific fields of
migration (e.g. Boswell 2012) and integration (e.g. Scholten et al. 2015).
A second aim of the book is critically to discuss and identify the reasons for
the failure or success of a range of initiatives aimed at using research to inform
public debates and/or policy-making on migration and integration, both
within national contexts and at supra-national levels of governance. In Part II
of the book (Chapters 5–10), senior scholars and researchers with extensive
experience of engaging in public debates and policy-making provide critical
reflections on efforts to use research to inform migration/integration debates
and policy-making in different national contexts. These reflections and ass-
essments cover ‘impact-oriented’ research projects and initiatives aimed at
informing national debates and policy-making in the UK, the Netherlands,
Norway, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. Part III of the book
(Chapters 11–14) then focuses on research and analysis aimed at informing
migration debates and policies across countries and/or at supra-national levels
of governance. This includes critical reflections on the role and use of research
and researchers in EU policy-making; the experiences of the long-standing
‘Metropolis’ project, which aims to bridge migration research and policy in
different countries; and the contributions of researchers and ‘experts’ to global
governance processes relevant to international migration.
A third core goal of the book is to identify effective strategies and institu-
tional designs for linking research to public debates and policy-making on
migration and integration in different national and institutional contexts.
Part IV (Chapter 15) provides a synthesis and critical discussion of the impli-
cations of the research in this book for how to think about, manage, and
strengthen the links between research, public debates, and policy. One focus
of the discussion will be on whether and how the nature of these interrela-
tionships varies across countries and issue areas, and the implications for the
‘transferability’ of particular approaches across borders and institutional set-
tings. While the specificity of the case studies does not allow for a systematic
cross-country analysis, the different chapters provide a rich and diverse col-
lection of case studies that clearly highlight the importance of paying atten-
tion to cross-country differences in the politics and institutions that mediate
the interrelationships between research, public debates, and policy-making on
migration and integration.
Overall, Bridging the Gaps contributes to existing research and knowledge
in at least two ways. First, the theoretical and empirical analyses in the book
go beyond the focus on the two-way relationship between research and
policy-making explored by most existing studies. This is achieved by concep-
tualizing and analysing triangular interrelationships between data/research,
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public (includingmedia) debates, and policy-making processes, set in the broader
context of the politics of public policies. The book thus inserts ‘public
debates’, including the role of the media, into the theoretical and empirical
analysis.
A second key feature and contribution of this book is that, rather than
aiming for comprehensive ‘impact assessments’ of particular initiatives, the
authors of the various ‘case studies’ in Parts II and III of the book provide
reflections and insights that are strongly based on their personal professional
experiences with informing migration and integration policy debates and
policy-making processes. The case studies are not meant to be attempts to
provide systematic impact evaluations. Instead, they constitute a diverse set of
structured explorations of successes and failures (including determinants and
policy lessons) of initiatives aimed at linking research to public debates and
policy-making onmigration and integration across different national contexts
and levels of governance.
Analytical Framework
All the chapters of the book are written within a common basic analytical
framework. The framework is intentionally broad and rudimentary. Its key
purpose is modest but important: to provide a common point of reference for
analysis that the individual chapters elaborate, illustrate, and develop further
















Figure 1.1 Triangular relationships between research, public debate, and policies
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We suggest that it is helpful to consider triangular relationships between
research, public debates, and policies. Figure 1.1 is meant to illustrate the
inter-dependencies and potential two-way causalities between the key vari-
ables of interest to this project (keeping in mind that there are, of course,
many other factors that are related to and have an impact on public debates
and policy-making).
We use the term ‘research’ as shorthand for concepts and theories, data, and
empirical findings, as well as ideas and perspectives. So, our approach to
conceptualizing and studying research is fairly broad and covers a range of
different types of knowledge. Since we are also interested in how different
forms of knowledge travel between country contexts, this broad approach is of
strategic importance. ‘Public debates’ is broadly understood, too. It specifically
includes public attitudes and media reporting on migrants and refugees, as
well as the arguments made by various public and civil society organizations.
Some of these components, such as media and public opinion, are likely to be
correlated in important ways. Finally, our understanding of ‘policies’ relates
not only to policy outputs (such as the formulation of new immigration laws
and policies), but also to the emergence of policy questions and the charac-
teristics of policy processes.
A first basic point to make about this conceptualization is that research,
public debates and policies can all influence each other. This means that any
assessment of the role of research in debates and policy-making processes
must consider the existence and potential implications of two-way causalities;
for example, whether and how the focus of research questions and the types of
data collected were affected by politics, policies, and public debates.
Second, researchers can influence public debate and policy-making by pro-
ducing research, and/or by providing ‘expert’ commentary in public debates
(e.g. through commenting on migration issues in the media) and ‘expert
advice’ to policy-making processes (e.g. as short-term advisors or longer-term
‘seconded experts’). Expert commentary and advice does not necessarily
require the production of new research. The relative influence exerted by
these two types of activities (production of new research and expert commen-
tary/advice) on debate and policy—and the relationships between them—can
be expected to vary across countries and institutional settings. Who qualifies
as an ‘expert’ and what exactly constitutes ‘evidence’ can also be specific to
place and time.
Third, Figure 1.1 makes clear that research can impact policy-making dir-
ectly and/or indirectly through public debate (especially public opinion,
media reporting, and civil society organizations). Public opinion is often—
but not always—an important factor in the development of new migration
and integration policies. In some cases, policy-makers consider public
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attitudes as a hard constraint on what they consider to be feasible policy
options. In other cases, policy-makers propose, defend, and sometimes imple-
ment new policies that are not completely in line with current public atti-
tudes. As migration and integration have become major politicized issue
areas, ministers or whole governments can be out of office if they do not
take account of public attitudes and balance their policies or policy state-
ments in an appropriate way. Evidence—including how it is presented and
contextualized—can play an important role in this process as policy-makers
can, and often do, ignore or use research selectively to strengthen their
arguments and justify their policy choices in public debates.
The media can correct or reinforce individuals’ misperceptions and stereo-
types about migrants and refugees. While the relationship between public
opinion and the media (e.g. in terms of who influences whom and to what
extent) is an open empirical issue that can be expected to vary across countries
and national media cultures, it is clear that research can potentially influence
both. While research can produce different and conflicting results depending
on the scientific discipline, methods, and/or data used, evidence and facts
have the potential to correct public misperceptions and shift public attitudes,
at least to some extent (keeping in mind that facts are not the only driver of
public attitudes to immigration and integration, often being of quite marginal
relevance). Similarly, researchers can become an important resource for civil
society organizations and journalists concerned with migration/integration—
although one clearly cannot assume that all media outlets are interested in
publishing evidence-based reports rather than, for example, articles that are in
line with their readers’ views.
Fourth, whether and how research affects policy-making and public debates
will always be critically influenced by institutions, interests, and the broader
politics of immigration, integration, and related policy areas (such as educa-
tion, labour markets, welfare states, and so on). There can be important
interactions between research and other policy determinants, such as the
economic interests of employers and the political orientation of the govern-
ment in power. Christina Boswell’s book The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge
(2012) shows that, in addition to playing an instrumental role in policy-
making, research can have important political functions which are often
more symbolic than instrumental.
The potential interrelationships between research, debate, and policy, and
the likely interactions with other policy determinants, can make it difficult to
isolate and assess the effects of research onmigration and integration policies.
The rapidly growing research literature on how to measure the wider societal
‘impact’ of social science research makes clear just how difficult this can be in
practice (see, e.g., Bastow et al. 2014).
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Outline of the Book
Part I: Concepts and Theories
The book begins with three chapters that provide theoretical analyses of
different parts of the three-way relationships between research, public
debates, and policy-making on migration and integration. Chapter 2, by
Christina Boswell, focuses on the relationships between research, experts,
and the politics of migration. Boswell’s starting point is that research and
expert knowledge can have different uses in immigration politics and policy-
making. It can play an instrumental role (i.e. it can help with the development
of policies to achieve certain outcomes, or to address perceived policy prob-
lems), perform a substantiating function (i.e. it can act as a resource for lending
credibility to particular preferences or claims), or be valued as a source of
legitimacy to the organizations taking policy decisions (i.e. research and expert
knowledge can help signal authority and competence of the decision-maker).
The chapter then identifies three sets of conditions that, Boswell argues,
influence the extent to which research is used and for what purpose, and
that can help explain cross-national variations and fluctuations over time in
patterns of knowledge utilization on immigration policy. These conditions
include the level of contestation and political salience over the issue, the
‘mode of settlement’ (democratic or technocratic) that is seen as appropri-
ate in political deliberation, and the mode through which policy-makers
derive legitimacy (whether through symbolic gestures or through outcomes).
The chapter goes on to explore how this theoretical approach and analysis
can help make sense of the current scepticism about expertise in debates
on immigration.
Chapter 3, by Han Entzinger and Peter Scholten, analyses the relation-
ship between research and policy-making on integration. Drawing on a large,
cross-country, empirical research project conducted during 2011–2014 (see
Scholten et al. 2015), the chapter considers how research and policy-making
in the field of migrant integration have developed over time, and how their
relationship functions under the present conditions of strong politicization of
the issue in Europe. Entzinger and Scholten propose a theoretical framework
that distinguishes between three aspects of research–policy dialogues in the
domain of immigrant integration: dialogue structures (including the formal and
informal arrangements created for the exchange and communication of
knowledge and research); knowledge utilization (i.e. the cultures and practices
of knowledge utilization in policy processes); and, taking the perspective of
researchers, knowledge production. The chapter then considers—first theoret-
ically and then empirically drawing on the results of Scholten et al. (2015)—
how the increasing politization of the issue of integration in Europe can affect
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the various dimensions of research–policy dialogues in different countries.
One of the findings from the empirical analysis is that increasing politization
of integration has been associated with more symbolic forms of knowledge
utilization (i.e. a rise in the substantiating and legitimizing functions of know-
ledge, to use the concepts developed by Boswell in Chapter 2). Another devel-
opment has been a gradual broadening of research–policy dialogues to
what Entzinger and Scholten call ‘science–society dialogue’, a term that is
meant to reflect a diversification of methods of mutual influencing to include
various forms of public debates. The chapter thus makes clear the need for
moving theoretical and empirical analyses beyond the relationships between
research and policy to include various forms of public debates, including
the role of the media. Entzinger and Scholten argue that the media can
play an important and effective role when the gap between researchers and
policy-makers widens.
Chapter 4, by William Allen, Scott Blinder. and Robert McNeil, then
focuses on the relationships between research and public debates with a
focus on public perceptions and the media. One of the chapter’s key mes-
sages is that we need to be highly critical of what the authors call a ‘naive
model of research impact’ that focuses only on the ways in which research
and data can flow into and affect public debates, whether through direct
engagement between researchers and publics, or through mediated chan-
nels. The chapter explains why and how the relationship between research
evidence and public debate is not only uncertain, but also bi-directional, in
the sense that media and public discussions affect research as well as being
affected by it. For example, engagement with media and other users of
research can shape the kinds of questions researchers ask in the first place.
The chapter makes a similar point about the relationships between media
and public perceptions. While media can affect how and what people think
about migration and integration, the causality can also run the other way,
as public perceptions and popular opinion can sometimes influence what
kinds of media content are produced. The chapter authors argue that, in
market-driven media systems typical of Anglo-American democracies, media
organizations can be understood as creating ‘products’ that they try to sell
to audiences, which requires an understanding of who their audiences are,
what they think, and what kinds of stories will motivate customers to access
their ‘products’. The authors thus argue that effective communication of
research for public impact involves much more than presenting facts and
figures. Instead, it requires awareness of both the conditions and the con-
texts in which researchers supply information, as well as the ways that
media and members of the public generate demand for certain kinds of
research or data.
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Part II: National Experiences
Following the largely conceptual and theoretical discussion in Part I, the five
chapters of Part II provide critical reflections on experiences with different
efforts and strategies to use research to inform migration/integration debates
and policy-making in different national contexts. Chapter 5, written byMartin
Ruhs, discusses the experiences of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)
and the Migration Observatory (MigObs) in providing independent analysis
to inform immigration debates and policy-making in the UK. The MAC was
established by the UK government in 2007 and MigObs was launched by the
University of Oxford in 2009 as an ‘impact project’ to inform public and
media debates. Ruhs provides critical reflections and personal assessments
based on his role as one of five members of the MAC during 2007–2014 and
as the first Director of MigObs during 2009–2012. He shows how the specific
institutional design of an impact initiative such as MigObs, or of an expert
advisory body such as the MAC, has important implications for its credibility,
political acceptability and, thus, long-term impacts on debates and policy-
making. The chapter argues that it is important to recognize and emphasize, as
MAC andMigObs have done in the UK, that it is neither feasible nor desirable
to ‘take the politics out’ of migration debates and policies. Policy-makers
sometimes present and justify expert advisory bodies in terms of their alleged
function of ‘de-politicizing’ migration debates and policy decisions. Ruhs
argues that this impression should be avoided and resisted by the experts
involved whenever possible. Ultimately, all policy decisions are inherently
normative, in the sense that a decision needs to bemade about whose interests
to prioritize and how to evaluate the inevitable trade-offs. Experts can advise
and suggest policy options but they cannot, and should not, identify the one
‘optimal’ policy solution that, for most questions, does not exist.
Chapter 6, by Monique Kremer, reflects on the public reception and con-
troversies surrounding the publication of Identificatie met Nederland (Identifi-
cation with the Netherlands), a major report by the independent Netherlands
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). In the report, the WRR
advised against an immigrant integration policy that promotes ‘the [Dutch]
national identity’ in favour of a strategy focusing on processes of identifica-
tion in education, in the labour market and in the community. This message
incensed many people, including politicians, scientists, and royalists. The
chapter uses the case of how this report was received to discuss more broadly
how scientifically informed policy advice is made in the context of a rapidly
changing relationship between science, policy, and politics, characterized by
the growing significance of public opinion. Kremer considers how social
scientists can better advise policy-makers in this new reality. She argues that
scientifically informed policy advice needs to go beyond the simple model of
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‘speaking truth to power’, and requires much greater collaboration and stake-
holder involvement than in the past. The chapter suggests that, if social
science has less authority and credibility than it once had and politicians
can ‘shop around for convenient truths’, researchers and academics cannot
always operate on their own to advise government. Consequently, ‘know-
ledge coalitions’ have become increasingly important. Kremer suggests that,
partly as a consequence of the experience with the ‘Identification with the
Netherlands’ report, different stakeholders are now more likely to be drawn
into the process of producing WRR reports, including a variety of academics
(including critics of the WRR), policy-makers, and civil society organizations
such as employers’ associations and trade unions. She argues that the WRR
has increasingly taken on the role of an ‘honest broker’ in the process of
production and exchange of knowledge and research for policy-debates and
policy-making.
Chapter 7, authored by Grete Brochmann, focuses on the role of research in
policy debates about immigration and the sustainability of the welfare state in
Norway. The contribution of experts to policy-making processes in Norway
was formalized in 1972 through the establishment of the Norwegian Official
Commissions (Norges offentlige utredninger—NOU). The Official Commissions
have been important in policy-making in Norway, playing a significant role in
the ‘consensual Norwegian governance’. The chapter draws on the author’s
experience with two specific commissions, which Brochmann chaired, on the
relationship between international migration and the sustainability of the
Norwegian welfare state. Brochmann argues that, while these commissions
did have some impact on actual policy changes, they had fundamental effects
on public discourse. In the early 2000s, immigration became one of the most
emotionally charged issues in public debates in Norway. Public discourse
became quite polarized, first with regard to issues related to refugees and
then, following EU enlargement in 2004, also with regard to the free move-
ment of EU workers. The chapter discusses how the first of the two commis-
sions analysed played an important role in promoting public understanding
of the diversity of immigrants in Norway, thus reducing existing stereotypes
and prejudices among the population at the time. According to Brochmann,
the first Commission also played a key role in moving public discourse in the
direction of accepting more open discussions of the impact of immigration on
the welfare state, thus also encouraging more conscious policy-making in the
field of immigrant integration. The second, more recent Commission was
established in the wake of the large inflows of refugees and migrants into
Europe in 2015. The Commission recommended an institutional approach to
integration and cultural adaptation, emphasizing the importance of long-
term processes of inclusion and socialization through the educational system
and the labour market. While it is too early to assess its policy impacts,
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Brochmann suggests that the public reception of the Commission report so far
reflects a general trend toward a situation where policy-making based on
research and facts has become almost common sense in Norway in the field
of immigrant integration.
Chapter 8, written by Klaus Zimmermann, discusses Germany’s evolving
migration policy challenges and developments from the perspective of a
scientific observer and academic policy advisor over a period of several dec-
ades. It reviews the major migration policy debates in Germany since World
War II to discuss the difficulties encountered by researchers when trying to
convey key research messages and findings to society and politics. The core
policy issues discussed in this chapter include accepting the status of Germany
as an immigration country, the creation of an immigration law for admitting
skilled migrants based on Schröder’s ‘Green Card’, the debate about transi-
tional employment restrictions on workers from the new EUmember states in
the context of EU Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the fight against
misperceptions about ‘welfare migration’, the debate about the need for
internal labour mobility in Europe, the challenge of openness to high-skilled
labour migration to Germany, and the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. Zimmermann
explains why, in his experience, the media are the most important channel
for policy advice. He argues that a fundamental problem with traditional
media is that they are committed to balanced reporting which, he argues,
can lead to a bias against mainstream scientific findings, as the importance
given to minority findings within the research literature is too great. The
chapter emphasizes the importance of promoting successful migrant role
models as one of the key tools for influencing public debates and policy-
making on migration and integration in Germany.
Chapter 9, by Kristof Tamas, discusses the Swedish experience with
government-funded committees to discuss critically the potential opportunities,
benefits, and pitfalls when attempting to bridge the gap between research
and policy-making. The chapter reviews the Swedish committee system, in
general, and the functioning of migration and integration committees work-
ing in the 1970s through to the 1990s, in particular. It provides a detailed
discussion of a specific case of a committee—the Integration Policy Power
Commission set up in 2000 to investigate integration, including discrimin-
ation issues, in Sweden—where this form of research became heavily politi-
cized and led to a major public controversy. Tamas compares the experiences
of government committees with those of two other types of research–policy
interactions: think tanks—which receive funding from, for example, the pri-
vate sector or various interest groups, but which might nevertheless be selec-
tively interpreted and politicized by various political interest groups; and
a more independent form of government-funded committee without direct
political involvement—such as the Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi).
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Tamas concludes that politics-based evidence can easily undermine the legit-
imacy of policy-making. This is why, Tamas argues, there is a need for more
transparency in the committee system when formulating the terms of refer-
ence and selecting the researchers tasked with an enquiry. Committees need
to operate at a measured distance from the government, permitted to be both
critical and supportive of government policies.
Chapter 10, authored by Philip Martin, focuses on the United States. The
chapter discusses examples of government-funded efforts to develop consen-
sus among researchers on the number and impacts of migrants in the United
States, including the Bi-National Commission on Mexico–US Migration and
National Academy of Sciences studies released in 1997 and 2016. Martin
argues that the US experience demonstrates that, even when researchers
achieve consensus on the socio-economic impacts of migrants, the results
can be interpreted very differently by what Martin calls admissionists (who
favour more immigration and the legalization of unauthorized foreigners)
and restrictionists (who oppose amnesty and want to reduce immigration).
The chapter suggests that the overall effect of economic research on policy-
making in the United States has been muted because migration’s major
economic effects are (re)distributional, with migrants and owners of capital
the major winners. Martin argues that admissionists generally stress the
positive net effects of migration for individual migrants, the minimal costs
to US workers and other benefits of immigration ranging from preserving
industries to repopulating cities and increasing diversity. In contrast, restric-
tionists highlight migration as a key reason, along with technology and
trade, for depressing wages and hurting low-skilled Americans, increasing
inequality, and reducing social trust. The chapter argues that, as the numbers
of migrants have risen, the debate over migration policy has become increas-
ingly dominated by the most extreme admissionists and restrictionists.
According to Martin, researchers are also tugged towards these ‘no borders’
and ‘no migrants’ extremes by the funders who support and publicize their
work. Martin argues that migration research risks joining other issues where
links between funders and researchers make research findings suspect, redu-
cing the credibility of experts and research in a wide range of fields.
Part III: International Experiences
Having discussed the links between research, public debates, and policy-
making in different national contexts in Part II of the book, Part III shifts
the analytical focus to research aimed at informing migration debates and
policies across countries and/or at regional, supra-national levels of govern-
ance. Chapter 11, written by Elizabeth Collett, provides a critical discussion of
the role of evidence in EU policy developments. It reviews the formal and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/1/2019, SPi
Linkages Between Research, Public Debates, and Policies
13
informal modes of research–policy interactions at EU level that have devel-
oped since the late 2000s, and assesses the relative merits of each. The chapter
concentrates particularly on the events of 2015–2018—including the so-called
‘refugee crisis’—to reflect on how the relationships between data, research,
and policy are changing, and what lessons might be learned for European
policy-makers and researchers. Collett sees a strong correlation between how
far EU institutions are actively seeking to engage with external expertise, and
how far that expertise can then influence its own policy work. She suggests
that proximity to policy-makers (how far experts are embedded in policy-
making networks at EU or national level), reputation (the canon of expertise
that researchers bring to the table), and familiarity (whether the research
framing fits within the pre-existing views of policy-makers) are all factors
affecting influence. The chapter also identifies an important paradox: policy-
makers are, according to Collett, ready to hear from civil society and academic
actors who can offer a first-hand account of policy effects, or raise issues that
otherwise do not reach Brussels. At the same time, however, access to EU
policy-makers is greatly advanced by regular presence in the policy-making
environment, whether in Brussels or in a national capital. Researchers who are
undertaking new fieldwork tend to have limited access to the policy-making
environment. Thus, Collett argues, as the scope of EU interest in migration
broadens to non-EU countries and the implementation of EU policy at local
level, the gap between knowledge production and access to EU policy-makers
is likely to broaden. The chapter thus suggests that the role of effective
interlocutors who can distil information and draw relevant policy conclusions
from the latest research has become ever more important.
To inform and help develop its externalmigration policies, the EUhas funded
a wide range of different research projects and cooperations. Chapter 12, by
Agnieszka Weinar, discusses the experiences of one of these EU-funded pro-
jects and ‘knowledge-brokers’: the Consortium for Applied Research on
International Migration (CARIM) Observatories at the European University
Institute (EUI), funded by the European Commission between 2004 and 2013.
The Observatories were given the task of building a knowledge base on migra-
tion in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods of the EU, and also in India.
The chapter focuses mainly on the case of the CARIM-South and CARIM-East
Observatories. It provides a critical analysis of the experiences of these two
projects, to identify key insights and lessons for consideration regarding the
relationship between research and policy-making in cross-country settings.
Weinar discusses the Observatories in the wider context of EU policy devel-
opments and reflects on the challenges of collaborative research in a complex
international environment. She reflects on the various risks that can hamper
such cross-country collaborations, including the language of knowledge pro-
duction and variations in research culture. The key challenge, according to
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Weinar, is how to create and sustain a genuine partnership in collaborative
research and research–policy communications that includes and effectively
engages academics from different academic cultures, policy-makers from dif-
ferent institutional settings, and actors from other sectors that bring their own
perspectives. She argues that effective partnerships rely on the acknowledge-
ment of diversity, understood as linguistic, cultural, and institutional diversity
that impacts on research goals, its execution, and on the policy–research
dialogue. Echoing some of the arguments made by Elizabeth Collett in
Chapter 11, Weinar suggests that collaborative research in such a context
requires a team of knowledge translators (or brokers) that have the trust of
the policy-makers and the researchers from the countries where the data
collection and research is taking place.
Chapter 13, written by Howard Duncan, provides critical reflections on
the experiences of the Metropolis project, including Metropolis Canada
and Metropolis International. Founded in 1995 and part-funded by the
Canadian government, the aim of Metropolis has been to ‘enhance policy
through research’ by making connections between and within academic
disciplines, government ministries, and civil society organizations. The chap-
ter first discusses the workings of the Metropolis Project in Canada, with
its university-based Centres of Excellence and a broad partnership of agencies
of government at all levels and civil society organizations across the country,
followed by an account of how it has worked—and continues to work—
internationally. Duncan reviews the reasons for the various successes of
Metropolis and identifies key challenges that remain. He argues, for example,
that the academic reward structure that favours publication in academic
journals and rarely recognizes work in support of policy has been a significant
barrier discouraging participation of some researchers, especially early-career
scholars. He also argues that academics working from a critical theory perspec-
tive remain largely ignored by the policy world, but those engaged in empir-
ical and statistical studies often find a much more receptive policy audience.
At the same time, Duncan argues, governments can be conservative in their
range of interests and slow to embrace new fields developed by the research
community. The chapter also discusses the challenges Metropolis has encoun-
tered when trying to reach countries in the Global South. Duncan suggests
that this is partly because the relation between migration and cities—a long-
standing focus area for Metropolis—is quite different in the North than it is
in the South. The agenda of most Metropolis discussions has primarily tended
to reflect the interests of the countries of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and those are the interests of des-
tination societies: integration and social cohesion, economic effects, demo-
graphic trends, smuggling and trafficking, and managing undocumented
migration.
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Chapter 14, written by Katy Long, discusses the role that both research
and researchers have played in (re)forming the global governance of inter-
national migration, with a special focus on refugees. The chapter considers
the motivations for researchers engaging in global governance reform, surveys
the historical role of research in defining policy and considers some of the
problems faced by researchers working in this area today. Long argues
that, while research has played a vital role in identifying and systematizing the
weaknesses within migration’s global governance systems, research has
an extremely limited ability to shape or effect reform directly, except where
it fits with pre-determined political agendas. She suggests that researchers often
play an important role in conferring legitimacy on processes of migration
reform, as global governance ‘experts’. But Long questions whether this type
of engagement has much impact in shaping global agendas, rather than simply
legitimizing existing political platforms. There is a clear risk, Long argues, that
the experts who are invited to the table are those whose conclusions best fit the
policy preferences of key policy-makers and stakeholders. Long argues for ‘fewer
experts andmore research’, precisely because the latter does not offer any ‘quick
fixes’ to what are typically very difficult and complex policy challenges. The
chaptermakes the case for research that is policy-relevant without being policy-
driven, calling for more innovative collaborations between researchers and
policy-makers where researchers play an active role in helping design and in
building policy projects. Critically, Long argues that for researchers to become
policy innovators, new policy ideas must be given room for failure, which
requires amajor change in the waymany researchers, policy-makers, and policy
reviewers think about and evaluate new policy initiatives.
Part IV: Conclusions, Lessons Learnt, and the Way Forward
Chapter 15 concludes the book by identifying key insights and lessons that
can be learnt from the diversity of national and international level experi-
ences with efforts to link research to public debates and policy-making on
migration and integration. The conclusion returns to the conceptual frame-
work outlined in this introduction—focusing on three-way relationships
between research, public debates, and policy-making—and highlights what
we have learnt about these relationships from the different types of analyses
in this book. It includes a number of recommendations for researchers,
policy practitioners, and other participants in public debates (such as
journalists) that are aimed at strengthening the links between them. The
concluding chapter argues that, when the different actors contributing to
research, public debates, and policy-making understand and appreciate each
other’s constraints, such common understandings can pave the way for
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improved policy-making processes and better public policies that deal more
effectively with the real challenges of migration and integration.
Notes
1. See Deacon 2016, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/10/michael-goves-guide-to-
britains-greatest-enemy-the-experts/
2. See The Economist 2016, www.economist.com/leaders/2016/09/10/art-of-the-lie
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It has frequently been observed that immigration politics and policy-making
are far from ‘evidence-based’ (Florence et al. 2005; Boswell 2009a; Caponio
et al. 2010; Jørgensen 2011; Scholten et al. 2016). In many areas of policy—
ranging from asylum and refugee policy, through to immigration control
and enforcement, and immigrant integration—policies often appear to be
based on somewhat simplistic, or even populist, assumptions about migration
dynamics. Public political debates on immigration tend to be even less
informed by expert knowledge or research, with an apparently widening gap
between evidence about the dynamics and impacts of immigration, and
media and political claims (Boswell 2009b; Balch and Balabanova 2011;
Boswell et al. 2011; Caponio et al. 2014). Thus, while there has been huge
growth in the field of migration studies since the turn of the millennium,
public political debate and policies appear to be largely reactive and short-
termist, often running counter to broader economic and social goals.
A classic explanation for this lack of take-up of research locates the problem
in the dynamics of politics. Politicians do not base their claims on ‘evidence’
about the effects of immigration, as this is not a vote winner. Immigration is a
famously emotive issue and, as we have seen recently with the surge in
support for populist movements in many democracies, the most compelling
narratives are not based on technocratic arguments about economic costs,
skills shortages, or demographic trends. Instead, they are informed by more
visceral concerns about identity, belonging, fairness, and entitlement (Sides
and Citrin 2007; Brader et al. 2008).
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However, this dismissal of the relevance of research is made too quickly. For
a start, research and expertise are often invoked in public debates about
immigration, and most ministries dealing with immigration have their own
research unit or department. Governments and international organizations
have spent substantial sums of money commissioning research on immigra-
tion, and constantly reaffirm the necessity of filling information gaps about
the causes, dynamics, and effects of migration (Boswell 2009a). Moreover, the
politicization of migration is not necessarily correlated with a decline in
interest in research. Indeed, research is often mobilized as part of political
contestation; and research findings themselves can become the object of
controversy (Boswell 2009b; Caponio et al. 2014; Scholten et al. 2016). Thus,
expertise and research are far from irrelevant to immigration policy-making
and political debate; the relationship between expert knowledge and policy in
this field is considerably more complex.
In my research on the political uses of knowledge, I have shown how
research is highly valued by politicians and public officials involved in
policy-making. It is far from irrelevant to the politics of migration.1 However,
we need to be more clear-sighted about how we understand its relevance.
Research is not valued exclusively—or even predominantly—for its role in
‘problem-solving’. It is not simply invoked tomake adjustments to policy with
the aim of achieving particular outcomes, as most accounts would hold.
Indeed, this ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘problem-solving’ account offers an overly
simplistic view of the value of expert knowledge. I have shown, instead, how
research can have an important symbolic function.
In my work on the use of research in immigration policy (Boswell 2009a),
I distinguish between two such symbolic functions. First, expert knowledge
may be seen as a resource for lending credibility to particular preferences or
claims—what I term the ‘substantiating’ function of knowledge. Politicians
and officials may be keen to invoke particular research findings to bolster their
arguments—a form of research as ‘ammunition’ (Weiss 1979). Theymay do so
through commissioning research from their own research department or from
an external source, through drawing on existing independent research, or
through setting up an expert committee or commission to produce research.
Second, expert knowledge may be valued due to its providing a source of
legitimacy to the organizations taking decisions—what I call the ‘legitimizing’
function of knowledge. In this second case, knowledge provides a signal
that the actor in question—whether an individual, a committee, or an
organization—is competent to make well-founded decisions, as they possess
epistemic authority (Herbst 2003). Policy actors may signal this authority
through hosting their own research unit, or establishing mechanisms to
draw on external expertise—for example, in the form of a research network,
expert group, or scientific advisor.Whatmatters in this case is not somuch the
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ability to invoke particular findings but, rather, the fact that policy-makers are
in a position to mobilize and deploy authoritative research, implying that
their decisions are sound.
When we seek to understand the role of research in immigration politics
and policy-making, we need to bear this three-way distinction in mind: is
research valued for its instrumental, substantiating, or legitimizing function?
Each of the three different uses of knowledge is associated with somewhat
different conditions. In the discussion that follows, I shall explore three sets of
conditions that influence the extent to which research is used and for what
purpose. These three conditions are:
 the level of contestation and political salience over the issue;
 the ‘mode of settlement’ (democratic or technocratic) that is seen as
appropriate in political deliberation; and
 the mode through which policy-makers derive legitimacy (whether
through symbolic gestures, or through outcomes).
I suggest that these factors help explain cross-national variations in patterns of
knowledge utilization on immigration policy, as well as fluctuation over time
and across sub-areas of immigration policy. The chapter goes on to explore
how this account can help make sense of the current scepticism about expert-
ise in debates on immigration.
Understanding the Political Uses of Expert Knowledge
Expert Knowledge and Political Contestation
A number of studies on the use of research in immigration policy have shown
how political salience and political contestation can influence the extent and
nature of knowledge utilization (Scholten et al. 2016). Here, political salience
refers to the level of attention devoted to the issue in political debate (as
measured by, for example, mass media coverage and political claims-making),
as well as the importance of the issue for voters. Political contestation implies
the existence of conflict over the nature of policy problems, or how best to
address them through state interventions. Where both conditions are
present—where an issue is seen as important to the public and is the object
of competing policy claims—then we would expect political actors to be keen
to mobilize resources to bolster their rival claims.
Expert knowledge is frequently one of the resources invoked by those
engaged in political debate. Protagonists may be keen to deploy research
findings and expert knowledge to bolster their claims. Such expert knowledge
often takes the form of quantitative data, such as statistics on levels of
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immigration, estimates of the economic impact of migration, or projections of
future migration flows. Quantitative data are often favoured due to their
presumed authority: they convey objectivity, precision, and rigour, and such
data are compact and portable across contexts (Espeland and Stevens 2008).
Such research utilization can be characterized as ‘substantiating’ research.
Research findings or statistics are selectively deployed to underpin claims or
preferences that are contested. Thus, political salience and a high level of
contestation are likely to generate a strong demand for substantiating know-
ledge, providing political actors with resources to support their pre-given
preferences.
This form of substantiating research use can also be identified in more
technocratic policy-making settings. Civil servants may draw on research
findings to reinforce the case for pursuing a particular policy, or adopting a
preferred programme. Again, this is more likely to be the case where the issue
is seen as politically significant, but where the preferred course of action is
contested. Knowledge may be deployed in this way in wrangles between
departments or ministries, or in attempts to justify particular approaches or
spending decisions to the core executive.
Modes of Settlement
There is a second important condition that influences modes of knowledge
utilization in political debate and policy-making: the ‘mode of settlement’
that is seen as appropriate for adjudicating between claims. By this, I mean the
sorts of claim that are considered legitimate or authoritative in weighing up
the desirability of different policy options. We can distinguish between two
main modes of settlement. The first comprises what can be termed ‘demo-
cratic’ modes of settlement: a procedure through which contestation is legit-
imately resolved by deferring to the interests or preferences of voters. In this
case, we could expect the views of each participant to count equally—each
voter or participant in the debate is equally qualified to give their (non-expert)
assessment, based on their interests or values. Such contestation is often
associated with more normative debates about justice, shared values, and
identity. Many areas of immigration policy meet this description: debates
over multiculturalism and diversity, citizenship, or distributive aspects of
asylum policy are often seen as legitimately resolved with reference to popular
notions of fairness, or by invoking the national ‘interest’.
The second procedure for assessing rival claims is what can be termed a
‘technocratic’mode of settlement. According to this mode, expert claims have
particular authority in settling contestation. This may be because the nature of
the policy problems requiring resolution are viewed as highly complex and
technical: decision-making is thus dependent on expert methodologies or
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empirical knowledge, so that the impacts of different interventions may be
gauged. Indeed, as sociologists studying risk have argued, expert knowledge is
more likely to be invoked in political contestation where the future implica-
tions of decisions taken now are difficult to predict. In such contexts, experts
and their claims have greater weight than those of ‘lay’ or non-expert partici-
pants. Such modes of settlement are also associated with ‘post-ideological’
debates (Fischer 1990), in which the fundamental orientation of policy has
already been agreed (for example, the importance of reducing unemployment
or improving health care); what remains contested is the most appropriate
means of achieving these goals.
In the field of immigration policy, technocratic modes of settlement are
most typically associated with debates on labour migration. Here, economic
and demographic analyses are often seen as having particular authority in
political debate and policy-making (see also Chapter 10 in this volume). This is
in contrast to more value- or interest-based issues, such as integration and
diversity, which may be more appropriately resolved through democratic
modes of settlement. It should be noted that the technical complexity of an
issue does not determine its mode of settlement. Issues that are extremely
complex may be settled through value- or interest-based debates (the UK’s
debate on leaving the EU being a prime example of this). The mode of
settlement reflects dominant views about the legitimate basis for settling
political conflict, rather than an ‘objective’ assessment of what types of con-
siderations are most valid in settling the matter. Thus, for example, although
the issue of managing asylum is immensely complex, in many national
debates it has been discussed in terms of values and interests, with little
consideration of specialized or technical knowledge about how best to reduce
asylum flows.
Political debate will rarely—or, perhaps, never—be resolved exclusively by
technocratic modes of settlement. Different value judgements and interests
will invariably have a role in shaping preferences. Indeed, recourse to expert
knowledge and statistics as a mode of settlement is often largely ritualistic.
Politicians have already fixed on their preferred course of action and are
deploying expert research to bolster their claims; also, their political rivals
may feel equally compelled to draw on research to substantiate their counter-
claims. Where this happens, expert knowledge may become discredited. Once
it is clear that protagonists are selectively marshalling data to support political
claims, evidence may lose its scientific authority, effectively becoming con-
taminated or ‘politicized’ (Weingart 1999) (see also Chapter 9 in this volume).
However, even if such technocratic modes of settlement are ritualistic, they
still imply that expert knowledge is seen as a relevant resource in political
debate. This is in contrast to democratic modes of settlement, in which expert
knowledge may be seen as irrelevant, out of touch or even elitist: this will be
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discussed more fully later on in this chapter. Thus, while political salience and
political contestation imply that participants in policy debates will be seeking
resources to strengthen their claims, it is not necessarily the case that expert
knowledge will be seen as an appropriate resource tomarshal. This will depend
on the second condition: which mode of contestation is seen as appropriate
for weighing up rival claims. This, in turn, may vary over time, across policy
fields and across different countries.
Modes of Legitimation
Thus far, we have concentrated on how expert knowledge may be drawn on in
political debate. But our third condition is more relevant to knowledge util-
ization in public administration: the ministries and agencies involved in
elaborating and implementing immigration policy. Following literature on
organizational institutionalism, I understand organizations in the public
administration as preoccupied with securing legitimacy from their environ-
ments (March and Olsen 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). They are keen to
meet expectations about appropriate behaviour through ensuring their rhet-
oric and actions meet the approval of key actors on whom they are dependent
for support. However, as Scott and Meyer (1991) have argued, organizations
may go about seeking legitimacy in two distinct ways, depending on the type
of ‘sector’ in which they operate.
First, where organizational outputs have tangible effects on the objects of
their intervention—in other words, where policy interventions are monitored
on an ongoing basis—then organizations will need to adjust their interven-
tions to ensure they achieve the right outcomes. Thus, they will need to draw
on resources to ensure the policies they adopt have the desired effects, in order
to meet the expectations of voters or stakeholders. Their mode of legitimation
is based on tangible outputs or outcomes. Examples of such areas may include
numbers of asylum seekers or net migration figures, which are measured
through reliable bureaucratic data on a regular basis. Voters are likely to
reward incumbents based on how far they are able to influence these meas-
ured outcomes.
Yet, in many areas of policy the effects of organizational interventions are
diffuse, difficult to measure and may not be easily attributable to particular
policies. There may be limited information about social problems or dynam-
ics, or the effects of policy interventions may only be felt in the longer-run, or
be difficult to attribute (Boswell 2012). In this second type of case, organiza-
tions cannot derive legitimacy through their outputs. Instead, they fall back
on rhetoric and symbolic actions to derive support (Scott and Meyer 1991;
Brunsson 2002). This is what can be termed a ‘symbolic’mode of legitimation.
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Typical areas where this is likely to be the case include policies on immigrant
integration and diversity, or on irregular migration. Policy is often symbolic
in the sense of comprising cosmetic adjustments. Such gestures substitute for
adjustments that achieve substantive change, given the difficulties in moni-
toring the effects of such interventions (Slaven and Boswell 2018).
These two differentmodes of legitimation are also linked to distinct patterns
of knowledge utilization. As shown in previous work (Boswell 2009a), where
policy outcomes are observable and attributable, policy-makers are more likely
to draw on expert knowledge to adjust policy outputs. Thus, they are likely to
use knowledge instrumentally, to adjust their policy interventions. By con-
trast, where they derive legitimacy through symbolic adjustments, they are
more likely to use knowledge symbolically. Indeed, they may well deploy
expertise to signal that their department or government is taking sound and
well-grounded decisions—in other words, we are likely to see expert know-
ledge being used as a source of legitimation.
As discussed in the previous section, we should note that expert knowledge
or research is not always deemed an appropriate resource for adjusting policy,
or for signalling commitment to certain goals. Such resources are likely to be
most relevant where the policy area is associated with a technocratic mode of
settlement. And, indeed, even in bureaucratic decision-making, not all forms
of expertise will be valued as authoritative. My research on the Home Office
suggested that officials working in the operational wing of the Home Office
often felt their practical understanding of immigration and asylum dynamics
was more reliable than research studies based on small samples or more
abstract theoretical presuppositions (Boswell 2009a). So, again, the mode of
settlement will shape what sorts of knowledge are considered pertinent, and
these may vary across issues or countries, even in more specialized decision-
making venues.
Bringing these three points together, we can summarize the conditions
shaping different forms of knowledge utilization.
 In public debates and policy-making, expert knowledge is most likely to
be used as a resource where the issue is salient and contested.
 The degree to which expertise and evidence is seen as relevant to such
debates also depends on the mode of settlement: how far expertise and
research is seenas an appropriate resource for evaluating competingoptions.
 Knowledge utilization also depends on how policy-makers derive legitim-
acy. Where support is contingent on observable outputs, expert know-
ledge is likely to be deployed to inform policy interventions. Where
support is derived from rhetoric or cosmetic adjustments, it is more likely
to be marshalled to signal authority and commitment.
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Immigration, Expert Knowledge, and Populism
I initially developed this theoretical approach in the 2000s, in an era when
many industrialized immigration countries were keen to marshal research
about the economic benefits of immigration, especially with regard to
highly-skilled workers. Debates on labour migration in particular were char-
acterized by a technocratic mode of settlement, with economic and demo-
graphic research exerting influence in framing debates and justifying policies
to recruit labour migrants. Debates on immigration in many European coun-
tries and the United States appear to have shifted since then, as illustrated
most strikingly by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the UK campaign on the
EU referendum and the ensuing ‘Brexit’ vote; the campaign and election of
Donald Trump in the United States; and rising support for populist anti-
immigration parties in a number of European countries, including Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
One common feature of the claims-making strategies of populist anti-
immigration movements is their eschewal of expertise. Populist movements
mobilize support through claiming to articulate the interests of ‘the people’ as
opposed to established institutions and elites (Taggart 1996; Canovan 1999;
Mudde 2004). Frequently, their claims are targeted at a discredited ruling elite
and its values: not only those seen as part of the political and economic
establishment, but also the media, academics, and other experts (Canovan
1999). While populism does not necessarily imply the rejection of techno-
cratic measures (Mudde 2004: 547), populist styles of mobilization tend to
reject complex, technical arguments in favour of simple claims and spontan-
eous action. Unlike other ideological movements that may sideline evidence
that runs counter to their claims, for populist movements, the rejection of
expertise is a core part of their political identity and strategy of mobilization.
This has interesting implications for the conditions set out earlier in this
chapter. On the one hand, populist parties are keen to put immigration
issues at the centre of their political claims-making strategies. They tend to
achieve electoral success in contexts where immigration issues are salient,
and they advance policy proposals that are often highly contested by other
political parties. Through their rhetoric, populist parties may also play an
important role in expanding and consolidating anti-immigrant sentiment,
thus increasing the salience of such issues in political debate. Thus, populist
anti-immigration movements are clearly associated with the politicization of
immigration issues, implying that rival political parties will be keen tomarshal
resources to bolster their claims about immigration.
However, populist narratives do not derive credibility from being backed up
by expert knowledge; indeed, such narratives are often premised on a rejection
of the methods and claims of experts. This implies that populist claims are not
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typically backed up with ‘evidence’ or specialized experience. Part of their
appeal may derive precisely from their defiance of such expertise. As Michael
Freeden puts it, populist claims are characterized by their simplicity and
urgency, and should not be ‘adulterated by reflection and deliberation’
(2017: 6). Part of this is what Clarke and Newman describe as a different
‘sense of time’, evident in populist campaigns. While the knowledge claims
underpinning conventional mainstream politics rely on expert analysis and
economic forecasts, acknowledge complexity and some degree of uncertainty
about the future, and factor in temporal delays to implementation, populist
claims effectively efface time. They promise immediate fulfilment—a capacity
to dispense with planning and negotiation, to achieve instantaneous results.
And the knowledge they appeal to is often experiential, harking back to a
‘celebrated and imaginary past’ (Clarke and Newman 2017: 12).
This could imply that populist parties are shifting debate away from techno-
cratic modes of settlement. They are the defenders par excellence of sup-
posedly ‘democratic’ modes of settlement. They want to let ‘the people’
decide. Yet, moderate parties do not necessarily embrace this purely demo-
cratic mode of settlement. They may continue to evoke more technocratic or
expert sources to substantiate their claims. In this sense, the ‘mode of settle-
ment’ may not be settled: there may be a co-existence of rival understandings
of what constitute relevant modes of evaluating competing claims. In other
words, there may be a divide between protagonists who continue to invoke
expertise as relevant to deliberation on immigration policy issues, and those
who see it as irrelevant. This type of fracture appears increasingly evident in
public political debates across liberal democratic countries experiencing a rise
in populist parties. It implies that political contestation goes beyond substan-
tive claims about appropriate policies, to more radical disagreement about
what constitutes legitimate and appropriate modes of settling political debate.
This is not just a challenge for public political deliberation. It also creates a
number of challenges for policy-making. As I argued earlier, incumbents are
likely to use research to adjust outputs where they anticipate their perfor-
mance will be appraised and rewarded by voters. Yet, one of the features of
populist claims-making is that it is not constrained by evidence or expert
knowledge about the causes and dynamics of social problems, or about
the sorts of interventions that may be effective in steering them. Thus, the
populist rejection of expertise creates an awkward gap between the types
of claim grounding pledges, and prevalent modes of knowledge use within
the administration. Populist politics invokes varying causal stories about
policy problems and responses, drawing on quite distinct sources of know-
ledge (such as anecdote, public myths, or dystopian scenario-mapping). The
gap is likely to be especially pronounced where populist movements offer
up specific pledges, or commit themselves to precise outcomes which can
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be measured. Incumbents seeking to mobilize support through signalling
commitment to populist goals will face substantial challenges when it comes
to implementing them.
This clearly creates political risks for populist parties that achieve political
power. In many ways, such movements will be more comfortable in oppos-
ition than as incumbents. Once in power, they risk being exposed as unable to
deliver their simplistic and overly ambitious pledges. This creates what I have
termed a ‘populist gap’—a discrepancy between what opposition parties may
claim, and what they can feasibly achieve once in government (Boswell 2003).
Indeed, this is a well-rehearsed issue in political science studies of immigra-
tion. How populist-oriented governments manage this risk depends in part on
how far they can sustain their narratives about policy problems and their
government’s performance to address these, in the face of contradictory evi-
dence. Where the impacts of interventions are diffuse and difficult to measure
and attribute, populist governments may evade exposure—and this may well
be the case in areas such as immigration control and immigrant integration,
where there is a lack of reliable data on government performance. But where
their performance is subject to observation and measurement, then they may
be exposed as unable to achieve their goals—as may be the case with, for
example, reducing asylum or immigration inflows. In such areas, voters are
likely to be disillusioned at the failure of governments to deliver. Thus, the
unfeasibility—and potentially damaging effects of—populist immigration
policy may be more evident in some policy areas than others, depending on
how easy it is to measure policy impacts.
The gap between populist narratives and more expert and technocratic
narratives also creates serious tensions in the relations between political lead-
ers and their public administrations. Bureaucratic modes of reasoning are
firmly grounded in technocratic modes of settlement, which employ a well-
established repertoire of rationales, methods, and modes of appraisal. The
implication is that the internal modes of constructing and responding to
problems within bureaucracies will be starkly out of kilter with the narratives
emanating from populist politics (Boswell and Rodrigues 2016). Where this
happens, populist policy goals may simply not be translatable into meaning-
ful courses of action for the bureaucracy.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the conditions under which expert knowledge is
deployed in political debate and policy-making. It started by distinguishing
between the different ways in which research and expertise can be used:
instrumental, substantiating, and legitimizing. It then set out three conditions
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influencing the extent and function of expert knowledge utilization in polit-
ical debate and policy-making: political salience and contestation, mode of
settlement, and mode of legitimation. In the second part of the chapter,
I explored what this theoretical approach could tell us about the current rise
in populist movements across liberal democratic countries. I suggested that
while populist movements are associated with the greater salience of, and
contestation over, immigration issues, they also eschew technocratic modes
of settlement. Yet, rather than shift debates to wholly democratic modes of
settlement, political contestation in such settings may well be characterized
by second-order contestation: conflict over what types of claim constitute legit-
imate grounds for assessing policy options. Thus, current debates on immigra-
tion involve not only contestation about the nature of immigration dynamics
and impacts and appropriate policies to address these, they also involve contest-
ation about what sorts of knowledge or other claims are appropriate resources
for settling such debates. This partly explains widespread observations about
how fractious and divided polities appear to be in such settings.
Finally, I explored what the rise of populist, anti-expertise political move-
ments implied for modes of legitimation. The eschewal of research and
expert knowledge by populist movements exposes them to a number of
risks once in government. It implies that their policy interventions are likely
to be based on popular and often simplistic narratives about social problems,
and appropriate modes of steering them. Given this, populist governments
are likely to try to sustain legitimacy through rhetoric and symbolic inter-
ventions. But where the effects of their policies can be monitored and
attributed, voters are likely to be disappointed in their failure to deliver.
At the same time, the pronounced gap between such populist narratives,
and the more technical forms of deliberation and reasoning that prevail in
public administration, are likely to create acute tensions between political
leaders and their civil servants.
The implication is that we are likely to see serious rifts not just in terms of
claims-making in the arena of public debate, but also between different logics
of deliberation in politics and public administration. The rise of populist
parties does not just threaten progressive approaches to immigration policy,
it also fundamentally questions the role of knowledge in public debate and
policy-making, which raises serious challenges for governance.
Note
1. See Boswell (2009a) for the fullest exposition of this research. The first part of this
chapter draws on the theory developed in this work.
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3
Research–Policy Dialogues on Migrant
Integration in Europe
The Impact of Politicization
Han Entzinger and Peter Scholten
The social sciences have played an important role in shaping public under-
standing of processes of immigrant integration in Europe, and often also in
shaping governmental policies. The reverse, however, is also the case: policy-
makers play a role in shaping the production of knowledge. Policy-makers,
including politicians, may solicit the knowledge they wish to have in many
ways and with differing degrees of openness. Althoughmajor differences exist
between European countries in the way relations between policy and research
on immigrant integration have evolved, many of these countries have wit-
nessed a substantial increase in the body of scientifically based knowledge on
immigrant integration. At the same time, inmany countries public authorities
seem to have become less interested in making use of the assembled know-
ledge. Politicians and policy-makers often use scientific research for symbolic
rather than instrumental purposes (see Chapter 2 in this volume; Boswell
2009; Scholten and Timmermans 2010). Clearly, in parallel with the increas-
ing politicization of the field, the belief in rational societal steering with the
help of academic expertise has yielded to a growing cynicism about the
validity of research and the credibility of researchers—a phenomenon con-
fined neither to the field of migrant integration, nor to Europe. At the same
time, researchers in academia seem progressively more disenchanted about
the policy orientation of research on immigrant integration and the lack of
theoretical development of this research field. They see this as an effect of the
intense contacts between researchers and policy-makers that have existed in
several countries.
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This chapter aims to develop deeper insights into how research and policy-
making in the field of migrant integration have developed over time, and
how their relationship functions under the present conditions of strong
politicization of the issue in Europe. We define politicization as the phenom-
enon whereby, in the process of decision-making, political arguments and
considerations gain precedence over other arguments, particularly scientific-
ally based arguments. The discussion in this chapter is based on a comparative
research project carried out between 2011 and 2014 under the auspices
of IMISCOE, the largest European network of migration research institutes.1
The project, named Science–Society Dialogues on Migration and Integration
in Europe (DIAMINT), was coordinated by the authors of this chapter at
Erasmus University Rotterdam, and funded by the Volkswagen Foundation
in Hannover. Seven EUmember states (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom) plus the European Union, as
such, were involved in the study, to which research teams in each of the
participating countries contributed.2
Conceptualizing Research–Policy Dialogues
In the DIAMINT project, research–policy dialogues are defined broadly as all
forms of interaction between researchers and policy-makers in the domain of
immigrant integration. The term ‘dialogues’ reflects the reciprocal nature of
research–policy relations; we are not just looking at how research is used in
policy-making, but also how the policy context and the dialogues influence
research in terms of size, orientation, and content. We distinguish three
aspects of research–policy dialogues. First, we explore and analyze the dialogue
structures. These are the formal and the informal arrangements that have been
created or have come into existence through which knowledge itself, deci-
sions on knowledge production, and the relevance of knowledge for policy are
communicated and exchanged. Second, we look at cultures and practices of
knowledge utilization in policy processes (knowledge utilization). Here, we take
the perspective of policy-makers or the process of policy-making and analyse
what role has been assigned to researchers and what function attributed to
knowledge and research. Third, taking the perspective of researchers, we look
at cultures of knowledge production in the field of migration research itself.
Figure 3.1 shows the three aspects of research–policy dialogues and how
these are interconnected. In the next section, we will elaborate on all three
elements—and also their interrelationships—and further develop the major
hypotheses that have guided us throughout the project.
Prior to the DIAMINT project, these three aspects of research–policy
dialogues had been dealt with separately in the migration literature.
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A considerable number of scholars have written on research–policy structures
and their various channels of communication, such as research institutes,
advisory bodies, expert committees and more informal networks (Bommes
and Morawska 2005; Florence and Martiniello 2005; Geddes 2005; Penninx
2005; Thränhardt and Bommes 2010; Scholten 2011). Christina Boswell
(2009, and see also Chapter 2 in this volume) has focused on knowledge
utilization. The impact of policy on migration research has been treated by
various other scholars, such as Favell (2003); Penninx (2005); Vasta and
Vuddamalay (2006); and Thränhardt and Bommes (2010). However, the inter-
connections between these three aspects were not dealt with. The key object-
ive of the DIAMINT project was to bring together these literatures and explore
how the relations between these three aspects could be conceptualized and
analysed empirically.
Dialogue Structures
Our first key question here is how research–policy dialogues are structured.
How are dialogues organized, in what venues do they take place, what types of
actors are involved, what type of knowledge is communicated, and what
issues are discussed?
In the sociology of sciences and in policy sciences, a number of ideal models
of research–policy structures have been defined (Hoppe 2005; Scholten 2011).
The enlightenment model (‘speaking truth to power’) is perhaps the one that
comes closest to the typical ideal image of the role that scientific research























Figure 3.1 The three main aspects of research–policy dialogues and their interrelation-
ship: the project’s conceptual model
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boundaries between research and policy, and assumes that scientific know-
ledge will eventually ‘creep’ into the policy-making process, thus (indirectly)
determining how policy-makers interpret and act upon policy problems. In
contrast to the sharp boundaries of the enlightenment model, Hoppe (2005)
formulates a technocratic model of research–policy relations, where researchers
(‘experts’) are more directly involved in policy-making. In a technocracy,
researchers do more than just provide knowledge; they also frame policy
problems and develop solutions; they come much closer to taking on the
role of policy-makers themselves.
Whereas both the enlightenment and the technocratic models assume
that research–policy relations should be structured to give research a primary
role in policy-making, alternative approaches such as the engineering
model and the bureaucratic model firmly believe in the primacy of politics
in policy-making. The latter two models assume that research provides
input to policy-making and political decision-making, while recognizing
that the outcomes of policy-making are also determined by other consider-
ations, including values, norms, and power. In the bureaucratic model, research
is supposed to provide data (‘facts’) that are required by policy-makers to
develop policies and to reach decisions. This model assumes a sharpWeberian
fact–value dichotomy between research and politics. The engineering model,
by contrast, allows researchers a more far-reaching role in policy-making,
while assuming, however, that politics keeps its primacy and is at liberty
to select (‘pick-and-choose’) those strands of expertise that it sees fit.
Although these models are primarily based on the function that research
and knowledge may have for policy and policy-making, they may also be
used as heuristic devices for mapping differences between forms of dia-
logues, or even for comparing types of research–policy dialogues between
countries. Several studies have already indicated that significant differences
exist between countries in terms of such structures, as well as in their
degrees of institutionalization. Scholten, for instance, found that the Dutch
research–policy nexus was strongly institutionalized between 1980 and 1992,
implying a very significant influence of research on policy-making (in the
logic of the technocratic model) (Scholten 2011). The French research–policy
nexus, by contrast, involved more informal and personal networks between
researchers and policy-makers, with a much stronger primacy for politics
(the bureaucratic model).
Knowledge Utilization
The second aspect of research–policy dialogues focuses specifically on the
question of how knowledge is utilized in policy-making. As explained in her
2009 book and in Chapter 2 in this volume, Christina Boswell distinguishes
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between different types of practices of knowledge utilization. The most basic
type involves the instrumental utilization of knowledge and expertise, where
research outcomes are directly taken as input for policy-making. It is this type
of knowledge utilization that is assumed in the notion of ‘evidence-based
policy-making’. In addition to the instrumental use of knowledge, Boswell
distinguishes two symbolic types of knowledge utilization. Rather than being
used as input for decision-making, knowledge can be used to provide author-
ity to policies that have already been decided by substantiating these through
relevant (and supportive) knowledge and expertise. Besides substantiating
policy decisions, research can also be used for the plain legitimization of
policies and policy institutions. This legitimizing function of research and
expertise does not refer to substantive research findings themselves, but to the
mere symbolic act of having knowledge and expertise to claim authority over
a particular policy domain or policy issue.
Knowledge Production
The third aspect focuses on the relationship between knowledge production
and the structures of research–policy dialogues: how does knowledge produc-
tion influence such dialogues and, vice versa, how do dialogues affect migrant
integration research itself? Research–policy dialogues can create opportu-
nity structures for specific researchers, research programmes, and institutes
to emerge and influence policy-making (Penninx 1988; Jasanoff 2005;
Entzinger and Scholten 2014). In the longer run, however, there may also be
a significant influence in the opposite direction. Strongly institutionalized
relations with policy-making institutions may affect the structural character-
istics of migration research as a research field; for example, the extent
of consensus or fragmentation. The strongly institutionalized relationship
between research and policy-making in the Netherlands and Sweden in the
1980s, for instance, provided a dominant position for specific dialogue struc-
tures and their participants—such as the Advisory Commission on Minorities
Research (ACOM) and the Expert Group for Immigration Research (EIFO),
respectively—and thereby created a ‘consensus’ in migration research in that
period (Hammar 2004; Penninx 2005; see also Chapter 9 in this volume). In
contrast, recent studies show that the rapid politicization of this domain has
created much more diverse opportunity structures, thus facilitating the frag-
mentation of the migration research field (Bommes and Morawska 2005;
Scholten et al. 2015).
Beyond such effects on the structure of the research field (which have
received relatively little attention so far), various scholars have pointed
to more substantive impacts on ‘knowledge production’, recognizable in
methodological, theoretical, and disciplinary developments. Thränhardt and
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Bommes (2010), for example, claim that research–policy dialogues have ham-
pered the theoretical development of migration research. They argue that
migration research uses the nation-state as a ‘constitutive frame’. This has
hampered the rise of a more critical approach to the role of the nation-state
and has stressed ‘the social importance’ of solving integration as a problem
of the nation, rather than conceptualizing and theorizing immigration and
integration from a more scientific perspective (Favell 2003; Thränhardt
and Bommes 2010: 30). Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 301–2) refer to
comparable biases in migration research, coining the term ‘methodological
nationalism’. In their view, ‘nation-state building processes have fundamen-
tally shaped the ways immigration has been perceived and received. These
perceptions have in turn influenced social science theory and methodology
and, more specifically, discourse on immigration and integration’. The strong
orientation on integration within the nation-state has (co)produced specific
national models of integration.
Partly as a reaction to the tendencies of migration research to confine
itself within a national framing, there has been an undeniable upsurge of
international comparative studies in the field of migration and integration,
especially since the mid-2000s. Emerging international research networks
such as IMISCOE have triggered this, but it has also been supported strongly
by policies of the EU’s Directorate-General Research and Innovation (for
instance, through the Framework Programmes and Horizon 2020) and other
EU funds (the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and its predecessors,
as well as the European Social Fund). This new direction of research has, in turn,
led to more explicit criticisms of national models of integration, and to the rise
of transnationalist and post-nationalist perspectives on immigrant integration.
The Effects of Politicization: Three Hypotheses
Migrant integration has clearly evolved into a highly politicized topic through-
out Europe since the early 2000s. This also has implications for research–policy
dialogues (Scholten and Verbeek 2014). In the DIAMINT project, we seek to
theorize the impact of politicization on research–policy dialogues, developing
and examining a number of hypotheses, based on more generic literature from
the sociology of sciences (Scholten et al. 2015).
Our first hypothesis is that the politicization of migrant integration would
contribute to a de-institutionalization of existing research–policy dialogues.
Dialogues will become less direct, more open to diverse participants and more
ad hoc. By contrast, institutional relations will persist in places with a rela-
tively low level of politicization.
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Our second hypothesis focuses on knowledge utilization. While instrumental
knowledge utilization involves the direct use of knowledge in policy formu-
lation and political decision-making—as in ‘evidence-based policy-making’—
symbolic knowledge utilization refers to more indirect functions of knowledge
for policy-makers, either to substantiate policy choices that have already
been decided or to legitimize policy actors. Following Boswell’s analysis
of knowledge utilization in the UK, Germany, and the EU, we expect that
politicization generates more symbolic forms of knowledge utilization
(Boswell 2009).
The third hypothesis refers to the effect of research–policy dialogues on
developments within the field of migration research itself. Trends such as
the de-institutionalization of research–policy dialogues and the internation-
alization of academia challenge the container view of ‘national models of
integration’, and can be expected to contribute to academic fragmentation,
or diversification in terms of knowledge paradigms (see also Favell 2003;
Thränhardt and Bommes 2010).
In the following sections, we assess the evidence for each of the three
hypotheses on the basis of the data collected in the DIAMINT project. Each
research team participating in this project collected original material through
a systematic study of relevant policy documents and literature, particularly
those published since the year 2000. Furthermore, in each country in-depth
interviews were held with twenty to thirty stakeholders and experts. All
activities were based on a commonly based research outline and used the
same methodology. The research teams held regular meetings to exchange
experiences and to discuss and interpret the outcomes. The remainder of this
chapter gives a presentation of some of the most important findings of the
project and attempts to draw parallels between the DIAMINT project and the
main research questions that lie at the basis of this book (see also Table 3.1.).3
Changing Structures of Research–Policy Dialogues?
Our first hypothesis dealt with the relationship between the politicization
of migrant integration and the de-institutionalization of research–policy dia-
logue structures. We have found mixed evidence when comparing the find-
ings from the various cases. Generally speaking, we have found evidence
of changes in the institutional set-up of research–policy dialogues, rather
than a clear de-institutionalization of dialogue structures. Politicization
appears to change, rather than impede, research–policy dialogues. Interest-
ingly, in some cases we have found that institutionalization followed after a
period of politicization, as in Germany and Austria.
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Only in the Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark have we found modest direct
evidence in favour of the original de-institutionalization hypothesis. In
the Netherlands, the strongly institutionalized technocratic research–policy
nexus that had been built around the Ethnic Minorities policy was dismantled
in the 1990s and 2000s, in a context of increasing politicization. However, this
de-institutionalization was also spurred by developments within the research
community. Furthermore, it led to a re-institutionalization of a different type
of nexus, of a more bureaucratic nature, that focused not so much on concep-
tual research but rather on data-driven studies, carried out by the Social and
Cultural Planning Office (SCP) and Netherlands Statistics (CBS), two govern-
ment agencies. In Italy, attempts were made to institutionalize research–
policy dialogues in the 1990s, particularly by setting up a Commission on
the Integration of Migrants. Given the politicization of migration at that
time, the Commission did not have a great impact and was dismantled. In
Table 3.1 Summary of findings on the development of research–policy dialogues on
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a This table is adapted from Scholten and Verbeek (2014).
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Denmark, researchers were directly involved in the genesis of policies in the
1980s and 1990s, but less so thereafter. However, as in the Dutch case, a
certain re-institutionalization of research–policy dialogues also took place in
Denmark, although it was different in character.
We have found that in various cases—Germany being the most prominent
example—the politicization of migrant integration may have spurred the
establishment of research–policy dialogues, rather than impeding them. In
contrast to, for example, the Dutch case, the development of migration
research in Germany followed a more autonomous path with very limited
dialogue between researchers and policy-makers, especially at an institutional
level. The politicization of migrant integration at the end of the 1990s and in
the early 2000s provided various opportunities for researchers to becomemore
actively engaged in policy-making and in political debate. This led to the
establishment of various ‘boundary organizations’, such as the Council for
Migration and the Expert Council for Migration and Integration (SVR)
(Entzinger and Scholten 2014). The Austrian case, reflecting to some extent
the German experience, even reveals evidence of efforts to institutionalize
research–policy relations in the aftermath of politicization. In Austria, at the
end of the 2000s, the grand coalition between the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and
the People’s Party (ÖVP) involved researchers and research-based commis-
sions as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stake-
holders in formulating a National Action Plan for Integration (NAPI). At the
same time, more informal dialogue structures emerged in Austria, outside
institutional channels.
The more bureaucratic dialogue structure that emerged in the Netherlands
in the late 1990s—with a preference for statistics-driven research oriented
towards specific government policy priorities—also emerged in other coun-
tries. In Germany, the Federal Institute for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)
performs a role in policy-making that is very similar to that of the Dutch
SCP. They play a key role by producing data that help to legitimize national
policies, promote policy learning, and monitor and identify areas for policy
intervention at the national, regional, and local levels. Similarly, in Denmark
the Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs has developed
in-house research facilities, bringing together knowledge and information
that are important for policy coordination (see Bak Jørgensen 2011).
One case that clearly defies the hypothesis on politicization and
de-institutionalization of research–policy dialogues is that of the EU, which
is distinctive for two reasons. The first reason concerns timing: the EU entered
this policy area rather late, at a moment when politicization of the issue
was thriving in much of Europe. In this respect, it resembles the situation
in Poland, where the emergence of a policy could not lead to any form of
de-institutionalization for the simple reason that no relevant institutions had
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yet been set up. A second reason is that the EU’s position is completely
different from that of national governments. In the absence of direct compe-
tencies in the field of migrant integration, mobilizing research has proved to
be one of the few strategies the EU possesses to influence policies in this
domain. A selective mobilization of research has provided a tool for the soft-
governance of migrant integration in a European setting (see Geddes and
Scholten 2014). In particular, this has led to a number of comparative studies
of migrant integration policies aiming to facilitate ‘horizontal policy learning’
between European countries. It has also led to more systematic efforts to
measure integration policies so as to monitor compliance with EU policy
frameworks (for example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index, MIPEX).
What stands out in the national cases in terms of dialogue structures is the
central role of ad hoc and, often, government-sponsored commissions at
critical junctures in the policy process. In Germany, Italy, the UK, and the
Netherlands, such commissions were put in place in the aftermath of focusing
events in order to create a temporary platform for research–policy dialogues.
Such commissions, however, are often highly selective in opening up to
researchers and in their knowledge claims (cf. Chapters 7 and 9 in this vol-
ume). This suggests that creating ad hoc commissions should be seen as a
political reflex in the face of immediate and intractable policy controversies,
rather than as an effort to engage in critical reflection based on research.
Furthermore, although their public profile was often high, the policy impact
of the work of these commissions was not always very direct. In fact, commis-
sions in the UK (for example, the Community Cohesion Review Team, led by
Ted Cantle), the Netherlands (the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative
Commission on Integration Policy, led by Stef Blok) and, to a lesser degree,
also Germany (the Commission on Immigration, led by Rita Süssmuth) show
how easily the knowledge claims selected by these commissions can lead to
public controversy and to contestation of the commissions’ authority.
Towards a More Symbolic Knowledge Utilization?
Our comparative analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis
on the increasingly symbolic character of knowledge utilization. It shows that
politicization does not impede knowledge utilization but, rather, changes its
nature. All national cases show that the use of knowledge became increasingly
symbolic in the 2000s. This includes forms of substantiating knowledge util-
ization, where research is used to support policy choices that have already
been decided, as well as forms of legitimizing use, where research is used to
boost the authority of specific policy actors.
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Some of the cases, such as the British case in the 1950s and the Dutch case in
the 1980s, do indeed show how research initially provided a direct stimulus
for policy development, thus accounting for instrumental forms of knowledge
utilization. This was also the case in Sweden, which, however, was not
included as a case study in DIAMINT (Hammar 2004). The other countries
studied do not provide such clear evidence: generally, we have found only
incidental cases where individual academics may have had an impact on
policy development at key moments, as did the Vesselbo report in Denmark.
Most of the cases examined reveal intriguing examples of symbolic know-
ledge utilization. In the originally more instrumental cases of the Netherlands
and the UK, the use of knowledge claims clearly becamemore selective around
the year 2000, aimed at substantiating policies formulated in the political
arena. In the UK, for example, research was utilized (at least partly) to substan-
tiate the Community Cohesion frame that emerged in politics after the ‘mill
town riots’ of 2001. In the Netherlands, research–policy dialogues virtually
came to a halt after a largely unforeseen rise of populism (Pim Fortuyn, and
later Geert Wilders) in the 2000s, with government only selectively using
outcomes of carefully commissioned research for purposes of policy monitor-
ing. Similarly, in Austria, there is broad consensus over the selective use of
knowledge,mainly driven by the development of in-house research facilities at
the Ministry of the Interior. In Denmark, the state supported the Academy for
Immigration Studies (AMID), thus legitimizing its policy position. However, it
hardly ever drew on the findings and recommendations of AMID studies.
In some cases, politicization has also contributed to a growing contestation
of research at large. This applies in particular to the case of Italy, traditionally
characterized by a certain distrust of social-scientific knowledge. To some
extent, it also applies to the Dutch case, where the credibility of migration
scholars involved in policy-making in the 1980s and 1990s was openly put on
the line in the 2000s; they were blamed for introducing a multiculturalist bias
into Dutch policies. This reinforced a mode of ‘articulation politics’ charac-
terized by clear political primacy, an orientation towards popular—if not
populist—views and distrust, especially of research on a conceptual level
(Caponio et al. 2014).
Knowledge Production: Beyond National
Models of Integration
Our third hypothesis, on the diversification of knowledge claims and the rise
of knowledge conflicts, finds partial support in our comparative analysis. We
observe a decreasing relevance for researchers of so-called national models of
integration in the various cases that have been examined. However, this seems
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to be related not just to politicization and changing research–policy dialogues
in these national settings, but also to broader developments, such as the
growing involvement of both the EU and local authorities, and the inter-
nationalization of the migrant integration research community.
Whereas research in Austria, Germany, and Italy was fragmented even
before the issue had become more politicized, the Dutch and British cases
show a more gradual fragmentation. Before politicization, migration scholar-
ship in these countries was characterized by a relative consensus within their
respective national contexts, leading to distinct ‘national models of integra-
tion’: the Dutch Ethnic Minorities model and the British Race Relations
model. Following politicization, which occurred much earlier in the UK
than elsewhere, these models became fragmented and contested. Both the
UK and the Netherlands also reveal many instances of knowledge conflicts
amongst scholars. In other countries—for example, in Germany—migration
scholarship has always been more fragmented, possibly even because of the
absence of an institutional relationship to policy that could have sustained
a single national model of integration. However, it is fair to say that in
Germany, but also in other countries—such as Austria and Italy—knowledge
claims have meanwhile become even more diversified, also along disciplinary
lines. The EU case, again, appears to be different, due to its recent genesis:
there was simply no pre-existing unity against which a possible fragmentation
could have taken place. Research initiated and supported by the EU has
always had a special, comparative character.
Conclusions
Our analysis has revealed profound changes in the dialogue structures associ-
ated with the research–policy nexus in the domain of migrant integration,
rather than a clear de-institutionalization of these dialogues, as we had ini-
tially expected. On the one hand, we have found that dialogue structures have
become more ad hoc, often established in response to distinct political events
or to specific problems. On the other hand, we have also found that politi-
cization has not thwarted all efforts to develop more institutionalized struc-
tures of dialogue between producers and users of knowledge. ‘Going technical’
or mobilizing specific types of research should not always be seen as a tactic of
depoliticization; it can also represent a strategy of ‘politics by different means’.
Additionally, we have found that, in all the countries studied in the DIAMINT
project, research–policy dialogues have gradually becomemore open. Although
it is difficult to establish a clear relationship with politicization here, we can
speak of a gradual evolution from ‘research–policy dialogues’ to broader
‘science–society dialogues’. In all the countries analysed, several new actors
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have emerged as participants in these dialogues. In the British case, this can be
illustrated by comparing the composition of three independent commissions
created to advise the government at different moments since the 2000s. The
membership of these commissions not only consisted of academics, but also
included expert practitioners in areas such as law, health, local government,
education, and journalism (Boswell and Hunter 2014). In the Netherlands, the
role of ‘public intellectuals’ in research–policy dialogues has increased notice-
ably; relevant names here are Paul Scheffer and (the late) Jaap Dronkers. From
the Italian case, it becomes apparent how important (primarily faith-based)
NGOs can be in providing knowledge to policy-makers. The Austrian case
study documents a central role for social partners alongside the very dominant
Ministry of the Interior. In Austria, NGOs have been largely excluded from
research–policy dialogues. In Germany, by contrast, civil society initiatives,
such as the Academies, have been very open to diverse actors, playing an
important stabilizing role in research–policy dialogues on issues such as nation-
ality legislation and Islam. In all cases, the DIAMINT project has shown that the
media should be conceptualized both as a platform for research–policy dia-
logues and as an important participant in such dialogues.
In the rational model of governance, knowledge utilization has traditionally
been assumed as being direct and instrumental. Our analysis provides clear
evidence that more symbolic forms of knowledge utilization prevail in almost
all cases. Knowledge is being used primarily not in an instrumental manner
but, rather, to legitimize government institutions or to substantiate govern-
ment policies. Generally speaking, this has become more visible as migrant
integration has been more politicized.
Finally, our analysis has revealed a sharp increase in both the quantity and
diversity of knowledge production and knowledge dissemination over the past
two to three decades in all cases examined. This makes it more complicated
than in the past to identify or to construct a distinct research–policy nexus.
Nowadays, many centres for knowledge production exist. This has facilitated a
more selective use of knowledge claims within specific policy settings. It also
signals, however, the maturing of migrant integration as a research area,
in which room has developed both for more policy-oriented and for more
theory-oriented schools. Migrant integration has come of age as an academic
field of study.
Lessons from DIAMINT
At first glance, the volume of which this chapter is part uses an approach
that is somewhat different from what we did in the DIAMINT project. Like
DIAMINT, it deals with the interface between scientific research and policy-
making or, as we called it, knowledge production and knowledge utilization.
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This volume, however, seems to leave more space than we did for the role
of public debates in affecting and shaping the dialogue. The interface in
DIAMINT was defined more narrowly, since it was limited to ‘dialogue struc-
tures’, at least initially. As DIAMINT progressed, however, we found that this
approach was too narrow. In reality, many more ways of communicating
exist, both formal and informal. With the rise of migrant integration on the
public and the political agenda, which has gone hand in hand with the
politicization of the issue, such alternative ways have become much more
apparent.
In DIAMINT, we came to the conclusion that our original approach of
‘research–policy dialogues’ had been broadened gradually to what we then
labelled ‘science-society dialogues’: a diversification of methods of mutual
influencing. We have noticed a clear increase in contestation of evidence-
based research outcomes in the public debate. Donald Trump’s presidency of
the United States has familiarized us all with ‘alternative facts’ and ‘post-
truths’ but, in fact, many older examples exist—also in the field of immigrant
integration—of scientifically based knowledge being publicly contested, and
therefore not taken seriously by politicians. There is a link between this
phenomenon and the recent rise of populism in several European countries.
It is not without reason that many populist movements and political parties
give immigration a prominent place in their manifestoes.
In DIAMINT we also found that the media can play an effective role when
the gap between researchers and policy-makers widens. They enable
researchers to reach out to policy-makers and politicians, particularly when
more direct opportunities for contact do not—or no longer—exist. The media
also influence the public debate, a phenomenon that policy-makers are
equally aware of, of course, and which they also use themselves. As a conse-
quence, the debate on a sensitive issue such as migrant integration has
broadened and no longer takes place in closed-shop settings, as was often
the case in the early years of immigration. A similar role can be attributed to
NGOs. DIAMINT has shown that, throughout Europe, NGOs play a much
more prominent role than in the early days when it comes to providing policy
advice. Sometimes, such advice is based on scientific research: NGOs also carry
out research themselves, or may commission research to academic experts.
Advice, however, may also be based on different considerations, such as the
interests of specific communities, or political or ideological views. With the
rise in prominence of migrant integration, it is only natural that such interests
have gained more influence on policy-making. Facts and opinions are not
always separated in the arena of the public debate; this is how democracy
works. Scientists will have to live with this; however, they should never lose
sight of their own responsibilities, which is to produce evidence-based facts
and insights that help us understand how society really works.
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Notes
1. IMISCOE began as an EU-funded Network of Excellence (2004–2009) and has con-
tinued since then as an independent consortium of research institutes in Europe,
which in 2018 number forty (see www.imiscoe.org).
2. The full report of the study was published as Scholten et al. (2015).
3. All findings mentioned in the following sections can be traced back to Scholten et al.
(2015), unless otherwise stated.
References
Bak Jørgensen, M. 2011. Understanding the research–policy nexus in Denmark and
Sweden: The field of migration and integration. British Journal of Politics & Inter-
national Relations 13(1): 93–109.
Bommes, M., and Morawska, E. T. 2005. International Migration Research: Constructions,
Omissions, and the Promises of Interdisciplinarity. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Boswell, C. 2009. The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social
Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boswell, C., and Hunter, A. 2014. The political functions of independent commissions:
Comparing UK commissions on migrant integration and cohesion. Journal of Com-
parative Policy Analysis 17(1): 10–25.
Caponio, T., Hunter, A., and Verbeek, S. 2014. (De)constructing expertise: Comparing
knowledge utilisation in the migrant integration ‘crisis’. Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis 17(1): 26–40.
Entzinger, H., and Scholten, P. 2014. The interplay of knowledge production and
policymaking: A comparative analysis of research and policymaking on migrant
integration in Germany and the Netherlands. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis
17(1): 60–74.
Favell, A. 2003. Integration nations: The nation-state and research on immigrants in
Western Europe. Comparative Social Research 22: 13–42.
Florence, E., andMartiniello, M. 2005. The links between academic research and public
policies in the field of migration and ethnic relations: Selected national case studies—
Thematic introduction. International Journal on Multicultural Societies 7(1): 3–10.
Geddes, A. 2005. Migration research and European integration: The construction
and institutionalisation of problems of Europe. In International Migration Research:
Constructions, Omissions and Promises of Interdisciplinarity, eds M. Bommes and
E. Morawska. Aldershot: Ashgate, 265–80.
Geddes, A., and Scholten, P. 2014. Policy Analysis and Europeanization: An Analysis of
EU Migrant Integration Policymaking. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 17(1):
41–59.
Hammar, T. 2004. Research and Politics in Swedish Immigration Management. In
Towards a Multilateral Migration Regime: Special Anniversary Edition Dedicated to Jonas
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/1/2019, SPi
Han Entzinger and Peter Scholten
48
Widgren, eds M. Jandl and I. Stacher. Vienna: International Centre for Migration
Policy Development, 11–34.
Hoppe, R. 2005. Rethinking the Science–Policy Dialogue Structure: From Knowledge
Utilization and Science Technology Studies to Types of Boundary Arrangements.
Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science
3(3): 199–215.
Jasanoff, S. 2005. States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the Social Order.
London: Routledge.
Penninx, R. 1988. Wie betaalt, bepaalt? De ontwikkeling en programmering van onderzoek
naar migranten, etnische minderheden en woonwagenbewoners 1955–1985. Amsterdam:
SGI-reeks, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Penninx, R. 2005. Bridges between research and policy? The case of post-war immigra-
tion and integration policies in the Netherlands. International Journal on Multicultural
Societies 7(1): 33–48.
Scholten, P. 2011. Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research–Policy Dialogues in
Comparative Perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Scholten, P., and Timmermans, A. 2010. Setting the immigrant policy agenda: Expert-
ise and politics in France, the UK and the Netherlands. Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis 12(5): 527–43.
Scholten, P., and Verbeek, S. 2014. Politicization and expertise: Changing research–
policy dialogues on migrant integration in Europe. Science and Public Policy 42(2):
188–200.
Scholten, P., Entzinger, H., Penninx, R., and Verbeek, S. (eds). 2015. Integrating Immi-
grants in Europe: Research–Policy Dialogues. Heidelberg: Springer.
Thränhardt, D., and Bommes, M. (eds). 2010. National Paradigms of Migration Research.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Vasta, E., and Vuddamalay, V. (eds). 2006. International Migration and the Social Sciences:
Confronting National Experiences in Australia, France and Germany. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Wimmer, A., and Glick Schiller, N. 2002. Methodological nationalism and beyond:
National-state building, migration and the social sciences. Global Networks 2(4):
301–34.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/1/2019, SPi




Research, Public Opinion, and Media Reports
on Migration and Integration
William Allen, Scott Blinder, and Robert McNeil
Research on migration often aims to influence not only relatively specialized
research communities, but also broader society including political institu-
tions, policy processes, and media and public debates. Whether motivated
by the intrinsic value of relating their work to the wider world, or prodded
by shifting financial and professional incentives, academic researchers
increasingly find themselves being asked to demonstrate how their work has
impact beyond universities—especially when that research is publicly funded.
Yet, defining and generating that impact is often elusive. Public debate and
major policy decisions often seem to fly in the face of the evidence base
accumulated by researchers in the academy, civil society, and even in govern-
ment agencies themselves. Despite escalating pressure to produce impactful
research, evidence-based public debate seems as far off as ever—particularly on
the issue of immigration, where public discussion is often polarized, emotive,
and based on perceptions rather than reality (Duffy 2014).
In this chapter, we explore the relationships between research and public
debate, two aspects of the tripartite model proposed in the Introduction to
this volume.1 We argue that the idea of ‘research impact’ is often based on a
naive model of one-way effects that does not reflect the multifaceted relation-
ships between research and elements of public debate. The pathway from
research evidence to public debate is not only uncertain, it is also inevitably bi-
directional:media and public discussions affect research aswell as being affected
by it. As academics aim to have impact on public debate, they should acknow-
ledge even further how their research—comprising the questions they ask, the
methods they employ, and the modes and venues in which they present their
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/1/2019, SPi
findings—relates to the contours of public debate. Therefore, despite growing
expectations that research can and should influence public debate, the implicit
model of impact underlying such expectations is misleading and simplistic.
Public Debate about Migration: Media Coverage
Informing Public Perceptions
For the purposes of this chapter, we view ‘public debate’ as referring to
discussions among members of the general public that both reflect and
shape attitudes toward migration and perceptions of migrants.2 Media cover-
age also constitutes an aspect of these debates. This includes not only opinion
pieces that directly and literally debate policy options, but also news articles
that help set the terms for policy debates by shaping the way members of the
public and even policy-makers think about migrants and migration.
Across many immigrant-receiving countries, members of the public tend
to view migrants in negative terms, and/or express preferences for increased
restrictions on immigration. For example, global surveys find that pluralities—
if not outright majorities—in a variety of traditionally migrant-receiving coun-
tries favour reducing immigration, or at least keeping levels the same, although
this varies along lines of age and education levels (IOM 2015). Sometimes, this
preference is associated with a perception that there are simply too many
migrants in the country (Transatlantic Trends 2014), or that immigrants cause
problems for the economy and society (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).
Although direct experiences with social and economic changes linked to immi-
gration may play a role in shaping these perceptions, information gained
through second-hand sources also contributes to what people think about
migration (Sides and Citrin 2007). Media, notably news media and social
media, are particularly visible sources of information about migration and
migrants for many people. Stories, images, narratives: media coverage, whether
explicitly focusing on migration or tangentially relating to the issue, provides a
variety of raw materials from which people generate their own ideas and
thoughts aboutwho immigrants are andwhat they do (Blinder and Allen 2016).
What is the nature of these raw materials? The picture of how media cover
migration is mixed. To be sure, in higher-income and traditionally ‘destin-
ation’ countries, media coverage of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees
tends to be negative and focused on the threats—economic, socio-cultural,
security—these groups pose towards ‘host’ publics (McAuliffe et al. 2015).
Examples include the ‘Latino Threat narrative’ in the United States (Chavez
2013), casting Romanian migrants to the UK as criminals in British news-
papers (Vicol and Allen 2014) and discussions about the fiscal impacts of
migrant workers in European press sources (Caviedes 2015). But these kinds
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of portrayals are neither universally observed nor completely negative. News-
papers in New Zealand, for example, became more sympathetic towards
migrants after 2000 (Spoonley and Butcher 2009), while Canadian news-
papers have tended to display more positive sentiment, especially since 2004
(Lawlor 2015). One type of sympathetic coverage depicts refugees, asylum
seekers, orother typesofmigrants as victims inneedofhumanitarianassistance
(Thorbjørnsrud 2015), as shown in studies of media in France (Benson 2013),
the Netherlands (Lecheler et al. 2015), and South Korea (Park 2014). Media in
migrant-sending countries, including Vietnam, have recently produced more
positive content about migrants—although, overall, coverage remains mostly
negative (McAuliffe et al. 2015). Also, thanks to social media, migrants can
create and promote their own content, highlighting positive and personalized
aspects of their migration experiences (The Observers 2017).
Media coverage contributes to public opinion and perceptions in several
ways. First, negative coverage is associated with negative attitudes toward
migration. At the level of individual choice, people who read a newspaper
that takes a negative line towards immigration are more likely to share that
negative view. Of course, this correlation may stem, at least in part, from
selection: people choose media sources that confirm their prior opinions.
However, research using controlled experiments or advanced statistical tech-
niques supports the claim that media coverage plays a part in causing these
negative views as well (Abrajano and Singh 2009; Boomgaarden and
Vliegenthart 2009; van Klingeren et al. 2015). Second, coverage that empha-
sizes particular aspects of immigration can shape public understandings of
what immigration is and who immigrants are. For example, by highlighting
the scale of migration in numerical terms, media may raise levels of concern
by feeding into a tendency the public has to overestimate the actual sizes of
minority groups and base their perceptions on this information (Herda 2010).
Indeed, several studies in Europe and the United States show that members of
the public become more opposed to immigration when they believe there are
large numbers of migrants in their country (Strabac 2011; Hooghe and de
Vroome 2015). These effects are in keeping with a well-established set of
research findings on the ability of media to influence ‘what people think
about’, known as ‘agenda-setting’ and ‘priming’ effects in the empirical litera-
ture (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; McCombs 2014).
Research, Media, and Public Perceptions: The Naïve
‘Impact’ Model
As set out in the Introduction, ‘research’ refers to a broad set of knowledge
including theories, concepts, data and datasets, and empirical findings.
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Research may influence public opinion and public debate in several ways.
Researchers often presume or wish for a model of influence in which
researchers conduct inquiries, report on their results and inject research-
based evidence into public debate. We characterize this desired model of
research impact as involving a simple, one-directional flow: information ori-
ginating with researchers influences the public (or a specified subset, such as a
targeted audience). A slightly more nuanced version acknowledges howmuch
of the public does not consume research directly but, rather, relies on mass
media for information, as discussed in the previous section. In this case,
evidence-based research needs to attract media coverage in order subsequently
to inform public perceptions. We represent these two pathways in Figure 4.1.
At first glance, this model resonates with some findings from studies
that considered how information influences what people think. Presenting
‘facts’ or definitive statistics can sometimes correct prior biases or mispercep-
tions to move them closer to reality. For example, majorities of residents
in immigrant-receiving countries overestimate the number of immigrants in
their country. Providing people with correct information about the foreign-
born proportion of their country’s population has been shown, at times, to
change attitudes, generating a shift towards more favourable opinions of migra-
tion (Transatlantic Trends 2014). Further experiments in the United States






Figure 4.1 Naïve model of research impact on public debates
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the statistical information (Grigorieff et al. 2016). This phenomenon may
extend beyond numerical statements to include qualitative claims about who
migrants are: in one study, British people presented with a media headline
about highly-skilled migrants became less likely to think of asylum seekers
and ‘illegal’ immigrants when thinking about who immigrates to Britain
(Blinder and Jeannet 2018).
Shifts in available information—a type of ‘head’-oriented intervention that
prioritizes facts, numbers, and rational thinking—are not the only channel
through which information is connected to public perceptions. Rather,
‘heart’-oriented approaches that account for emotions and story-based tech-
niques also matter, and, in light of motivated reasoning accounts, these may
be more effective. Negative feelings, particularly anxiety, mediate the impact
of media content on perceptions (Brader et al. 2008). Anxiety can create
self-reinforcing feedback as well: anxious people seek out information that
reinforces their pre-existing beliefs that migrants constitute a threat, adding
further to their anxiety (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).
While ‘head’- or ‘heart’-based appeals may play a role in the effectiveness of
research-based interventions in public debate, these effects are conditional on
trust in themessenger. Generally, information has greater impact when coming
from a source or messenger that is seen as credible (Druckman 2001). Credibil-
ity, whether curated and implicitly signalled over time as part of reputation, or
explicitly claimed in a particular moment of communication, is an important
heuristic by which individuals evaluate messengers (Mackiewicz 2010).
Therefore, research-based evidence will vary in its impact on public debate,
depending on public views of universities (and other sources of research). For
example, university researchers enjoy a relatively high degree of public trust in
Britain: 81 per cent of the British public place either a fair amount or great deal
of trust in academics, compared to45per centwho trust theUKgovernment and
25 per cent who trust politicians (ComRes and Research Councils UK 2017). But
this is not the case across all country contexts. In theUnited States, recent public
opinion research shows a wide partisan divide in views of universities, with
Republican partisans rating professors more coldly and increasingly seeing uni-
versities as a negative influence on American society (Fingerhut 2017).
Therefore, by highlighting their generally credible status, researchers may
gain some traction in impacting public perceptions, especially among less
ideologically motivated citizens. However, this credibility varies across coun-
tries, as well as across different segments of the public within a country. Of
course, relatively high levels of credibility may not matter anyway if researchers
are not prominent in migration media coverage, compared to politicians and
other ‘official’ government representatives (Allen 2016).
Research can also contribute to public debate more subtly by delimiting the
terms available for discussion. For example, public opinion surveys implicitly
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shape the nature of public debate by choosing which questions to ask and
which topics to ignore (Lewis 2001). As a result, pollsters and survey
researchers provide informative, yet inevitably selective, portraits of what
‘the public’ thinks about immigration, which, in turn, feeds back into public
and policy debates. In the case of Britain, pollsters’ and academics’ survey
questions have been consistently framed around quantities of migration (i.e.
whether there are ‘too many’ migrants, or whether the number of arrivals
should be reduced). This frame, in turn, soared to prominence in media
coverage: recent policy debate has often focused on quantitative goals for
immigration (Allen and Blinder 2018).
Furthermore, this quantitative frame for debate and policy draws on another
essential form of research-based evidence: government-collected data on
migration stocks and flows. Government-collected data often forms the raw
material for the construction of research evidence on the economic and social
impacts of migration, which, in turn, can be referenced in media stories. For
example, US and UK estimates of unauthorized migrant populations are based
on data on foreign-born populations from government-conducted censuses
(Woodbridge 2005; Warren and Warren 2013). It is easy to miss these subtler
forms of influence by focusing on the narrower—although more enticing—
question of whether research influences public attitudes and media coverage.
However, these forms of research and data, such as polling results, are often the
basis of media reports on migration trends.
Thus, research may shape public perceptions by generating new knowledge
for practitioners about audience receptivity to different approaches to the
presentation of data and evidence. Provision of new information may be
more effective for some audiences when packaged in narratives that appeal
to emotions, or in visual ways that enable both exploration of the data and
explanation of key trends or outliers (Kennedy et al. 2016; Kirk 2016). But
misperceptions may also exist for mundane reasons: people may lack the
time, interest, or resources to seek out relevant information independently,
or to question the information they are presented with by the sources they
use. Regardless of their provenance, misperceptions place public debate on
shaky foundations. Therefore, providing and publicizing correct statistical
information—using empirically evaluated approaches to presenting data—
remains a useful pathway through which evidence can reshape public debate.
Moving Beyond a Naïve Model of Impact
However, a working model of impact that only focuses on the ways that
information flows into public debates—whether through direct engagement
between researchers and publics, or through mediated channels—greatly
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oversimplifies the realities that confront researchers. Two critiques are espe-
cially relevant here: first, the public should not be conceived as passive recipi-
ents of information, whether from researchers or media; and second, public
opinion and media environments—as well as developments in the wider ‘real
world’—also influence the practice and communication of research.
Addressing Mutual Influence between Media and Perceptions
Media influence is not a one-way street. Public perceptions and popular
opinion can also influence what kinds of media content are produced. In
market-driven media systems typical of Anglo-American democracies, media
organizations create ‘products’ that they try to sell to audiences (Croteau
and Hoynes 2006). This requires a keen sense of who their audiences are,
what they think and what kinds of stories will motivate customers to access
whatever product is being offered—a physical newspaper, digital subscrip-
tion, or other kinds of content—and, nowadays, also share it with their
networks via word of mouth or social media. Content that matches audi-
ences’ pre-existing beliefs and worldviews is more likely to be seen as inter-
esting and, as a result, purchased or shared (Winter et al. 2016). Moreover,
media exist within contexts that vary widely in terms of their institutional
freedom, or links with states and political parties (Hallin and Mancini
2011; Freedom House, 2017). This can be seen in media ties to political
parties in the ‘polarized pluralist’ model typical of Southern Europe, or in
media connections with major elements of civil society in the Northern
European ‘democratic corporatist’ model (Hallin and Mancini 2004).
These media systems are less market-based than the Anglo-American
model, but retain feedback loops in which elements of the public can also
shape media content.
Besides shaping media outputs through demand, members of the public
also push back against media by resisting new information that conflicts
with pre-existing political beliefs or values. Public opinion scholars call this
tendency ‘motivated reasoning’ (Kunda 1990) or ‘motivated scepticism’
(Taber and Lodge 2006), and see it as one of the biggest obstacles for creating
a better-informed public on migration or any other issue (Druckman 2012).
The difficulty, then, is not with the existence or even the dissemination of
accurate evidence; rather, it is in the lack of effect on members of the public.
Someone with strongly held negative views about immigration might be
unlikely to accept or trust research showing, for example, that migrants have
a positive impact on the economy. Instead, the motivation to defend one’s
own political convictions and personal values takes priority over alternative
motivations (such as a desire to hold accurate beliefs), resulting in a dismissal
of counter-attitudinal evidence. As a result, in politically polarized times,
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people may trust research only when it confirms their political orientations—
or trust in research itself may become politicized as seen in the recent March
for Science in the United States (Financial Times 2017). Therefore, in contexts
where migration is a salient issue and firmly held opinions are common,
motivated reasoning would be expected to dampen the impact of evidence
on public opinion and public discussion, regardless of the quality or relevance
of the evidence.
How Public Debates Influence Research Outputs and Practice
Meanwhile, the relationship between the worlds of research and public
debate is not unidirectional, either. For example, engagement with users
can shape the kinds of questions researchers ask in the first place. On the
one hand, some migration scholars express concern about the extent to
which policy-makers, or any user for that matter, exert influence over the
definitions, categories, and topics that researchers pursue (Bakewell 2008). In
a polarized political environment around migration, and where a variety of
organizations (called ‘intermediaries’) connect university researchers with
media and other public users, there are many opportunities for evidence-
generating and reporting processes to be led by popular and institutional
politics. When a campaigning organization is facing a fast-moving issue of
high strategic importance, it may commission research for which it already
knows the conclusions (Allen 2017b). In this case, the research serves a
legitimizing function that confers political benefit, rather than scientific
understanding, to the body that commissioned it (see also Chapter 2 in
this book). On a more routine level, existing data and research can become
relevant for media when real world conditions change, as was the case with
quarterly migration figures produced by the UK’s Office for National Statis-
tics. As levels of ‘net migration’ (the difference between the number of
immigrants entering the country and those who were leaving) continued
rising to record heights during 2013–2015, the British press began demand-
ing and using these statistical packages to report on the government’s per-
formance (Allen and Blinder 2018).
On the other hand, engaging with public users may actually generate
more refined understandings of problems without imposing pre-determined
solutions (Spencer 2017). Researchers and users can learn from each other
in processes of ‘knowledge exchange’ (Kitagawa and Lightowler 2013), pos-
sibly improving both the quality of the academic outputs as well as fostering
trust with key stakeholder groups. These kinds of personal relationships
and feelings of goodwill, notwithstanding research quality and credibility,
also facilitate the successful use of evidence (Contandriopoulos et al. 2010;
Ward et al. 2012).
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A Multidirectional Model of Impact
Our brief survey of media coverage, public perceptions, and research on
migration aimed to highlight how these elements relate to each other. Some-
times, this is exemplified through specificmechanisms such as agenda-setting,
information effects, or motivated reasoning. At other times, these relation-
ships are either more diffuse, as in assumptions which drive survey develop-
ment, or event-specific. A clear implication arising from this synthesis is that
‘effectively’ communicating research for public impact involves much more
than presenting facts and figures. Instead, it involves being aware of both the
conditions and the contexts in which researchers supply information, as well
as the ways that media and members of the public generate demand for
certain kinds of research or data.
Critically, researchers and users of research should no longer think in terms
of the simple model depicted in Figure 4.1, in which research findings simply
flow downstream to the public through media or other intermediaries. This
model omits reciprocal relationships and points of resistance to new informa-
tion, possibly leading to misdirected effort and missed entry points where
evidence may inform public debate in less direct ways. Rather than the uni-
directional model, we suggest that the relationships between public debate
(itself comprising links among media and public perceptions) and research
look more like a complex web with potential influence between participants
running in both directions, as seen in Figure 4.2. Moreover, these interrela-
tions sit within wider social, political, and economic contexts that may favour
some possibilities over others.
Research-based evidence can enter into public debate but, equally, public
perceptions and the media environment create demand for certain types of
evidence that shape researchers’ activities. This includes which topics to
investigate, and also how to design, execute, and disseminate research in
order to have an ‘impact’ on these elements of public debate. Migration
research may help set the agenda for public debate, but the public, media,
and policy environments have their own agendas which exert their own force
on researchers’ activities. What is more, the goal of public ‘impact’ actually
magnifies the reciprocal impact of public, media, and policy communities on
research activity itself. When impact is an explicit or implicit goal, researchers
must focus on topics or questions that are meaningful to broader audiences
instead of, or in addition to, research communities. Data and methods must
be legible to non-specialists, or at least able to be translated into more
accessible forms.
Thus, successfully impacting public debate through research—whether by
changing what people think about migration directly or through media
coverage—involves navigating a complex world of reciprocal relationships.
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That complex world leaves open the very real possibility that, even when
information can find its way into media coverage, it will encounter citizens
who are inclined to seek media coverage that confirms their prior beliefs, and
dismiss or discount information that challenges those beliefs.
Conclusions and Extensions
What our synthesis does not explicitly deal with are the normative questions
surrounding media, public perceptions, and research. How should media
cover migration issues? To what extent, and through what means, should
academics seek to introduce ‘correct’ viewpoints about migration, its impacts,
or determinants? Instead, what we have aimed to do is paint a picture of
complex interrelationships—a feature that becomes more apparent when we
include policy-making, as discussed in Chapter 2 in this book. Debates and
concepts originating in policy, for example, can stimulate media to focus on
particular aspects of migration, which, in turn, generates further public dis-
cussions. The natures and compositions of these interactions are changing, as
well as the conditions in which they are occurring.
One way this is happening is evidenced by the rise of ‘fake news’ in popular
discussion, even if the phenomenon itself is not new: producing false, or at
least questionable, information to achieve political ends is a standard propa-
ganda technique (Bernays 1947). Moreover, fraudulent assertions about
migrants and minorities have been part of policy and press narratives
Media Perceptionsopinions
Public debates
Social, Political, Economic contexts
Researchers and academics
Figure 4.2 A multidirectional model of research impact
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throughout history, often as justifications for the control of human mobility
(Anderson 2013). Examples range from the grotesque pictorial representation
of Jews in thirteenth-century England (Menache 1985), to The Sun’s 2003
article ‘Swan Bake’, which told a fabricated story of Eastern European asylum
seekers killing and eating the Queen’s swans in British parks (Medic 2004).
More recently, in the United States, senior Republican Party officials produced
fraudulent stories in the early stages of the Trump administration, including a
terrorist incident allegedly undertaken by migrants—the ‘Bowling Green mas-
sacre’. This event was used both to argue that mainstream media were not
properly reporting on immigration threats to the United States and to justify
severe restrictions onmigration to the United States from a number of Muslim
majority countries (Kendzior 2017).
In this context, research potentially plays two critical roles. First, it can
enable informed public debates about migration by providing a solid founda-
tion of evidence on which bothmedia and policy narratives can be built. ‘Fake
news’ is actually not a single object but, rather, many objects with many
purposes: from information that may unintentionally mislead, to material
deliberately constructed to deceive, to ideas with which we strongly disagree
(Beckett 2017). As a result, the phenomenonmay be forcing people to reassess
their use of media, andmove back towards ‘respected’ and trusted media, or to
fact-checking organizations and other sources of research evidence (Graves
and Cherubini 2016). Second, in the digital age, research is providing new
routes for wider public scrutiny of those narratives. Large-scale analysis of
large amounts of text and digital content, ranging from news to tweets to
forums, can reveal connections, patterns, or relationships that previously were
not possible to identify (Hardaker 2010; Allen 2017a).
But, we also see that research outputs, and researchers themselves, are often
under-exploited in debates about migration. Also, merely making research
available does not guarantee its successful use, access, or understanding
(Easton-Calabria and Allen 2015). The challenges facing those wanting to
promote evidence uptake in global migration debates, such as those exempli-
fied in this volume, are manifold. Addressing those challenges in responsible,
thoughtful, and effective ways is the task ahead.
Notes
1. ‘Perceptions’ and ‘opinions’ are different: opinions refer to specific evaluations of
attitude objects, while perceptions refer to more general awareness of an object
and, possibly, its characteristics. In this chapter, we use both terms as indicative of
‘what people think’ about migration, though see Fiske and Taylor (2016) for more
information.
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2. Public debate can, of course, also refer explicitly to policy debate, which can take
place within governmental institutions or between government officials and organ-
izations seeking to influence policy decisions. This form of public debate is addressed
in detail in Chapter 2 of this book.
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‘Independent Experts’ and Immigration
Policies in the UK
Lessons from the Migration
Advisory Committee and the Migration
Observatory
Martin Ruhs
This chapter discusses the experiences of the Migration Advisory Committee
(MAC)1 and the Migration Observatory (MigObs)2 in providing independent
analysis to inform immigration debates and policy-making in the UK. The
MACwas established by the UK government in 2007 andMigObs was launched
as an ‘impact project’ by the University of Oxford in 2009. I provide critical
reflections and personal assessments based on my role as one of five members
of the MAC during 2007–2014 and as the first Director of MigObs during
2009–2012.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the changing scale, public
opinion, and politics of immigration in the UK since the mid-1990s. It then
discusses the origins and goals of the MAC and MigObs, their approaches and
strategies, as well as effects and experiences. My assessment of the MAC and
MigObs is necessarily selective and focuses on what I think have been the
most important issues and experiences. I conclude with a few implications
and suggestions for ‘research impact initiatives’ and researchers who aim to
bridge the gaps between research, public debates, and policy-making on
migration.
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Migration to the UK: Rising Numbers, Public Opinion,
and Changing Politics
The size of the foreign-born population in the UK increased from about 3.8
million (7 per cent of the population) in 1993 to over 8.7 million (13.5 per
cent of the population) in 2015 (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2017). This rise in the
number of migrants in the UK is the result of considerable increases in net
migration flows (i.e. immigration minus emigration) since the mid-1990s (see
Vargas-Silva and Markaki 2017). Net migration increased sharply in the late
1990s, after 2004 (the year of EU enlargement), and in 2013 (when the UK
economy was recovering from economic downturn following the financial
crisis that began in 2008). In 2015, annual netmigration reached a record high
of 332,000 but it fell sharply to 248,000 in 2016, the year when the UK voted
to leave the European Union. This decrease was primarily the result of a
decline in EU net migration which was the consequence of a fall in immigra-
tion and an increase in emigration of EU citizens to and from the UK
(Migration Observatory 2017).
Since 2004, a large part of the growth of the number of migrants in the UK
has been driven by immigration from the EU. Together with Ireland and
Sweden, the UK was in a minority of EU15 countries that opened its labour
markets to workers from the new member states immediately upon EU
enlargement on 1 May 2004. Following this decision (and subsequent rounds
of enlargement that included Romania and Bulgaria in 20073 and Croatia
in 2013), the number of EU-born migrants in the UK tripled from about
1.2 million in 2003 to over 3.5 million in 2016. EU migrants now constitute
over one-third of all foreign-born persons in the UK. Poland has recently
replaced India as the most common country of birth and citizenship among
the migrant population in the UK (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2017).
The rise in migration since the mid-1990s has been accompanied by an
increase in the salience of immigration as an issue of concern to the British
public (Blinder and Allen 2016). During most of the 1990s, fewer than 5 per
cent of the British public considered immigration as one of the ‘most import-
ant issues facing the UK’. Since the early 2000s, immigration has consistently
ranked among the five most important issues. In most of 2015, immigration
was the biggest issue of concern to the British public, more important than the
economy and the National Health Service.4 Notably, following the 2016 UK
referendum vote to leave the UK, the salience of immigration in public opin-
ion in the UK declined markedly. By April 2018, immigration had dropped to
the fourth most important issue among the British public (Ipsos MORI 2018).
Opinion polls in recent years show that a majority of the British public
would like to see immigration reduced. Over 56 per cent of respondents to the
British Social Attitudes Survey 2013 said that immigration should be ‘reduced
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a lot’, while 77 per cent chose either ‘reduced a lot’ or ‘reduced a little’ (Blinder
and Allen 2016). While public opinion data are not always comparable over
time, the evidence suggests that public attitudes have been in favour of
reductions in immigration for a long time, even when the actual number of
migrants and the salience of immigration as an issue of concern were much
lower than today. Since the early 1960s, a majority of the British public has said
that there were ‘too many immigrants’ in the UK (Blinder and Allen 2016).
The rise in the scale of immigration and its salience in public opinion have
been accompanied by considerable changes in the domestic politics of migra-
tion in the UK. The Labour government that came to power in the late 1990s
strongly believed in the economic benefits of immigration. It implemented a
number of ‘managed migration’ policies, such as expanding the UK’s work
permit programme for employing skilled non-EU workers and encouraging
foreign students to enrol at British universities. The government’s decision
not to impose any transitional controls on the employment of A8 workers at
the time of EU enlargement in May 2004 was fully in line with its goal of
expanding migration to fill vacancies in skilled and, especially, in low-skilled
occupations, where employers found it difficult to employ migrants legally
before EU enlargement (because the work permit system focused on admitting
skilled non-EU workers only).
The increase in EU immigration in the UK after enlargement in 2004 turned
out much larger than the government had anticipated, fuelling a popular
impression that immigration was ‘out of control’. With public opinion hard-
ening against immigration, the Labour government decided to reform its
immigration policy. In 2008, the government introduced a ‘points-based
system’, which comprised three tiers for admitting migrant workers from
outside the European Economic Area (EEA). According to the UKHomeOffice:
Tier 1 was for ‘highly skilled individuals to contribute to growth and product-
ivity’; Tier 2 for ‘skilled workers with a job offer to fill gaps in the UK labour
force’; and Tier 3 (which has never been opened) could facilitate the admission
of ‘limited numbers of low skilled workers needed to fill specific temporary
labour shortages’. The UK’s points-based system was designed to make policy
simpler and more ‘rational’. Increased selection and regulation of admission
by skill, with higher-skilled migrants facing fewer restrictions than lower-
skilled migrants, was at the heart of the new policy. Importantly, while the
new points-based system aimed to increase the ‘selectivity’ of the admissions
policy, it did not include a limit on the number of migrants coming to the UK.
After coming to power in May 2010, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat
Coalition government, led by David Cameron, essentially maintained the
structure of the existing points-based system but added an explicit annual
migration target. The overriding objective of the UK’s immigration policies
since 2010 has been to reduce net migration to the ‘tens of thousands’ (i.e. to
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less than 100,000). The target has never been achieved but, nevertheless,
remains, at the time of writing this chapter (mid 2018), at the heart of the
government’s immigration policies. The desire to reduce net migration to
the tens of thousands was affirmed after the Conservatives won a majority
in 2015 and it has remained a key goal for the current Conservative govern-
ment under Theresa May. Few people believe that the target can ever be
achieved, yet in early 2018 it remains a stated policy goal while Britain is
negotiating its exit from the European Union. Concern about immigration
has been a major factor, and some argue the most important issue, in explain-
ing Britain’s referendum vote to leave the European Union (Goodwin and
Milazzo 2017).
The Migration Advisory Committee (2007–)
Aims and Rationale
Set up by the then Labour government in 2007, the MAC is an independent
body5 of five academic economists and migration experts tasked to ‘provide
transparent, independent and evidence-based advice to the government on
migration issues’. TheMAC is sponsored and funded by the UK’s HomeOffice.
The work of the MAC is supported by a secretariat comprising civil servants
(researchers and policy experts) from within the UK’s Home Office. Appoint-
ments to the MAC are made in line with guidance by the Office of the
Commissioner for Public Appointments; that is, it is an open and competitive
recruitment process. Members of the MAC are usually appointed for three
years. Re-appointment is possible for another limited period of time (typically
a further three years). The Committee usually meets once a month.
The establishment of the MAC was part of the process of introducing
the new points-based system for regulating non-EU immigration in 2008.
The MAC was set up with the specific (and narrowly defined) mandate of
recommending which occupations should be on the ‘shortage occupation list’
within Tier 2 of the points-based system. Tier 2 (for admitting skilled migrant
workers with job offers) includes three sub-channels: one admits migrants
to fill jobs in ‘shortage occupations’ (the ‘shortage occupation route’); a sec-
ond admits migrants after employers try and fail to find ‘local workers’,
including British workers or workers from other EEA countries (the ‘resident
labour market test route’); and a third admits ‘intra-company transfers’
employed by multinational companies; that is, workers who are employed
by a multinational abroad and are transferred to an office of the same com-
pany in the UK.
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Employers wishing to recruit migrants from outside the EU have a keen
interest in their vacancies being on the shortage occupation list because there
are relatively fewer obstacles to admission. Employers thus frequently lobby
the government to include specific occupations on the list. Before 2007, the
shortage occupation list was drawn up by civil servants. The pre-MAC process
of deciding which occupations should be included and excluded from the
list was once described to me as ‘analytically inelegant’. The initial rationale
for establishing the MAC was to make the shortage occupation list more
evidence-based.
The mandate of the MAC has expanded over the years to cover a wide range
of migration policy issues. Since 2007, the MAC has produced over forty
reports and advised on most—although not all—major changes in UK immi-
gration policies, including, most recently, the development of a post-Brexit
immigration policy.6 To understand why the MAC was established and why
its remit expanded over time, it is important to understand two key features of
the MAC’s processes and work. First, the MAC only advises in response to
specific questions asked by the government. The MAC normally responds to
government queries within three to six months, issuing a public report (usu-
ally launched at a press conference) that lays out the questions posed by the
government, the analysis, and its recommendations. The fact that the MAC
cannot independently launch an inquiry with a published report and recom-
mendations means that the government remains in control of the issues and
questions analysed by the MAC.
Second, the MAC provides advice but does not directly make policy. In
other words, the MAC’s recommendations are non-binding, which means
that the government can accept or reject the MAC’s advice. The fact that the
MAC’s advice is public can make it hard, but not impossible, for the govern-
ment to reject MAC recommendations without good reason or further evi-
dence. Since 2007, the government has accepted the great majority of the
MAC’s recommendations but, as discussed further later in this chapter, not all
of them.
Approach and Strategies
All of the MAC’s analysis has been based on a combination of ‘top-down’ and
‘bottom-up’ approaches. Top-down analysis refers to analysis of existing large-
scale data such as labour force survey data on earnings, employment, and
other characteristics of the labour market. Bottom-up analysis includes con-
sideration of qualitative data and information, as well as extensive engage-
ment with all the relevant stakeholders including employers, trade unions,
government departments, civil society, and so on. Whenever the MAC
launches a new inquiry, it issues a public ‘call for evidence’ inviting any
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interested party to make written submissions. In addition to soliciting written
evidence, MAC members and the secretariat also meet a large number of
people and organizations including through site visits at major companies,
schools, hospitals, and the like. This extensive engagement with stakeholders
has been a key aspect of the work of the MAC, adding to its transparency and
credibility. The MAC has always tried to avoid working and being seen as a
body of experts who advise on policy without engaging the relevant affected
people and organizations. In many cases, the government’s questions to the
MAC cannot be answered without engaging at the micro-level because rele-
vant top-down data simply do not exist. For example, when the government
asked the MAC to investigate claims about a shortage of mathematics
teachers, the MAC’s analysis had to rely heavily on bottom-up information
as the top-down (labour force survey) data were not detailed enough to
capture mathematics teachers.
A second important feature of the MAC’s approach has been to be clear
about subjective normative judgements that are inevitable when providing
policy advice. Immigration generates uneven benefits, and migration policy-
making ultimately requires a balancing of competing interests. For example,
deciding whether the optimal response to labour shortage is the admission of
migrant workers, higher wages, or some other option is an inherently norma-
tive and political decision. Independent expert commissions such as the MAC
canmake the trade-offs between these options and their consequences clearer,
but they cannot, and should not, replace an explicit political debate about
how to balance and prioritize competing policy objectives. The MAC’s
approach has thus been to highlight trade-offs and different policy options.
As an advisory body, the MAC makes specific policy recommendations but
they are usually based on an explicit discussion of the relevant trade-offs and
normative judgements made.
Impacts and Experiences
Following its establishment by a Labour government in 2007, the MAC was
retained by the subsequent Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition govern-
ment (2010–2015) and Conservative governments (2015–). In my view, its
principal benefit has been to improve the quality of policy debates on migra-
tion and related public policy issues in the UK. Not all stakeholders agree with
the specific policy recommendations made by the MAC but there has gener-
ally been widespread agreement about the data and evidence presented by the
MAC as part of its analysis of the questions asked by the government. On a
wide range of migration policy questions, theMAC’s reports and analysis have
become the accepted starting point and evidence base for debate.
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Another key benefit of the MAC has been to highlight and trigger debates
about the important interconnections between migration and a wide range of
public policies, such as labour market policies, welfare policies, education, and
training policies, housing policies, enforcement policies, and so on. A key
problem with immigration debates is that they are often conducted in isola-
tion from other public policies that not only directly impact on, but can also
be directly affected by, immigration. For example, in its analysis of alleged
shortages of social care assistants, the MAC highlighted the important links
between public funding for social care and the demand for migrant care
assistants. London is one of the world’s most expensive cities, and two-thirds
of the caregivers in London who look after the elderly and disabled in their
homes or in nursing homes were born outside the UK. Caregivers are often
employed by private firms and non-governmental organizations that have
contracts with the local authorities (i.e. local government) that pay for social
care (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). Public underinvestment in the care sector has
kept caregivers’ wages low, while the desire to provide good care means that
caregivers must have credentials that require training. British workers with
credentials can earn more outside the publicly funded care sector, so training
more British workers—a common suggestion to curb labour shortages—would
not help in this case. The MAC’s analysis highlighted the trade-off between
taxes and caregiver wages. It concluded that care ‘budgets need to be larger, or
at least better targeted toward those parts of the sector suffering from labour
shortage, so that those workers can be paid more’. The MAC recommended
that only the highest skilled care workers be added to the shortage occupation
list to avoid ‘institutionalising low pay in the care sector’ (Migration Advisory
Committee 2009: 96).
Based on my experience as a member of the MAC during 2007–2014,
I would highlight four key limitations and problems. First, the fact that the
government decides the questions for MAC analysis means that there can be
important questions that the MAC does not analyse for political reasons. For
example, the Labour government in power until 2010 never asked theMAC to
advise on limits to immigration despite the fact that the pros and cons of
numerical targets were key issues in public debates on migration at the time.
Similarly, subsequent Conservative-led governments were, until recently,
unwilling to ask the MAC to advise on the immigration of students despite
huge public controversies about whether student immigration should be
restricted, and whether students should be taken out of the net migration
target. In late 2017, after sustained pressure about this issue for many years,
the government finally asked the MAC to advise on the impacts of inter-
national students in the UK. To be clear, the fact that the MAC cannot
independently start inquiries on issues of its choosing is a limitation—but it
is also a key reason why the MAC exists and has found continued political
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support. By choosing the questions, the government can clearly control the
scope of the work and recommendations of the MAC.
A second limitation—which is not accidental—stems from the composition
of the MAC in terms of the disciplinary backgrounds of its independent
academic members. The MAC was conceived as a body of economists. When
the MAC was established, the government also created the Migration Impacts
Forum (MIF) which was meant to advise the government on social issues
related to immigration (with the MAC focusing on economic concerns).
However, the government did not provide the MIF with a secretariat and its
work was, therefore, extremely limited. It never really got off the ground and
ceased to exist after a couple of years. As a consequence, the MAC became the
key advisory body dealing with a range of migration issues, primarily but not
always economic in nature.
A third key issue that has affected the impacts of the MAC relates to the
implementation of the MAC’s recommendations. The government has for-
mally and publicly accepted the great majority of theMAC’s recommendations
since the late 2000s but it has not implemented all the recommendations it
accepted. At times, the government claimed that it had made policy changes
that were ‘in the spirit’ of theMAC’s recommendations without really doing at
all what the MAC had recommended. To the best of my knowledge, nobody
has ever analysed how and to what degree UK governments have actually
implemented the numerous recommendations by the MAC that have been
formally accepted. In my view, this would be an important piece of work.
Fourth, given the set-up of the MAC, and especially the government’s
ability to decide on the questions, there is clearly the danger that the ‘inde-
pendent’ MAC is used to provide ‘evidence’ and ‘objective analysis’ that ends
up being used to support a particular policy in a way with which the MAC
would not necessarily agree. As a formermember of theMAC, and speaking for
myself only, I think this was the case with the MAC’s inquiry and report on
the minimum threshold for admitting family migrants (Migration Advisory
Committee 2011). The government had asked the MAC to advise on the
following question:
What should the minimum income threshold be for sponsoring spouses/partners
and dependants in order to ensure that the sponsor can support his/her spouse or
civil or other partner and any dependants independently without them becoming
a burden on the State? (MAC 2011: 6)
The context and motivation for this question was that the government felt
that the existing minimum threshold was too low. At the time, a UK-based
sponsor (UK national or foreign national with indefinite leave to remain)
required a post-tax income of £105.95 per week (£5,500 per year), excluding
housing costs, to apply to bring a spouse or partner into the UK. This figure
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was determined by the HomeOffice following an Immigration Appeal Tribunal
ruling in 2006 that the sponsor’s income must be at least equal to what the
family would receive on income support.
The MAC’s conclusion and recommendation was as follows:
The MAC recognises that family migration regulations are not determined by
economic factors alone. But it is an economic issue—required family income—
that we have been asked to address. On this basis, the present income stipulation is
too low. The MAC suggests, instead, a minimum gross income figure to support a
two-adult family of between £18,600 and £25,700. (MAC 2011: 1)
Based on the MAC’s analysis and advice, the government decided to change
the income threshold to £18,600. Importantly, the Home Office decided that
the immigrating partner’s income could not count towards the threshold (this
was also made known to the MAC during its inquiry). As a consequence, a
large number of British citizens (e.g. about 40 per cent of British citizens
working as employees in 2015) were no longer able to sponsor a family
migrant (e.g. spouse or partner) from outside the EEA. Young people and
women are less likely to meet the threshold because of their relatively lower
earnings in the labour market (Sumption and Vargas-Silva 2016).
Unsurprisingly, the new threshold led to a series of court cases that con-
cluded with a Supreme Court Judgment in early 2017. As explained in more
detail in Sumption and Vargas-Silva (2016), in July 2013 the High Court ruled
that the family income requirement was not unlawful in itself and that the
aims of the policy were legitimate. However, the whole set of requirements—
including the level at which the threshold was set and the exclusion of
spouses’ future income—was deemed disproportionate and unlawful (High
Court 2013). This decision was overturned in July 2014 by the Court of
Appeal, which ruled that the Home Secretary had ‘discharged the burden of
demonstrating that the interference was both the minimum necessary and
strikes a fair balance between the interests of the groups concerned and the
community in general’ (Court of Appeal 2014). The case was then heard by
the Supreme Court in February 2017. The Supreme Court decided not to
overturn the new income threshold.
During the various court cases, the MAC’s report played an important role.
The government argued that it presented an objective evidence-base that
could be used to justify the new threshold. The government thus used the
MAC to support its position in court cases about a new and higher threshold
(which the government would have surely tried to implement with or without
the MAC’s advice). This example shows how the government was able—
through its power to decide on the scope and wording of the question, as
well as the exclusion of the partner’s current or future income—to shape and
influence the MAC’s analysis and its impacts on debates and policies.
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The Migration Observatory (2009–)
Aims and Rationale
Based at the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS) at the Uni-
versity of Oxford, MigObs is an ‘impact project’ set up in 2009. It aims to
provide impartial, independent, and evidence-based analysis of data onmigra-
tion and migrants in the UK in order to inform media, and public and policy
debates, and to generate high-quality research on international migration and
public policy issues. Comprising a core team of four to six staff, the Observa-
tory’s analysis involves a large number of experts from a wide range of discip-
lines and departments at the University of Oxford and beyond.
The rationale for establishing MigObs was to inform debate with ‘neutral’
reviews of existing data and research, as well as discussions of the trade-offs
associated with different policy options. With immigration rarely out of the
news and high on the policy agenda, we felt that there was an opportunity
and need to provide journalists, policy-makers, civil society, and the general
public with an accessible ‘one-stop’ website with easily downloadable data,
information, and analysis on migration in the UK, set in an international
context. A key aim has been to enable media and participants in the UK’s
migration debate to use MigObs materials to make more evidence-based argu-
ments about migration.
MigObs was initially funded by a consortium of three charitable founda-
tions (Unbound Philanthropy, the Barrow Cadbury Trust, and the Diana,
Princess of Wales Memorial Fund) that were concerned to see a less polarized
debate onmigration andmigrants in the UK. Over the years, MigObsmanaged
to expand and diversify its funding sources, which now include a wide range
of different organizations including various academic funding bodies.
The work of COMPAS, the umbrella research centre where MigObs is based,
has always included extensive public engagement activities. The establish-
ment of MigObs was regarded by COMPAS as an additional ‘impact initiative’
which would further facilitate linkages between research, public debates, and
policy-making. It also served the purpose of generating policy-oriented
research and an ‘impact case study’ that could be submitted to the UK’s
Research Excellence Framework (REF) which plays an important role in the
allocation of public funds to different universities and university depart-
ments.7 Such research evaluations take place every four to five years.
Approach and Strategies
The recruitment and make-up of the initial core team of MigObs was
an important strategic decision. The initial MigObs team included three
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post-doctoral researchers (two economists and one political scientist) all of
whom were actively pursuing research agendas on issues related to migration
and public policy. Given our aim to present migration data and research
in an authoritative and credible way, we felt it was important to recruit
researchers with recognized academic expertise and publications. Perhaps
somewhat unusually for a project based at a university, we also recruited a
senior Head of Media and Communications (a former journalist with several
years of work experience in the UK and United States) and a web developer
(who was with us full-time for one year, and part-time subsequently). Given
the characteristics of the British media landscape, we felt it was critical to
recruit an experienced media expert who could help us researchers ‘navigate’
the British (and international) media. The full-time web developer was
needed because the MigObs website was going to be one of the principal
ways of disseminating our work.
I remember sitting down with the newly recruited team in 2008 to discuss
how to develop the project for launch in early 2009 (we were given a one-year
development period). We faced two major challenges. First, how should
we balance ‘neutral’, evidence-based, and potentially ‘dry’ presentations of
the data and available research with our aims to be relevant, up-to-date,
and ‘interesting’ to media, policy-makers, civil society, and other participants
in the UK’s highly polarized migration debate? Second, given the relatively
small size of the core team, how could we generate data and materials that
remain up-to-date and relevant to current debates?
We decided to structure the MigObs outputs and website in four sections:
 Briefings: Overviews of key migration issues, supported with data, ana-
lysis, and explanations of the nature of the evidence and its limitations.
The MigObs website now includes in excess of forty briefings of about
3,000 words each, updated annually.
 News and commentary: Analysis of migration issues in the news and news-
worthy elements of migration research, press releases, and a space for
links to media coverage featuring the MigObs. MigObs usually publishes
one or two commentaries per month.
 Data and resources: Key charts, maps, tables, and other data—including a
facility to create your own charts based on specific datasets.
 Policy primers: In depth expert discussions considering the complexities,
challenges, and trade-offs associated with particular migration issues. The
primers included submissions from MigObs staff and other experts on
migration issues from COMPAS and from other Oxford University centres
and departments.
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A third important decision that was taken during the early stages of the
development of MigObs was to pursue a strategy of pro-active engagement
with a wide range of stakeholders and potential users of MigObs materials.
This included organizations and individuals who were known for their argu-
ments in favour of and against immigration (such as the Institute for Public
Policy Research, a ‘left-leaning’ think tank and Migration Watch, a well-
known pressure group), as well as a wide range of different media outlets
including tabloids, broadsheets, television, radio, and online presence.
Impacts and Experiences
Since 2009, the MigObs has become widely recognized as a major source of
independent and evidence-based commentary and analysis of key migration
policy issues in the UK. The Observatory’s work has been heavily used and cited
in senior policy circles (including by various government ministers), among a
wide range of civil society organizations, as well as all major news outlets in the
UK. I focusmy following comments on three interrelated challengeswithwhich
MigObs has had to deal since its inception (and mainly during my time as
Director in 2009–2012), relating to ‘independence’, ‘credibility’, and ‘visibility’.
Somewhat predictably, but perhaps still earlier than we had expected, soon
after its public launch the independence of MigObs came ‘under attack’ by the
Daily Mail and Frank Field, a Labour MP, alleging a ‘left-wing bias’ in our
work.8 Critics asked how MigObs could be independent given that its funders
were charitable organizations with a broad interest in ‘improving migration
debates’ and helping bring about more just societies? Part of the MigObs
response was to argue that, while our charitable funders did have their own
normative goal and arguments, they funded MigObs specifically for the pur-
pose of providing non-partisan analysis.9 To the extent possible, MigObs also
continued to engage proactively with organizations and people who were
sceptical about its ‘independence’. Over the years, claims of political or
other bias in MigObs analysis have notably declined. Still, it is clear that, for
some people, the characteristics of MigObs funders, together with the fact that
the project is based at a university, remain reasons for questioning the neu-
trality of MigObs analysis and commentaries.
A second key challenge has been to establish andmaintain the credibility of
MigObs as an authoritative source of data and analysis in highly polarized
debates and contested policy environments. Being based at Oxford University
has clearly been a great help in establishing credibility in terms of the quality
ofMigObs research and analysis. MigObs has had access to a large number and
wide range of academic researchers with considerable expertise in migration
and related public policy issues. Some of the researchers who contributed to
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MigObs hold strong and well-known normative and policy views. So, where
briefings and analysis have been prepared by ‘outside researchers’, a key
challenge for the editorial process has been to ensure that the presentation
remains neutral and in line with the aims of MigObs. Our policy has always
been that, while we respect individual researchers’ personal views, all work
that is part of MigObs needs to be conducted and presented in a neutral and
strictly evidence-based manner.
Media and public debates often (although not always) seek out commenta-
tors with opposing viewpoints; that is, one commentator speaking in favour
of immigration and the other ‘against’. This can create challenges for organ-
izations that explicitly do not ‘take a line’. It can become particularly prob-
lematic when MigObs is invited to discuss migration with one other ‘expert’
who takes a strong view. MigObs strategy has been to avoid most of such
interviews and discussions.
A third challenge relates to the aim of maintaining visibility in media and
public policy debates. In the context of a highly polarized debate, organiza-
tions that focus on explaining insights and limitations of existing data and
research without advocating for a particular policy position can easily find
themselves crowded out by other ‘experts’ with stronger views, ‘more clarity’,
and ‘less uncertainty’. As a Daily Mail journalist once told us, ‘the Daily Mail
reader does not like uncertainty’. While this has been a challenge in the early
years of MigObs, more recently it appears to have become a strength. Given
the increasing polarization of the debate, there seems to be an increasing
demand for commentators who present analysis (e.g. about numbers and
impacts) without suggesting what the policy conclusions should be.
Conclusion
The MAC and MigObs have undoubtedly played important roles in linking
data and research to public debates and policy-making on immigration in the
UK. Comparing the constraints and impacts of the two organizations illus-
trates the obvious but important point that the ‘institutional design’ of an
impact initiative such as MigObs, or of an expert advisory body such as the
MAC, has important implications for its credibility and political acceptability,
and thus long-term impacts on debates and policy-making. While national
migration debates and policy-making processes differ across countries,
evidence-based and transparent analytical approaches that generate public
but non-binding policy recommendations are likely to be important charac-
teristics of successful impact initiatives in a range of different countries.
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It is also important to recognize and emphasize, as MAC and MigObs have
done repeatedly, that it is neither feasible nor desirable to ‘take the politics
out’ of migration debates and policies. Policy-makers sometimes present
and justify expert advisory bodies in terms of their alleged function of
‘de-politicizing’ migration debates and policy decisions. In my view, this
impression should be avoided and resisted by the experts involved whenever
possible. Ultimately, all policy decisions are inherently normative, in the
sense that a decision needs to be made about whose interests to prioritize
and how to evaluate the inevitable trade-offs. Experts can advise and suggest
policy options but they cannot, and should not, identify the one ‘optimal’
policy solution that, for most questions, does not exist.
Linking research to media debates and policy-making processes carries
‘risks’ for all sides—for the researchers, journalists, and policy-makers. Under-
standing and appreciating the different actors’ objectives, constraints, and
perceived risks is critical to constructive engagement. For researchers who
wish to inform public debates and policies, this means that trying to under-
stand the ‘politics’ of immigration, as well as the characteristics of policy-
making processes and media debates, is of fundamental importance. As
Christina Boswell, in Chapter 2, and other contributors to this book have
pointed out, research and researchers can have various different ‘functions’
in public debates and policy-making processes, some of which may go against
the researchers’ personal views and motivations for engagement. This is a
clear risk that, in my view, can never be avoided. More evidence and analysis
can lead to better-informed migration debates and policy-making processes




3. In contrast to its policy of granting A8 nationals immediate unrestricted access to
the UK labour market in 2004, the UK government decided, in 2007, to impose
transitional controls on the employment of A2 workers in the UK, primarily due to
the larger than expected inflows of A8 workers during 2004–2007.
4. Until 2015, the ‘most important issue’ coding scheme combined ‘race relations’with
‘immigration’ and ‘immigrants’.
5. Formally, the MAC was set up as a ‘non-departmental, non-time limited public
body’.
6. In July 2017, the government commissioned the MAC ‘to advise on the economic
and social impacts of the UK’s exit from the European Union and also on how the
UK’s immigration system should be aligned with a modern industrial strategy’.
7. See www.ref.ac.uk
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6
The Changing Relationships between
Research, Society, and Policy in the
Netherlands
Reflections on the WRR ‘Máxima Report’
Monique Kremer
Introduction
‘Unscientific’, ‘political’, ‘naive’, ‘leftist’, ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘out of touch with
the people’, but also ‘courageous’—these were among the many different, but
overwhelmingly critical, reactions towards the Netherlands Scientific Council
for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid—WRR)
on the publication of its 2007 report Identificatie met Nederland (Identification
with the Netherlands). In the report, the WRR, one of the Dutch government’s
leading scientific think tanks, advised against an immigrant integration policy
that promotes ‘the [Dutch] national identity’ in favour of a strategy focusing
on processes of identification in education, in the labour market, and in the
community. The message incensed many, among them politicians, scientists,
and royalists.
The heated reception of Identification with the Netherlands (WRR 2007)—
rechristened the Máxima report after a speech by the then Crown Princess
became a lightning rod for criticism—marked a turning point in the provision
of scientific advice on migration and integration issues in the Netherlands.
The WRR had been a key advisory body in this field since the late 1970s and,
although some of its reports had sustained criticism, many went on to influ-
ence the course of subsequent policy. In the wake of the Máxima report, the
status of the WRR’s advice was no longer so self-evident.
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This chapter considers the case of the Máxima report—not its content but
its heated reception—which shows that scientifically informed policy advice
must increasingly address two interrelated developments that are visible in
many societal domains but are particularly pronounced in the field of migra-
tion and integration: the growing significance of public opinion and the
changing relationship between science, policy, and politics. We also consider
how scientists can better advise policy-makers in this new reality. But, before
turning to the lessons contained in the reception of Identification with the
Netherlands, we describe the role of the Scientific Council for Government
Policy in Dutch policy-making.
The WRR and the Policy Advisory System
in the Netherlands
The WRR is an independent scientific think tank subsidized by the national
government. Its role is to advise—and, where necessary, criticize—the govern-
ment. Established in 1975 alongside other policy assessment agencies includ-
ing the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (for economic
issues) and the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (for social and cul-
tural issues), theWRR operates within its own statutory framework and reports
directly to the Ministry of General Affairs, the ministry headed by the prime
minister.
The WRR’s statutory responsibility is to ‘furnish scientifically sound infor-
mation on trends and developments that may influence society in the longer
term. It is the Council’s duty to draw timely attention to anomalies and
anticipated bottlenecks and to focus on identifying problems associated with
major policy issues, and to propose policy alternatives.’ TheWRR is independ-
ent and—unlike many think tanks in other countries—has no political affili-
ation. While it offers both solicited and unsolicited advice, the emphasis is on
the latter. The WRR draws up its own work programme and decides which
issues appear on its agenda. The act establishing the WRR also states that the
government must comment on its reports. These comments are usually dis-
cussed in the House of Representatives. While the government is not required
to comment on the WRR’s other publications, foresight studies and policy
briefs, it has in recent years done so on a growing number of occasions, in
part because the media tend to report on most WRR publications.
The WRR produces its advice by combining its scientific expertise with its
knowledge of policy-making. It gathers scientific evidence by asking
university-based researchers to contribute to its studies by having its staff
conduct academic literature and policy studies, and, in some cases, by per-
forming statistical analyses of data provided by Statistics Netherlands, the
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national statistics office. Advising policy-makers based on scientific evidence
is a specialized endeavour that involves building bridges between science and
policy. In recent decades, the WRR has come to see its role as that of what
Pielke (2003) calls the ‘honest broker’: a body that integrates scientific know-
ledge in order to arrive at policy alternatives (Den Hoed and Keizer 2007).
The WRR in the Field of Immigration
In his dissertation ‘Constructing Immigrant Policies’, Peter Scholten (2008)
describes how the WRR, from its founding until the turn of the millennium,
functioned at the intersections of science and policy. In his view, it had a ‘solid
reputation’ (Scholten 2008: 203) in the domain of immigration and inte-
gration. In 1979, a WRR report laid the foundations for the government’s
subsequent minorities policy, focusing on disadvantaged minorities and
emphasizing socio-economic integration and cultural emancipation; for
example, by teaching minority languages and culture. In 1989, another
WRR report, Allochtonenbeleid (Immigrant Policy), informed the transition to a
new minorities policy that focused on socio-economic integration, rather
than ethno-cultural origins. It introduced the term allochtoon (while difficult
to translate precisely, this infers an ‘alien’ or ‘foreigner’) as a uniquely Dutch
policy concept, referring to ‘all those who have migrated to the Netherlands
plus their descendants up to the third generation, insofar as the latter wish to
regard themselves as non-indigenous’.
Since the turn of the millennium, the WRR’s impact on policy-making in
the domain of immigration and integration has dwindled. When its third
report, Nederland als immigratiesamenleving (The Netherlands as an Immigration
Society), appeared in 2001, it was overshadowed by the events and aftermath
of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September (WRR 2001). For
the first time, aWRR report on integration had little influence on the direction
of policy. The scientific council had seemingly gone too far by calling the
Netherlands an ‘immigration society’. The same period saw a motion intro-
duced in parliament asserting that Dutch integration policy had failed. The
WRR’s report was criticized but otherwise largely ignored by the press and
politicians.
This encouraged the WRR to embark on another project that eventually led
to Identification with the Netherlands. The report addressed the theme of
‘national identity’, which was then omnipresent within public debate. To
some extent, the Netherlands’ concern with national identity can be traced
to Paul Scheffer’s essay ‘Het Multiculturele Drama’ (The Multicultural Drama),
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published in one of the country’s leading newspapers in 2000. In it, Scheffer
argued that a whole generation of allochtonen was lagging behind in the
education system, as well as on the labour market. Immigrants had also
brought with them values incompatible with the liberal foundations of
Dutch society. ‘Indifferent multiculturalism’—one that preserved minority
identities rather than emphasizing integration into Dutch society—had
given rise to a new social question. He concluded that if ‘the Dutch’ were
better able to define and communicate the boundaries of their national
identity—especially for their own language, history, and culture—immigrants
would know better what they were integrating into.
Although scholars disagree on the extent to which the Netherlands ever
truly embraced multiculturalism (Duyvendak et al. 2016), most agree that
‘national identity’ has become central within public debate, as well as in
policy-making. For example, Dutch lawmakers in 2004 enacted legislation
severely restricting dual citizenship, with prohibitions unique to the Nether-
lands and a few other countries. National identity was to be espoused in
education through the introduction of a canon for Dutch history and through
an envisioned ‘museum of national identity’. Sociologists have labelled this
shift from previous policy the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ (Duyvendak et al.
2016)—that is, citizenship becoming less a formal matter of legal rights and
obligations, and more a subjective state of mind, of belonging. More con-
cretely, it means that newcomers must prove their cultural integration into
Dutch society. For instance, they must pass a mandatory language and culture
test within five years lest they be fined and disqualified for permanent settle-
ment. The test includes questions on what to do when one’s neighbour has
given birth to a child.
Identification with the Netherlands was critical of such rigid, ancestry-based
interpretations of national identity which allow scant space for multiple
identities. Emphasizing the fluidity of national identity, the report advised
the government to look to the future, rather than to the past, and to adopt a
more dynamic, pluralistic approach to belonging. Rather than offering a
blueprint for Dutch national identity, it espoused the idea that there can
be multiple routes towards identification with the Netherlands. In particular,
the report distinguished between three processes of identification: emotional
(feelings of belonging), normative (shared norms), and functional (when
people meet not as a member of an ethnic group but rather as an individ-
ual with numerous functional relationships at work, in the community,
and so on). The authors of the report further argued that functional identifi-
cation could lead to emotional and normative bonding, and eventually to a
new ‘we’.1
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Two Responses to the Máxima Report
In September 2007, the WRR presented Identification with the Netherlands to
the then Minister of the Interior and Justice, Ernst Hirsch Ballin (a Christian
Democrat), and Crown Princess (now Queen) Máxima, herself an allochtoon—
she had come from Argentina to marry Crown Prince Willem Alexander. In
her speech at the report’s unveiling, the popular Crown Princess said that she
had been searching for the Dutch identity for quite some time and had so far
failed to find it. ‘The typical Dutch person doesn’t exist’, were her words. She
also made other comments: that the typical Argentinean also didn’t exist; that
Dutch identity could not be summed up in clichés; and that it was not a good
idea, even for newcomers, to think in terms of stereotypes. But these other
comments were largely ignored by the media. In her speech, which had been
vetted by the responsible ministers and read by the WRR, Crown Princess
Máxima focused mainly on the importance of diversity and less on the
report’s other message: the importance of functional identification (shared
experiences such as attending school, going to work, and being active in the
community) in promoting normative identification (shared values) and emo-
tional identification (a sense of belonging). She said: ‘So I find it very interest-
ing that the title of the WRR’s report is not “the Dutch identity” but
“Identification with the Netherlands”. That allows space for evolution. And
for diversity’ (Koninklijk Huis 2007).
Upon its release, the report received considerable media coverage: inter-
views with its main authors in the leading national (quality) newspapers and
a slot on the televised evening news. While, at first, the reporting was mostly
neutral, this changed quickly when De Telegraaf—the country’s largest cir-
culation daily newspaper billing itself as the newspaper of ‘Wide-awake
Netherlands’—ran an interview with Michiel Zonnevylle, the chairman of
the Oranjevereniging (Association of Royalists). Zonnevylle was outraged by
Crown Princess Máxima’s statement that ‘the typical Dutch person doesn’t
exist’ as it denied there was such a thing as a Dutch identity. ‘The princess
is a classic example of a young, upper-class cosmopolitan who works and
lives all over the world. Her description of our culture is simply not repre-
sentative of the ordinary man’ (Telegraaf 2007). It later became clear just
how many people shared Zonnevylle’s views, with many venting their
feelings in the newspapers, on TV, and at public meetings. How dare these
academics suggest that we ‘Dutch’ don’t have an identity? Paul Scheffer,
author of ‘The Multicultural Drama’, stated in a television interview that the
Crown Princess’s comments were irresponsible and implicitly rejected all
those voters who valued their Dutch identity and who had voted for right-
wing nationalists such as Geert Wilders and Rita Verdonk or for the Dutch
Socialist Party.
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The WRR was accused of being ‘alienated from the world’ and ‘out of touch
with society’—particularly with the ‘majority’ of society. Some people never-
theless praised the WRR for its courage. Minister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin,
when he accepted the report, called the WRR brave for going against the
general consensus. Many later journal articles and academic treatises referred
to the report as ‘brave’ and ‘courageous’. While immigrant groups also gener-
ally welcomed Identification with the Netherlands, this only encouraged the
perception that the WRR was out of touch with the majority of society.
Politicians also reacted to the report. The right-wing anti-Islam member of
Parliament Geert Wilders denounced it as ‘politically correct tittle-tattle’; the
WRR was ‘a club of naive people. Get rid of it.’ ‘The WRR has completely
missed the mark,’ said member of Parliament Halbe Zijlstra of the People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). ‘They want to keep harping on that
multicultural drivel. They’re about fifteen years behind the times. In this way
the WRR is gradually calling its own raison d’être into question’ (Volkskrant
2007).
Zijlstra’s statement represents a second prominent way in which the
report was framed: as the product of politics, not of science. More specifically,
it was the product of a particular kind of politics—that of ‘politically correct
multiculturalists’. The WRR was assigned to the camp of ‘multiculti’ leftists,
migration advocates, problem-deniers, migrant-huggers, and bleeding-heart
liberals, while the opposite camp was populated by realists, those who loved
the Netherlands, who called a spade a spade and valued a firm hand. Although
the authors of Identification with the Netherlands had addressed precisely this
division and maintained that they were following a ‘third way’, the WRR was
conflated with one side in the debate.
Some politicians were more positive about the report. The Minister of
Integration and Housing, Ella Vogelaar of the Labour Party, pointed to its
scientific merits; she considered Identification with the Netherlands ‘well-
researched and valuable’. Alexander Pechtold of the progressive-liberal Demo-
crats’ 66 also defended the WRR, stating that ‘I was already very happy with
the previous report and the tone of this one is even more to my liking. I’m a
big fan of these researchers’ (Volkskrant 2007). But, by emphasizing his appre-
ciation of the report’s tone, he also turned it into a political missive.
A few days later, the report drew sharp criticism from several well-
established professors—the most effective fault-finders for a scientific council
such as the WRR—commenting in the major newspapers. In his article in the
national broadsheet NRC, sociologist Ruud Koopmans (2007) criticized the
report’s ‘unscientific nature’; choices had beenmade that were not dictated by
scientific motives, the report lacked empirical underpinnings and did not
advance any scientific facts. Koopmans felt that it painted an all-too-frivolous
picture of dual identities and asserted that there was not enough evidence that
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being critical of immigrants affected their behaviour. ‘By allowing itself to
stray from its scientific bedrock, the WRR is jeopardizing its own legitimacy
andmay also be eroding its credibility precisely in subject areas about which it
undeniably has sensible things to say—for example, when it argues against
segregation in education and in favour of banning the term allochtoon.’ His-
torian Frank Ankersmit (2007) fanned the flames further. In his article ‘This is
politics, not science’, he criticized the report for being murky in its definitions
and for lacking long-term statistical analyses, insinuating that it was a pet
project: ‘It will not do to crown the private political opinions of a few ladies
and gentlemen in the WRR with the halo of scientific dispassion. The WRR
should either be scientifically respectable or throw in the towel altogether.’
Identification with the Netherlands ultimately had little direct impact on
policy. Although the government came out in support of the report’s main
conclusions in its (compulsory) comments—that national identity should not
be the overriding concept in integration policy and that dual citizenship is
unrelated to loyalty—it ignored all of the report’s policy recommendations.
Until the present day, and in contrast to most countries of the world, dual
citizenship remains problematic under Dutch law. Many politicians continue
to portray Dutch citizenship as an achievement, something that is granted to
an individual on the basis of successful integration (Groenendijk 2011); as
Dutch nationality is a precious gift, people with other nationalities must first
renounce them. Neither has much changed in the realms of education and
labour market segregation. The hardening of political discourse, which the
report also addressed, has only continued.
While the museum celebrating Dutch national identity never materialized,
this was largely due to financial reasons and mismanagement. Funding for all
sorts of ethnicity-based public participation bodies was cancelled without new
forms of public participation to replace them, as the report recommended. In
2016, theWRR—this time acting in concert with the Netherlands Institute for
Social Research and Statistics Netherlands, and at the explicit request of the
Minister of Social Affairs (Lodewijk Asscher of the Labour Party)—suggested an
alternative for the politically charged and inappropriate term allochtoon. The
Máxima report may have, almost a decade earlier, planted the seeds for this
long overdue change in terminology.
When asked on television about the critical reception of Identification with
the Netherlands, WRR chairman Wim van de Donk replied: ‘Don’t worry, our
head will grow back’ (Buitenhof 2007). The WRR has often encountered push-
back before; for example, against its 1989 report Allochtonenbeleid. It can
be years before ideas and insights take hold and usher in change. Impact is
never immediate, let alone quantifiable. Nevertheless, the critical response
to the Máxima report, I argue, points to broader challenges in the provision
of scientifically informed policy advice: the growing importance of public
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opinion and the changing relationship between science and policy. What do
these developments mean in practice?
The Growing Weight of Public Opinion
The charge that the WRR was ‘alienated from the majority of citizens’ illus-
trates the growing importance of public opinion within political debate.
While some lauded the WRR as ‘courageous’ for largely ignoring public opin-
ion, others said it was ‘naive’ for disregarding the feelings of ‘the Dutch
people’. Both viewpoints share the premise that the study was not in line
with (majority) feelings in society. Although the report did discuss tensions
within communities, crime, uneasiness about Europeanization and globaliza-
tion, and the importance of a sense of belonging for native Dutch people also,
the report—and especially Crown Princess Máxima’s speech—did not empha-
size these dimensions.2 To what extent was the message, indeed, not in line
with ‘the public’?
It is too reductionist to argue that Dutch public opinion has turned against
immigrants and immigration, and that theWRR is therefore out of touch with
society. There was, and still is, no overwhelming Dutch majority against
immigration; neither is there any clear upward trend in negative feelings.
When the report was published in 2007, a minority—40 per cent—said that
the Netherlands would be a better place with fewer foreigners. This was less
than in 2000, when more than 50 per cent said the same thing (SCP 2012). In
fact, negative feelings towards immigration decreased from 2001 until the
more recent arrival of refugees in the Netherlands (SCP 2016).
That said, the issue of national identity goes much deeper than opinions
about immigration. Although Identification with the Netherlands acknowledged
the importance of a sense of belonging—including for Dutch ‘natives’—the
WRR at the time may have underestimated the importance of feelings of
national identity for many people, who interpreted the phrase ‘The typical
Dutch person doesn’t exist’ as a denial of national identity. Survey research in
the ensuing years indeed revealed that the majority of the Dutch population
(52 per cent) said that the Netherlands’ open borders were ‘placing Dutch
national identity at risk’ (SCP 2012). National surveys in the ensuing years
confirmed national identity to be among citizens’ major worries (SCP 2015).
This suggests that scientifically informed policy advice must be more aware
of deeper public worries and emotions, without of course being captured by
public opinion. It is also important to relate to various ‘publics’ (plural). The
populist politician Geert Wilders often states that he represents the average
Dutchman—‘Henk and Ingrid’ who are fed up with immigration. Although
‘Henk and Ingrid’ do exist, so do many other citizens who are less vocal in
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their opinions. The opinions and feelings of the Dutch population do not fall
into two oppositional ‘black and white’ camps. This can be seen in more
recent surveys of public opinion (SCP 2016) concerning the arrival of refugees,
where a small minority was explicitly and unconditionally in favour of wel-
coming refugees, a small minority was explicitly against this, and the majority
held muchmore nuanced views (SCP 2016). All this suggests that criticisms of
‘not being in touch with society’ build on the mistaken premise that there is
such a thing as a singular ‘public opinion’.
Nevertheless, to be effective, scientifically informed policy advice must be
aware of attitudes and feelings across the host society. When Identification in
the Netherlands was written in the mid-2000s, there was only fragmented scien-
tific data about native Dutch citizens’ feelings towards immigrants and
immigration—an important gap in our knowledge. More recently, there has
beenmuchmore scientific attention to analysing and explaining citizen discon-
tent (e.g. for the USA, Hochschild 2016; for the UK, Goodhart 2017; for the
Netherlands, Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Van der Waal and Houtman
2011; Van der Waal et al. 2017; see also: Larsen 2013)—a trend that will most
likely intensify in thewakeof Brexit andPresident Trump’s election. In addition,
we also need to know more about the feelings of first- and second-generation
immigrants, who should also be considered as part of the host society.
The criticism that the WRR is ‘out of touch with society’ does not acknow-
ledge the diversity and the roots of opinions, feelings, and interests in the
country. ‘Society’ or ‘the public’ consists of groups with different, often
ambiguous feelings towards issues surrounding immigration and national
identity. Acknowledging this is crucial since ‘publics’ are increasingly important
audiences of scientifically informed policy advice, especially as immigration
policy becomes politicized—the subject of the next section.
Changing Relationships between Policy, Politics, and Science
A prominent response to Identification in the Netherlands was that ‘science has
gone political’—a slogan that captures the changing relationships between
policy, politics, and science. Peter Scholten (2008)—who, in his dissertation,
examined the evolution of the relationship between policy and science in
the Netherlands—argues that a ‘technocratic symbiosis’ held sway in the
1970s, with academic researchers deeply involved in and influential in
policy-making, especially through their relationships with bureaucrats. The
1979 WRR report, in which the WRR worked closely with the Institute for
Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam, directly
informed the government’s subsequent minorities policy. In the 1980s, a
new ‘enlightenment model’ emerged in which researchers often advocated
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‘paradigm shifts’ to existing policy; here, a report was deemed successful if the
government initially distanced itself from it. The year 2000 saw the dawn of a
new phase of political primacy; under what Scholten terms the ‘engineering
model’, the role of research was now to support politics. Put more negatively,
politicians can shop around for truths that suit their views (Den Hoed and
Keizer 2007). One could argue that the WRR was naive in its belief that, with
the Máxima report, one could still press for a paradigm shift as in the 1990s—
hence its conclusion: from national identity to pathways of identification.
The WRR may have been insufficiently aware that times had changed; pre-
senting an alternative view was now more easily considered as being
political—that is, not being neutral.
This was certainly the case in the highly politicized domain of immigration
and integration. Since the rise of Pim Fortuyn in the first years of this century,
anti-Islam and anti-immigration politicians have dominated political dis-
course. Although they never broke through at the ballot box—Pim Fortuyn’s
LPF party won 17 per cent of the vote in 2002 and Geert Wilder’s PVV 13 per
cent in 2017—other political parties, in particular the VVD (the right-wing
liberal party, now the biggest political party in the Netherlands) have adopted
some of their viewpoints and themes, as well as tone.3 Prins (2002) argues that
Dutch opinion leaders since the 1990s have embraced a new political genre—
‘new realism’—that emphasizes ‘facing the truth’, being the ‘voice of the
(ordinary, native-born, ethnically Dutch) people’, and the desire to bring
down ‘leftist’ progressives, the politically correct ‘libtards’. Under this ‘new
realism’, scientists are often said to ‘cover up’ the facts and are quickly deemed
to be ‘political’.
This is the primacy of politics that scientists and evidence-informed policy
advice must deal with in the twenty-first century. Academic advisers have
little direct influence on politics and policy-making, except through the
media or through citizens. Communicating directly through the media has
become necessary, as Dutch politicians tend to set their agendas and ask
parliamentary questions on the basis of media coverage (Vliegenthart 2007).
This, however, is no easy task as the logic of science often collides with a
media logic in which images are more important than words and issues are
often portrayed in black and white—migration is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (see
Chapter 4 in this volume). We also need to communicate directly to citizens—
for instance, through publicmeetings and social media—not only because this
may generate media attention, but also because citizens are voters and crucial
stakeholders in the public debate on immigration and integration.
At the same time, science no longer has the authority it once enjoyed
(Scholten 2008), although in the Dutch context it is an exaggeration to
speak of ‘science in crisis’ or ‘the death of expertise’—as, for instance,
Nichols (2017) does. Public opinion research shows that people trust science
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more than government, parliament, newspapers, trade unions, and courts
(Tiemeijer and De Jonge 2013). Then again, many people place high trust in
democracy but are distrustful of politicians, an analogy that may apply here as
well: people trust science but not necessarily all scientists. Science is not self-
evidently credible. As Jasanoff (2012: 14) puts it: ‘At the turn of the twenty-
first century, many things that seemed self-evident about science even fifty
years back no longer seem so. In particular, the image of an impersonal
science, standing apart from human interest and values, and sternly commit-
ted to the delivery of truths, has given way to an awareness that science is
frequently commissioned to serve political ends, is constrained by the limits
of human imagination and capability, and, through its very ambition, extends
the horizons of uncertainty while producing new knowledge.’
Moreover, science pursued at universities can be out of touch with social
and policy issues. Science is growing more specialized and more focused on
publications in academic journals. ‘Impact’ often means impact on other
scientists as measured by the h-index (an author-level metric based on a
researcher’s most cited papers and citations in other academic publications)
and not impact on policy. There is little funding for provocative research
which may or may not produce useful findings (Dijstelbloem et al. 2013).
This ‘narrowing of science’ has made it all the more necessary for the WRR
to act as an honest broker, a role that has become harder to perform at a time
when politicians can shop around for truths and the media logic often differs
from that of research.
In the Wake of the Máxima Report: Lessons
for Scientific Policy Advice
What can scientifically informed policy advice learn from the response to the
WWR report Identification with the Netherlands? Given the changing (power)
balance between science, policy, and politics, scientific policy advisers must
learn to cultivate greater modesty; Jasanoff (2012) speaks about a shift from
‘technologies of hubris’ to ‘technologies of humility’. Indeed, the 1990s buzz-
word ‘paradigm shift’ is scarcely heard in the WRR’s offices today. Those who,
like the WRR, are charged with ‘producing long-range views and policy alter-
natives’ would do better to acknowledge that scientific research is always
subject to bias in its choices and that uncertainty is intrinsic to science.
Scientifically informed policy advice needs to go beyond the simple model
of ‘speaking truth to power’.
The provision of scientific policy advice today also requires greater collab-
oration and stakeholder involvement. If science has less authority than it once
had and politicians can ‘shop around for convenient truths’, researchers
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and academics cannot always operate on their own to advise government;
knowledge coalitions matter. For example, the WRR in recent years has
collaboratedmore oftenwith otherDutch research andpublic knowledge organ-
izations working in the domain of migration and integration, including the
Netherlands Institute for Social Research and Statistics Netherlands (e.g.
Engbersen et al. 2015) as well as with international scientists (e.g. Holtslag et al.
2012). Although it is crucial to stress that academic research rarely produces
consensus, it is possible to come up with composite views on specific themes.
Some truths aremore plausible than others.Moreover, different stakeholders are
now more likely to be drawn into the process of producing WRR reports and
foresight studies, consisting both of a variety of academics (including critics of
the WRR), policy-makers, and civil society organizations such as employers’
associations and tradeunions. This consultationandparticipationprocesshardly
existed in the early 2000s when Identification with the Netherlands was written.
At theWRR today, there is a greater emphasis on the role of the ‘honest broker’.
Academic think tanks such as the WRR depend on extant research and
scientific knowledge. This is a strength, but also a vulnerability. To do justice
to their role as honest brokers, science must be diverse and funding must
be made available for research that roams beyond the beaten paths and
whose conclusions are not known in advance. Although scientific conclusions
seldom lead directly to policy alternatives, it is crucial that social scientists
look beyond academia. Theymust be willing and allowed to play a public role.
To fulfil its role as honest broker, scientific policy advice in the domain of
immigration and integration must be aware of the breadth of academic and
other stakeholder opinion; the research should be varied and focus on the host
society, as well as on immigrants. This does not mean that researchers should
bow to societal majorities. On the contrary, one must at times be brave, as one
of the ministers stressed at the launch of the Máxima report. Nevertheless,
without a deeper understanding of the impact of immigration across
the breadth of society, policy recommendations will often miss their mark.
For instance, the WRR may have underestimated the various feelings of
the citizenry towards the idea of national identity. Better understanding
of the breadth of feelings and experiences in society is necessary in an age
when reaching out to the publics—often via media—appears as the most
effective route to impact on politicians and policy-making.
Notes
1. The report was supported by two background studies: In debat over Nederland
(Sleegers 2007) and Nationale identiteit en meervoudig verleden (Grever and Ribbens
2007). The WRR also staged a creative intervention in the public debate by
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commissioning a documentary film-maker from the Dutch public broadcasting
association VPRO to produce a film on immigrants in the Dutch army and their
(at times strained) feelings of loyalty. The documentary was broadcast a few days
prior to the report’s publication.
2. According to the WRR’s internal evaluation, the report’s message was not always
univocal, in places too multi-layered and ambiguous to communicate clearly.
3. Political scientists debate whether political parties mainly express the feelings of ‘the
people’ or whether they are also catalysts of resistance to immigration. For
Koopmans and Muis (2009), who refer to a ‘spiral of discursive escalation’, it is the
latter. Others, such as Van derMeer (2017), argue that democracy is doing a good job
as new parties arise giving voice to otherwise hidden feelings and voices.
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7
Investigating Immigration and the
Sustainability of the Norwegian
Welfare State
The Role of Government Commissions
Grete Brochmann
Research based policy-making has held a prominent position in theNorwegian
polity—particularly since the Second World War. The development of the
comprehensive welfare model, the basis of which was established before the
War, required intensive expertise. Economics, in particular, served as a ‘master-
profession’ in the formative years of the Norwegian post-war political econ-
omy. Economists—within andwithout government—played a prominent role
in policy-making, as ‘doers’ and as ‘premise providers’ (Slagstad 1998; Sejersted
2011). Following completion of the basic structure of the welfare model in the
late 1960s, other academic professions also entered the arena, contributing to
the unremitting task of ‘social engineering’ that characterized post-war policy-
making in Norway.
In 1972, the contribution by experts to policy-making processes was formal-
ized through a new institution—the Norwegian Official Commissions (Norges
offentlige utredninger NOU). The Official Commissions have since played a
significant role in policy-making in Norway,1 arguably representing a core
factor of the consensual Norwegian governance (see also Chapter 9 in this
volume; Christensen and Holst 2017).
The composition and content of the NOUs have changed somewhat over
the years; it can also be argued that the NOU genre covers different kinds of
consideration under the general heading. This variation can be related to the
importance of the subject under scrutiny; committees directly responsible for
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preparing legislation have their own rationales, and there has been a quite
significant difference between clear-cut expert committees and more corpora-
tive committees, where social partners, members from the civil services and
other relevant organizations are represented. But, by and large, they represent
ad hoc advisory commissions, appointed by the government (sometimes a
ministry), led by a chairman and supported by a secretariat. Having been
assigned to investigate a specifically defined policy problem, the commissions
are expected to come up with appropriate policy advice after having con-
ducted a thorough examination in accordance with their terms of reference.
Usually, the advice contributes to the policy-making process before concrete
proposals are handed over to parliament. These commissions usually last for
approximately one year, sometimes longer, depending on the scope of the
task and—quite often—the urgency of the problem for the government. The
commission reports are often ‘state-of-the-art’ in character due to the com-
mission synthesizing existing research, in addition to commissioning new
studies and, occasionally, undertaking its own. Over the years, the level of
academic representation on these commissions has risen substantially. Over
recent decades, the leaders of commissions have increasingly recruited from
academia, to the extent that criticism has been raised to the effect that a
‘scientization’ is taking place in this democratic institution (Christensen and
Holst 2017).
Since the 1970s, many researchers have been prepared to serve in such
functions, although social/political scientists may have felt less than comfort-
able with regard to engagement with government—this was more so during
the 1970s and 1980s than is the case today. The critical voices have been
prevalent throughout; however, ultimately, many—and perhaps most—social
and political researchers would make themselves available when called upon
by the Norwegian Welfare State. Even during the radical 1970s, when the
modern Norwegian immigration policy was formulated, researchers possessed
the field knowledge; thus, they were used extensively as advisors to the state
administration. State officials often sympathized politically with the radical
researchers and, together, they could influence government to some degree in
what they considered the right direction (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli 2008).
Regarding the Official Commissions, the understanding among academics has
on the whole been that, even though the terms of reference are formulated by
the government, one can usually maintain academic integrity and independ-
ence throughout the process, and one may dissent from majority conclusions
if necessary. Besides, being a member of a commission is interesting and
rewarding in terms of access to information and influence.
Thus, the NOUs have had a high level of legitimacy generally speaking, to
the degree that a popular weekly Norwegian newspaper hailed the NOU
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institution as ‘the prose that builds the country; the intellectual footprint on
policy-making’ (Lien and Gundersen 2014). This assertion should neverthe-
less be nuanced by the fact that NOUs not only sometimes trigger vast debates,
but may also be highly controversial.
Norwegian academics working on an issue may also serve as a ‘bridge’
between research and policy-making outside of the NOU institute. Norwegian
social science has a long tradition in dealing with policy relevant issues and, in
fact, a large part of Norwegian research is ‘commissioned’—that is, ordered
and financed by the authorities in order to feed policy-making processes. An
unrelenting discussion on the pitfalls of commissioned research has taken
place over the years, in which the question of academic freedom has been a
core issue.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on theNOU institute andusemyexperience
from a number of such commissions to describe and analyse preconditions for
bridging some of the gaps between academic knowledge and policy-making in
the Norwegian context. As cases, I will draw on my experience with two com-
missions on the relationship between international migration and the sustain-
ability of the Norwegian welfare state (NOU 2011:7 and NOU 2017:2). Since
I served as head of both endeavours, I had direct access to all the investigation
processes; also, to a certain extent, I had access to the preparatory phases, as well
as the important dissemination periods afterwards. Yet, when it comes to the
appraisal of impact, my opinion will necessarily be subjective. It is possible to
trace the influence of these commissions on policy changes—concrete reforms,
as well as references in the press and in research documents—but, in my view,
themost interesting impact has been in terms of the change of public discourse.
In assessing this, I rely on my own impressions, as neither I nor anyone else—
yet—systematically evaluated this specific part of the impact of thework of these
two commissions.
Context: Challenges to the Welfare Model
Before discussing the two commissions, it is important to understand the
broader socio-economic and political context. As in the other Scandinavian
countries, thewelfare state inNorwayhas had an outstanding political position—
‘Scandinavia’s holiest cow’, as it was labelled in the Danish periodical
Weekendavisen in April 2007. No political party would challenge this major
institution in a basic sense. The welfare model has represented a fine-tuned
institutional set-up: a small, open-market economy relying on an interplay
between stability orientedmacro-economic policies, an organized working life
with coordinated wage setting and a comprehensive public, tax-based welfare
system. Based on a regulated labourmarket governed by social partners, its key
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traits are: pooling of risks through extensive social insurance, public services,
corporatist coordination, and low inequality.
Today, the welfare model is challenged by multiple forces, many of which
are related to globalization. The most central fiscal challenges are represented
by demographic changes—an ageing population—and the decline in oil rev-
enues. Yet, a growing worry has developed as to the potential fiscal and
structural challenge of immigration. The universally oriented Norwegian wel-
fare model—in which legal residency in principle is the only qualifier2 for
basic access to benefits and services—is particularly vulnerable to a large
increase in the number of low-skilled persons. The compressed wage structure
in combination with the equal treatment policy implies that newcomers with
low productivity tend to become reliant on welfare. Challenges with enduring
underemployment in significant parts of the immigrant population have
come to the fore politically speaking, particularly at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
Before 2004, these challenges were associated with people coming from the
global South (refugees and familymembers). Lacking education, they typically
experienced problems in a highly paid labour market that required good
skills, thus imposing a challenge to systemic inclusion. After 2004, when the
enlargement of the European Union (EU) eastward resulted in the largest
influx ever of semi-skilled and low-skilled labour migrants in Norway, differ-
ent challenges occurred. By and large, the inflow of newmigrants from Eastern
Europe has served the Norwegian economy well, yet there have been concerns
about low wage competition and ‘social dumping’ which, arguably, could
disturb the fine-tuned labour–welfare nexus in the longer run. What is at
stake is general social protection by means of the balancing mechanism of
the welfare model: having an income from work is a fundamental pillar of the
expensive, tax-based welfare system in Norway. If the wage level is pressured
downwards through low wage competition, the level of welfare benefits will
also come under downward pressure to maintain the incentives to work.
The First Commission: 2009–2011
Even though concerns about underemployment among (some) immigrant
groups, value conflicts, and social marginalization had grown among the
Norwegian public, the impact of immigration on the Norwegian welfare
system was still highly contentious at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. The only party in parliament to have addressed this issue earlier was the
Progress Party, which was not only critical of immigration, but had also,
during the 1990s, called for a large-scale cost–benefit analysis of immigration
to Norway. None of the other parties wanted to touch the issue at the time.
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It was consequently a significant event when the Centre-Left government3 of
Jens Stoltenberg appointed the first Official Commission onMigration and the
sustainability of the Norwegian welfare model in 2009. The assignment came
after a period of public debates about the future of the welfare state. Opposing
fronts were asserting either that immigration was the largest threat to the
sustainability of the welfare state or, conversely, that immigration was a
central factor in securing labour supply and finances for the economy,
which was confronted with the demographic challenge of an ageing popula-
tion. The government thus wanted a thorough investigation and analysis
based on as many reliable facts and as much robust evidence as possible. The
time was seen to be politically right for such an undertaking.
The Commission was given comprehensive terms of reference, asking for
both economic analyses, andmore substantial descriptions and evaluations of
the existing integration regime. The aim of the report was ‘to raise the level
of knowledge on how the Norwegian welfare model functions in a time of
increased migration; to identify mechanisms that impact the interplay
between working life and welfare in light of this development and to propose
a direction for future policy and some strategies to deal with the challenges’
(NOU 2011:7, 1). Three main themes were analysed: economic sustainability;
relevance of existing policies; and the political legitimacy of the regime. Three
policy areas were singled out as most relevant: welfare policy; policies on
working life; and integration policy. Immigration policy—although an import-
ant parameter—did not form part of the terms of reference. The Commission
was given a two-year period of operation and a large secretariat that included
eleven persons. The Committee itself consisted of seven members, predo-
minantly professors and researchers, but also two members from the state
administration. Economists were in the majority although, as the leader of
the Commission, I was a sociologist.
The main conclusions of the Commission were, in the main, in line with
ongoing reform processes in the Norwegian model: better education, voca-
tional qualification, activation, grading of benefits, inclusive working life,
and the defence of high standards and equal income distribution in working
life were all important components. The central elements suggested by the
Commission’s report were a public cost–benefit analysis of public finances,
including certain economic prospects for the future (based on a new model
generated in the National Bureau of Statistics); overarching advice as to mech-
anisms to be applied to improve integration; and a number of concrete policy
recommendations, based on an analysis of the existing regime.
The findings of the Commission were not dramatic but nonetheless pro-
vided a basis for concern. Improving labour market inclusion for marginal-
ized groups was seen as essential, as were the efforts to keep up the orderly
labour market regime. Even though the task was to evaluate the effects of
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‘immigration’ as such, the major part of public attention after publication of
the Commission’s report was concerned with EU labour immigration, and—
not least—the potential for the export of welfare benefits to countries of
origin. This focus came as a surprise to us in the Commission, having expected
a greater emphasis on refugees and their welfare dependency rates. The main
explanation for this is most likely the novelty of the labour migration issues,
combined with the volume of the influx at the time. The issue of exporting
welfare benefits highlighted an important discussion on the potential threat
to the generous benefit levels, considering new pressure on the sustainability
of the welfare model with increasing internationalization.
Public attention was extensive after the publication of the report. The
combination of the contentious nature of the issue and the great demand
for data and reliable information probably explains the extraordinary level of
public interest taken in the report. As the leader of the Commission, I had
expected heated discussion and attacks, particularly from the immigration-
friendly political Left. To a certain extent, this materialized. Some journalists
and representatives of non-governmental organizations reiterated arguments
that were present before the assignment, addressing the legitimacy of the
whole operation. To investigate the relationship between immigration and
the sustainability of the welfare model was, in itself, seen as illegitimate—
potentially discriminatory, if not racist. Even though very few of these voices
questioned the substance of the analysis, for these critics the research and
report produced by the NOU represented ‘unwanted knowledge’.
There was heated discussion along these lines in social media and, occa-
sionally, also in the print media. However, the main impression I was left
with, once the dust had settled, was an immensely and surprisingly positive
response, both among party politicians and, generally, among the public.
There could be many and combined reasons for this. The government minis-
ter in charge of the NOU belonged to the Socialist Left Party, which may have
soothed the critical reactions in that camp; the political Right—conservatives
and liberals—found the analysis accommodating many of their concerns as
well; and the general public were presented with allegedly more reliable and
systematized data. Importantly, since the dominating discussion was occu-
pied with labour immigration more than refugees, some of the most emotion-
ally sensitive issues were under-communicated in the debates. Clearly, there
existed milieus that continued to be in opposition to the whole undertaking,
yet a new consensus had been established that these issues were important
for all residents of Norway—both the majority and minorities—and, conse-
quently, that open debates about these issues should be welcomed.
In the years following the finalization of the Commissions’ report and
recommendations, the economic and sociological analyses of the NOU
became standard reference in public debates on issues related to immigration
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and the Norwegian model. The legacy of the report was, by and large, a
constructive, scientifically based approach, largely occupied with the
improvement of labour market integration and adjustments of the Norwegian
welfare system, in order to make it more robust towards different kinds of
immigration. Immigration, as such, was appraised as a social fact.
As to concrete impact, I believe this has been twofold. First, the NOU
contributed to creating a new frame of understanding of the relationship
between immigration and the welfare system, primarily through increasing
the knowledge basis in the public. Since the content and the analysis were
basically received as solid and reliable, it created legitimacy for the discussions
on prospects and concerns in this area of policy-making. Second, the report
has influenced a series of reform processes, predominantly through a new and
more systematized thinking in terms of integrating immigration perspectives
into general policy reform processes. It can therefore be difficult to ‘measure’ its
direct impact. Reforms of welfare institutions are slow and complicated pro-
cesses, and many critics have complained that only a few of the NOU’s
recommendations have actually materialized in new policy-making. I believe
this is only partly true, as ‘the immigration perspective’ has become a standard
concern in reform endeavours after the NOU, yet the interconnectedness of
general reforms with integration policy changes makes it difficult to claim
unequivocal ‘ownership’ of this impact. It is, nevertheless, possible to trace
the effects on family policy, on educational policy, welfare and integration
policies, activation policies, and approaches related to EU immigration.4 The
attention paid to the export of welfare benefits, ‘social dumping’, and low
wage competitions has increased markedly following the NOU.
The Second Commission: 2015–2017
The high number of asylum seekers and refugees arriving in the summer and
autumn of 2015 placed severe pressures on the Norwegian immigration
regime. The number of asylum applications reached its highest level ever,
and the magnitude of the international refugee crises indicated that this
pressure was likely to persist. When viewed in relation to population, Norway
was among the European countries that accommodated the highest propor-
tion of asylum seekers and refugees during this period, with more than 31,000
asylum seekers arriving in 2015.
As a result of this development, emergency measures were implemented,
much in line with other major receiving countries in the EU and the European
Economic Area, with the support of a broad political coalition in parliament.
Border controls were re-established, the prompt return of failed asylum
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applicants was intensified, temporary protection was reinstated and retrench-
ments of various rights for asylum seekers were proposed to legislative bodies.
Faced with this extraordinary situation, the government also appointed
an Official Commission to investigate the ‘long-term consequences of high
immigration’. The Commission was asked to examine the consequences of
this development for the national economy, the capacity to integrate new-
comers, and for the continued development of trust and unity in society.
Neither the immigration-policy nor the asylum-policy in Norway was to be
reassessed, and the term ‘high immigration’ was not further specified.
The Commission chose to interpret this as meaning a level of immigration of
sufficient scope to subject the vital institutions, in their present form, to significant
pressure. This interpretation is intentionally not precise with regard to the
number of immigrants. This approach was chosen because it is a dynamic
issue. National institutions are being changed and adapted continuously, and
increased immigration is only one reason for this. The ‘pressure’ on the
system will always be dependent on the broader context, and it will also
vary over time. The pace of change in the wake of the refugee crisis in 2015
is illustrative of this. Swift action at many levels, both internationally and
nationally, contributed to the number of arrivals being drastically reduced
from December 2015 onwards.
Therefore, the situation that motivated the appointment of the Commis-
sion in 2015 had already changed in 2016 and 2017. The mandate neverthe-
less called for a full assessment of continued high immigration in the coming
years. Even though the pressure on the authorities and the tone of the public
debate hadwaned due to the unusually low number of asylum seekers in 2016,
there was little reason to believe that this would be a permanent situation. The
conflicts that caused the refugee crisis in 2015 had not been resolved and new,
serious conflicts in other regions were erupting. The Commission considered
it important to look ahead and analyse how the Norwegian labour market and
welfare system could be made more robust in order to cope with high pressure
from immigration in the future.
There has been a significant increase in immigration to Norway in the past
twenty years, particularly since the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. Net
immigration of foreign citizens reached a peak of approximately 48,000 per
year in 2011–2012. By the end of 2015, almost 850,000 people in Norway had
an immigrant background—triple the number in 2000. Just over half of these
immigrants were from countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin-America. Among
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Norway has had one of the highest rates of immigration in relation to
the size of its overall population in the past decade and the national demo-
graphic picture has—within a short period of time—changed significantly as a
result of this development.5
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Again, to understand the work and impact of the new Commission, it is
important to understand its background and context. Even though the motiv-
ating setting was one of alarm and crisis, the terms of reference were in many
ways similar to those of the first Commission. Both commissions focused
on ‘the sustainability of the Norwegian Welfare Model’ as the central issue.
What could be done to make it stronger in the face of large inflows of
immigrants? The second Commission explicitly asked for an investigation
based on the analysis of the first Commission. This is interesting considering
the fact that the second Commission was assigned by a Conservative–Right
coalition government, even with the Progress Party, a party critical of immi-
gration, in charge. More than anything, this underlines the extraordinary
standing of the Norwegian welfare model throughout the political landscape.
The second Commission was, however, asked to put a specific emphasis
on the inclusion of refugees. In addition, a brand-new issue was included
in the mandate; namely, an evaluation of preconditions for maintaining
unity and trust in Norwegian society in light of persistent, high immigration.
Increasing inequality—economic, cultural, and social—was asserted as being
an important factor for the analysis of the potential for diminishing trust
and for polarization and conflict.
The composition of the group of people appointed to serve on the Com-
mission was different the second time. Even though researchers were still in
the majority, the representation of persons from government authorities and
think tanks was stronger. A broader representation was obviously of concern
for the government, and a total of eleven persons were appointed. The fact
that I myself was asked to be leader of both endeavours, can be interpreted as
the government wanting an independent academic direction for the overall
task. It can also be interpreted as indicating a growing consensus in Norwegian
politics on issues related to immigration and the welfare state.
The second Commission was also provided with a total of eleven persons in
the secretariat; however, this time the working period was only one year. The
limited time frame, the different composition of the Commission and, not
least, the new theme to be analysed—preconditions for trust and unity—made
the second undertaking much more demanding in terms of leadership.
The NOUs that are considered ‘expert committees’, with their academic
robustness, hold a nimbus of ‘independence’ and ‘evidence basis’. Yet, when
a commission is asked to enter a field where such evidence is hard to come by,
and where the contentiousness is at its highest, researchers’ different norma-
tive platforms come to the fore. Researchers will disagree on how to approach
the field of study, which factors to emphasize or omit, as well as how to
interpret the findings. And such disagreements often spring out of normative
cleavages. The issue of ‘trust and unity’ triggered intense discussions, ending
with four notes of dissent from three different members of the Committee.
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The disagreements basically related to an analysis of national culture—the
degree to which it is (and should be) changing as a result of immigration—
and to the question of the conduciveness of governance in relation to new-
comers’ cultural affiliation and practices. What could be done to facilitate a
greater overlap in and shared experiences in everyday life? What kind of roles
would be feasible for public bodies in facilitating interaction in order to
promote social cohesion? What responsibilities should be placed on individ-
uals versus institutions?
The essence of the overall NOU 2017:2 analysis was that the Norwegian
welfare society is facing a period of structural upheaval. An increased burden
of dependency and increased uncertainty surrounding the returns from the
Government Pension Fund of Norway (formerly known as the Government
Petroleum Fund) will require the reprioritization of economic and welfare
policies. High levels of immigration, including people with little ability to
provide for themselves, will represent an additional challenge and increase the
pressure on public finances. The Norwegian welfare model is both a resource
and a problem when considered in relation to the integration of immigrants
and their descendants. The model is vulnerable to the immigration of a high
number of adults with low qualifications. At the same time, low economic
inequality and solid educational institutions contribute to a high level of
mobility among descendants of immigrants. Thus far, Norway has not been
sufficiently successful in integrating refugees into the labour market. The
Committee’s analyses showed that there is potential for improvement in
Norway’s existing integration policies, and also outlined alternative strategies
for application in the event that the results continue to be inadequate, or if
there is a significant decline in the economic framework conditions. If Nor-
wegian society does not improve its ability to integrate immigrants and refu-
gees from countries outside Europe, there is a risk that increasing economic
inequality in conjunction with cultural differences could weaken the founda-
tion of unity and trust and the legitimacy of the social model.
The Commission report was handed over to the government on 1 February
2017. It is consequently too early to evaluate the political impact of the
investigations and recommendations. I will nevertheless conclude with
some comparative reflections on the two varying receptions of the first and
second Commissions.
Conclusion
Since the turn of the millennium, public discourse in Norway has been quite
polarized, not least in relation to refugee issues—one of the most emotionally
charged immigration issues debated in the public sphere. Yet, the public tenor
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has changed during this period, becoming more critical of immigration: spell-
ing out frustrations over immigration and inadequate integration has gained
more legitimacy. At the same time, immigrant voices have become much
more prevalent, revealing a variety of positions among the ‘immigrant popu-
lation’, thus contributing to the playing down of stereotypes and prejudices in
the majority population. The first Commission contributed to this ongoing
process by emphasizing strongly the diversity among immigrants. The fact that
labour migration became the major concern may have paved the way for a
more open and direct tone in the debate.
The summer and autumn of the refugee crisis in 2015 stirred up the old
schism again in the Norwegian public; the divide between the people for
whom refugee protection was the overriding concern and those who empha-
sized the limited capacity of the Norwegian reception system, as well as the
sustainability of the welfare state. The climate of the discussion was quite
harsh, and it was not until the inflow was seen as out of control by the larger
public that a broad political coalition emerged to curtail the inflow.
The second Commission that sprang out of this crisis situation could have
been expected to induce more commotion than was the case with the first
Commission, not least since refugee issues were now at the centre of the
debate. Now, as time has passed since its dissemination, it seems safe to
conclude that this has not been the case. An important reason for this is
most likely the extraordinary low influx of refugees after 2015, which has
strongly reduced the heat in the public debate. Besides, the NOU’s terms of
reference did not include the most contentious immigration issue—the immi-
gration policy proper; that is, how to control or possibly reduce the inflow.
Thus, the report basically dealt with the ‘soft side’ of the issue—how to include
people more constructively and productively in the Norwegian welfare
society.
The reception of the second Commission has been largely positive. All the
major newspapers (liberal, conservative, and Left) welcomed the report and
praised it for being nuanced, analytical, and trustworthy. The critical voices
from the first round—those that emphasized the illegitimacy of the operation,
as such—were close to non-existent.
The relatively limited criticism that appeared argued either that there was
‘nothing new’ in the Commission’s analysis, or that it was too weak with
regard to future prospects. The latter criticism came from sources on the
political Right that were critical regarding immigration. This was in contrast
to the major line of criticism in 2011, which came from the political Left.
Two issues, nevertheless, caused quite intense discussions in the press:
certain technicalities concerning the calculations of future costs for the wel-
fare state but, first and foremost, questions related to trust and social cohesion.
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The trigger of the debate was a couple of dissenting notes from one of the
Commission members,6 rather than the analysis of the Commission, as such.
By and large, the Commission had recommended an institutional approach
to integration and cultural adaptation, emphasizing the importance of the
long-term processes of inclusion and socialization through the educational
system and the labour market. The dissenting notes underlined the need
for an active assimilation policy. One of the notes also underscored that
‘ethnic Norwegians’ would become a minority in a few decades—a fact that
this member felt had been omitted from the Commission’s analysis.
It remains to be seen what direct policy impacts will come out of the report
of the second Commission but the public reception so far reflects a zeitgeist in
which policy-making based on research and facts has become almost common
sense in Norway in the field of immigrant integration. This zeitgeist has come
about over a number of years. The contentious interrelationship between
immigration and the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare model gradually
gained attention and credibility as a public issue. In the late 2000s, sufficient
apprehension had accumulated both in the public debate and in policy-
making circles to warrant the appointment of a research-based operation
in the form of an Official Commission. Timing is of central importance in
this regard. ‘Legitimacy’ is clearly an essential matter when judging the impact
of endeavours such as these. Inappropriate timing could have adversely
affected the Commission’s efforts, regardless of the solidity of the investiga-
tion. The systemic worries and the public attention—the tenor of the debate—
had gradually surfaced during the 1990s and the 2000s to the extent that
immigration and welfare state issues had been (partly) decoupled from the
ownership of the populist right-wing Progress Party. On the one hand, the
Progress Party had succeeded in pushing concerns about immigration into
mainstream politics. On the other hand, the Party—through its ambitions to
enter government—had had to tone down their rhetoric in relation to immi-
gration issues. These parallel processes may have made Norway a special case
when it comes to a more pragmatic, matter-of-fact-approach to the conten-
tious issues of immigration and the sustainability of the welfare state than
may be the case in some other European contexts. This is, however, not to
argue that Norway’s immigration debates are generally more evidence-based
and considered than in other countries.
In the aftermath of the two Commissions, it is also possible to trace causal-
ities from both sides. The first Commission definitely moved public discourse
in the direction of accepting more open discussion on the impact of immigra-
tion on the essential labour–welfare nexus of the welfare model, thus also
preparing the ground for more conscious policy-making in the institutional
field of immigrant integration. The high standing of the research-based NOU
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institution—with its facts, figures, and clear-cut analyses—has most likely
contributed to a reduction in the emotional charge of the Norwegian public
on issues related to immigration and the welfare state.
Notes
1. Sweden andDenmark have, by and large, the same polity-tradition (Christensen and
Holst 2017).
2. EU migrants need to have been employed (sometimes only for one day) to obtain
access to welfare benefits.
3. Consisting of the Labour Party (by far the largest), the Center Party (rural; rather
conservative as to values) and the Socialist Left Party (to the left of the Labour Party;
very immigration friendly).
4. For example, several NOUs after 2011 have built on or referred to the Commission
report (e.g. NOU 2012:2 Europautredningen; NOU 2017:6 Barnefamilieutvalget).
A White Paper to parliament came as a direct result of the Commission (Meld.
St. 6 (2012–2013) En helhetlig integreringspolitikk). Currently, a new NOU com-
mittee on employment policies uses the Commission report as a central premise
(Sysselsettingsutvalget).
5. For figures, see NOU 2017:2.
6. One of the remarks was signed by two commission members, yet only one of them
was targeted in the subsequent debates. Dissenting notes are published as adden-
dums to the NOU.
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The gap between scientific insights and societal perception of international
migration is large. It stems, at least in part, from the complexity of the matter
and the unspecific fears the unknown raises. This chapter reflects upon these
issues against the background of post-World War II migration and migration
policy in Germany. Providing robust evidence is not sufficient for a policy
adviser to succeed. In my experience, patience, persistent argumentation, and
the propagation of successful migrant role models seem to be the key to
influencing public debates and policy-making on migration and integration.
A ‘jobs approach’ that integrates both migrants and refugees into the labour
force early could make a difference. Germany, while stumbling slowly on its
path, still has a chance to find a proper balance between observing humani-
tarian migration and following economic needs.
Since the end of World War II, Germany has experienced large migratory
movements: war refugees and resettlements after 1945; guest worker recruit-
ments, mostly in the 1960s until an abrupt ban in 1973 in face of the oil crisis;
the unification and integration of East Germany after 1990; integration of
European labour markets, including the Eastern enlargement of the European
Union (EU) in the mid-2000s; and, most recently, the so-called European
‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 and thereafter. Although only recently and slowly
recognized and accepted, Germany has long been a country of immigration.
However, this status is not yet fully accepted by German society and, even
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more importantly, not sufficiently considered to react flexibly and success-
fully to the major challenges of our time. Such challenges include the ageing
and shrinking of the population, the rising and increasingly unsatisfied
demand for skilled workers, the rising use of robots, the humanitarian and
economic challenges raised by the inflows of refugees, and—more generally—
the search for a proper balance of economic rationales and human concerns in
public policies on migration and integration.1
Facing these developments, Germany has struggled and stumbled on its way
to a balanced strategy towards migration phenomena. A key question and
challenge on this path has been how to deal with the rising gap between
scientific evidence on migration and integration, and the many myths that
often dominate public perceptions of the issue, as outlined in this book by
Martin Ruhs, Kristof Tamas, and Joakim Palme (Chapters 1 and 15). The
question has to be understood in the context of the use of expert knowledge
in policy-making as discussed, for instance, by Zimmermann (2004), Boswell
(2012) and Davies (2012).
This chapter intends to describe and understand Germany’s evolving policy
challenges and developments, from the perspective of a scientific observer and
academic policy advisor over a period of several decades. For over thirty years,
I have been intensively involved in migration research and policy advice. As
Programme Director of the Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR),
Founding and Acting Director of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA),
and President of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin—
the largest German think tank in economics—I was concerned among other
issues with the creation of research on migration and related topics in Europe
and, in particular, in Germany. I was also deeply involved in the dissemin-
ation process of research to policy-making.
I will outline the major migration policy debates and developments since
World War II in Germany, and discuss the difficulties encountered in convey-
ing messages to society and politics which are widely accepted by the research
community. The core issues of concern have been about:
 accepting the status of Germany as an immigration country;
 the struggle of creating an immigration law allowing for skilled migration
with Schröder’s ‘Green Card’ and its cessation after the terrorist attack on
11 September 2001;
 the fight around free and unfettered labour markets in the context of EU
Eastern enlargement;
 the fight against misperceptions about ‘welfare migration’;
 the debate about the need for internal labour mobility in Europe;
 the challengeof openness tohigh-skilled labourmigration toGermany; and
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 the 2015 refugee crisis, including the policy switch from an attempt to
open up evenmore to economicmigration, to welcoming refugees, and to
hindering refugee migration in 2016–2018.
The Migration Debate in Historical Perspective
In this section, I outline and discuss the evolution of German migration and
migration policy since World War II in distinct periods.2 For a considerable
time, the migration issue was characterized by substantial ignorance about
empirical facts and scientific knowledge.3 This section describes how, over
time, the country has dealt with this and how it has moved closer to reality
and to considering—if not always accepting—scientific facts and advice.
Over decades, the German government was unwilling to recognize that
the country was, de facto, an ‘immigration country’. It would have been
more accurate to argue that the country did not want to be an immigration
country, which was still the case in 2018. Although labour immigration
has frequently been debated, Germany still has no clear legislation in place.
With the exception of the 1960s, the prevalence of labour scarcity was not
acknowledged, although the scarcity of skilled labour has progressively
become more of an issue during the 2010s. Further, the long-term challenges
of an ageing German population and the long-term needs of migrants are still
not taken seriously.
Extending the analysis of previous literature (Schmidt and Zimmermann
1992; Zimmermann 1996), one can distinguish the following migration
phases that have affected Germany following World War II:
 1950–1961: War Adjustment Phase from 1950 to 13 August 1961, the day
of the building of the Berlin Wall.
 1961–1973: Manpower Recruitment Phase in West Germany from August
1961 to November 1973, when the guest worker regime was halted at the
onset of the oil price crisis.
 1974–1987: International Migration Consolidation Phase in West Germany.
 1988–2003: Transition after the Socialism Phase including the process of
German unification, the Bosnian war, and ethnic German resettlement
after the end of communism.
 1992–2003: European Labour Market Integration Phase following the 1992
Maastricht Treaty, intensifying the EU and free labour mobility.
 2004–2014: EU Eastern Enlargement Phase.
 2015–2018: European Refugee Crisis.
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In the 1990s, economic research slowly began to provide the necessary
empirical evidence for policy-making (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009,
2016; Zimmermann 2014a, 2016, among others). However, since the time of
the EU Eastern enlargements, the flow of evidence seized up.4 Schmidt and
Zimmermann (1992) evaluated the West German immigration experience
at that time and found that Germany has been an immigration country
since the beginning of the 1950s. Adjusting for population size, Schmidt
and Zimmermann found the inflow comparable to that of the United States
at the beginning of the last century, when immigration there was the greatest.
So, Germany was, de facto, an immigration country from early on.
What else can we learn from the various periods? Certainly, we can observe
that it was possible to integrate many ethnic Germans either as war refugees
or, later, as ethnic migrants, and to organize substantial labour immigration
with official recruitment offices inmany sending countries. So, (West) Germany
always was a covert immigration country. We have also seen many guest
workers returning after 1973, when labour recruiting was abruptly stopped
in the middle of the first oil crisis and a recession. Similarly, many refugees
from the Bosnian war left after 1995. One can generalize that while, most
of the time, policy debates concentrate on the potential burden caused by
the inflow of migrants, a fully realistic picture also has to take into account
the large parallel outflow of people; this can typically be seen, but is ignored.
The net effects are relevant, and those flows have been either positive or
negative over time. It is important to observe the size of long-term net inflow,
which was at an annual average of about 200,000 in Germany for many
decades.
Germany also had to learn that the guest worker regime of the 1960s was
not easy to terminate in reality; the ‘guests’ were not necessarily leaving and
the country was suddenly confronted with unplanned integration challenges.
In contradiction to the myth, the majority left after 1973, but there were
interesting differences. As Zimmermann (2014b) has noted, numbers of
migrant from countries that either were EU members or became members,
and hence enjoyed free labour mobility, decreased or stagnated. In contrast,
the number of Turkish nationals rose substantially, although there was no
free labour mobility between Germany and Turkey. More openness corre-
lated with lower migration, a phenomenon which was also observed with
Mexican–US migration (Massey et al. 2016). This can be explained easily and
is another important message for policy-making. Labour migrants come and
go according to the attraction of the economic situation. If flexibility is
stopped, however, workers stay even if they cannot easily find employment.
They bring their family and have children. Hence, the transition of mobility-
restricted populations from full employment to a much lower labour market
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attachment is—at least in part—associated with or caused by labour mobility
restrictions. Establishing the right to return to Germany for work in the future
for Turkish workers returning to Turkey after 1973 would probably have
reduced the levels of Turkish migrants in Germany.
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) later imposed free labour markets for all EU
member countries as a pillar of existence, although the European labour
markets were, de facto, not only far from being integrated, but they are also
still not fully integrated (Constant and Zimmermann 2017; Krause et al.
2017). With the creation of the euro in 2002, the need for rising internal
labour mobility became transparent. To fight internal asymmetric economic
shocks, labour was expected to play the role of an adjustment factor to
substitute for the exchange rate flexibility that was no longer available. The
labour markets have taken on this role; labour mobility in Eurozone member
states has increased, but not yet sufficiently (Zimmermann 2014a; Constant
and Zimmermann 2017; Jauer et al. 2018). Hence, the subsequent decades can
be referred to as the European Labour Market Integration Phase (1992–2003),
which overlapped the Transition after Socialism Phase (1988–2003) and was
followed by the EU Eastern Enlargement Phase (2004–2014), which involved a
larger number of Eastern European countries with a complex set of transition
periods to free labour mobility. The EU Eastern Enlargement Phase is often
seen as a ‘natural experiment’, a reliable model that shows that the labour
market effects have largely been positive, in particular in the UK (Kahanec and
Zimmermann 2009, 2016; Wadsworth et al. 2016).
Finally, we are currently in the middle of what has been called the European
Refugee Crisis (2015–2018), which is more a crisis of the European political
regime than of refugees, and is strongly driven by perceptions and public
sentiments.5 Later observers may call this and the Brexit decision the begin-
ning of a European Disintegration Phase, a phase that also encompasses rising
concerns about internal mobility—in general, and also for EU citizens—in
correlation with the rise of far right-wing and populist parties. This is con-
nected with general propagated fears that migration causes welfare take-up,
creates job losses for natives, and depresses their wages—even though the facts
do not support these concerns.
Behind the ups and downs in migration and migration policy across the
diverse phases, one can identify a path that will lead Germany to a more open
society and a better developed immigration law. I shall now analyse the
elements of this process.
With the decline of non-labour migration and rising scarcity of skilled
labour at the end of the 1990s, reflections about the status of Germany as an
immigration country increased. The understanding was that Germany should
open up more. An indication of this was the announcement by Chancellor
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Gerhard Schröder, in February 2000 at the Cebit Fair in Hanover, that a
German ‘Green Card’ (temporary work permit) was to be created to attract
non-EU IT specialists. This initiative broke the ice in the public debate to
allow labour immigration to be viewed as beneficial and to reflect Germany’s
status as an immigration country. Consequently, in June 2000 a high-ranked
government commission began to prepare modern immigration legislation
that was potentially to include a points system; the commission reported in
July 2001. Germany was close to a significant change in its migration policy;6
however, the New York terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 caused a de
facto termination of the initiative. The ‘Green Card’ initiative, although quite
successful, faded into the shadows.
The reservations against migration in German migration policy remained
strong in the following years and policy was also cautious towards the citizens
of the new EU member states during the EU Enlargement Phase that began in
2004. Unlike other member states of the EU, Germany and Austria applied full
labour market flexibility only after the end of the seven-year transition period.
The media played a particular role, predicting large inflows of migrants in all
the phases of enlargement (2004, 2011, and 2014) although scientific research
at the time was suggesting that this would not be the case (Kahanec and
Zimmermann 2009, 2016; Zimmermann 2014a, 2016, among others). If any-
thing, the decision to keep Germany’s labour market closed for as long as
possible redirected qualified Polish and Baltic labour migrants to Ireland
and the UK, where their presence was very beneficial, while Germany did
not get the workers it needed but, instead, only lower-qualified and mainly
black market migrants.7 Furthermore, for over a decade, practically every year
since the EU Eastern Enlargement, the media has supported rumours about
welfare shopping by the citizens of the new member states’. It did not matter
that these circular debates died out swiftly because the claimed evidence was,
at best, anecdotal. In particular, EU2 migrants (Romanians and Bulgarians)
were blamed, but mostly they found employment and did not take up welfare
benefits.
Over the years and across many party lines, policy-makers began to under-
stand that a more flexible and open labour market-oriented immigration
regime was needed. However, politicians often acted in a helpless fashion
and were either too defensive to fight openly for such a policy, or were
overwhelmed by political pressures. Under Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first
grand coalition cabinet of Christian and Social Democrats (22 November
2005–27 October 2009), Germany began a double-sided migration policy
that attempted to attract the skilled migrants while trying to keep out the
unskilled migrants. On the one hand, the country remained closed as long as
possible to the citizens of the new Eastern European member states, but, on
the other hand, began to open up to worldwide high-skilled migration.
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Merkel’s labour minister in 2007–2009, Olaf Scholz,8 discretely managed to
liberalize high-skilled labour immigration through changes in various admin-
istrative regulations and through the preparation of the Work Migration
Control Act of 2008.9 Under this new policy and since that time, all those
considered qualified (either by virtue of a university degree or a high salary)
mainly needed a concrete job offer to be able to take upwork inGermany. This
policy continued and was refined through the next two Merkel cabinets, the
last again a cabinet with the Social Democrats.
However, in the opinion of many observers, Germany’s worldwide immi-
gration image was determined by its closed-door policy towards Eastern Europe
and the low-skilled world; see, for instance, Fihel et al. (2015) and SVR (2015).
Hence, in spite of an ever-improving labour market and a substantial need
for skilled labour, only few such workers came. This was interpreted as having
been caused by the absence of a ‘welcoming culture’ (Willkommenskultur).
Observing short-term pressures and expecting long-term needs, in the first
half of 2015 all the major parties started debating how to update the immi-
gration regulations into concise immigration legislation.10
When, in 2015, an increasing number of refugees crossed the German
borders, Merkel and large parts of the German media took the chance to use
the asylum seekers to promote a more open German welcoming culture. What
first got the sympathy of Germans, and many in the world, was soon des-
troyed by the alternative media picture of refugees ‘invading’ Europe and
Germany, which was (wrongly) portrayed in the public after Merkel solved
the problem of the strandedmigrants in Budapest later in 2015. It is unknown
what motivated Merkel to help the Hungarians, but one could see this as a
move to establish European solidarity and the introduction of a fair quota
system between the EU member states. I had recommended this in various
studies including Rinne and Zimmermann (2015), a paper which, indeed, was
on the desk of the Chancellery. I still think that there was no alternative for
Germany but to lead Europe into a solution to the refugee challenge. This issue
remains valid, since there is no alternative if one wants to preserve the EU in
the future.
After the events in Budapest, the paranoia about migrants exploded, fuelled
the rise of right-wing populists, and ended any ongoing efforts to establish a
modern and flexible labour immigration regime in Germany. The Christian
Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), the Bavarian part within the German conser-
vative movement with the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) as
a partner in all other German states, insisted on a humanitarian quota which
Merkel had for a long time (rightly) argued to be non-constitutional. Ultim-
ately, all government parties saw a substantial loss of votes in the 2017 federal
elections in favour of a new right-wing party, the Alternative für Deutschland
(Alternative for Germany—AfD).
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However, the situation is much less dramatic than some people claim.
Politically, Germany has remained rather stable, although it has taken by
far the greatest number of asylum applications in Europe (Constant and
Zimmermann2016). If there is a country in Europewith the right to benervous
about keeping the refugee inflowmanageable, it is Germany. Nevertheless, the
AfDwon only 12.6 per cent of the votes. This is a relatively small number if one
compares it withmany other recent country elections—for instance, the Neth-
erlands, Austria, Italy, or even the French presidential elections. It is not even
necessary to weight the results with the relatively small numbers of refugees
those countries received. Nevertheless, the AfD is larger than the other small
parties (the Left, the Greens, and the Liberals) and hence can claim the consti-
tutional role of opposition leadership, which gives it significant visibility.
However, the formation of a new government took six months, from
24 September 2017 (election day) to 14 March 2018, the longest in German
post-World War II history. At first, the Social Democrats preferred to lead the
opposition, but coalition talks between the Conservatives, the Greens, and the
Liberals did not converge. Hence, after challenging negotiations, Conserva-
tives and Social Democrats finally formed a third cabinet under Merkel. The
government contract reveals a two-tier migration policy strategy. The difficult
refugee issue was addressed by the agreement to seek a maximum of 200,000
refugees net (!) per year, if possible and in accordance with the German Basic
Law. Largely undiscussed in the media is that the government contract clearly
announces modern immigration legislation allowing for a much stronger
labour market oriented immigration policy. The contract signals clear criteria
which can be associated with a points system. Hence, my prediction is that
Germanywill soon havemodern labour immigration legislation, whichwould
be a great success for those researchers who have supported such a policy for a
long time.
What can we learn from recent German migration policies? One can ignore
economic or social constraints for a while, following one’s own objectives or
the preferences of voters. However, in the long run, one has to observe
constraints such as budget deficits while, in the short run, overspending or
ignoring environmental or social damage is possible. Destroying Europe and
keeping migrants out can imply large welfare losses in the long run. Reality
will then force policy-makers to adjust—see the recent French elections. Such
a policy is sustainable, if it is clearly formulated and consequently followed.
Rethinking Policy Advice
This section reflects the failures of past migration policy-making from my
perspective as a policy advisor. Optimizing the impact of policy advice on
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migration issues must begin with an analysis of the interests and weaknesses
of the main actors—voters, politicians, media, and scientific policy advisors.
The task of policy advice is challenging, since the migration topic is analytic-
ally complex and emotionally heated.
It is natural that voters follow preferences and emotions, and are not always
aware of facts and constraints. Hence, scientists need to communicate facts
and insights to a broader public through both traditional and social media, to
act as a policy advisor by providing reports or personal face-to-face advice, or
to communicate directly with the public through speeches and popular books.
Too few are doing this; neither are they educated for this purpose, nor are they
free of self-interest.
However, academic success is related to creating new knowledge, which can
be too specialized to be helpful to policy-making processes. In my view, in
their advisory role, scientists need to advocate the mainstream, not outsider
positions. Scientific advisors need to respect the different time-horizons of
science, which are long term, and policy-making, which is short term and
often immediate. This means that the production of knowledge should be
completed long before its time to be used in the political arena has come. This
implies that the researcher should stand by, until the right time comes.
Obviously, in 2018 it is high noon for policy advice on the migration issue.
New political directives are needed, and the scientific profession is better
prepared for it than ever.
In my view, the media is the most important channel for policy advice;
here, both society and policy-makers can be reached informally and effect-
ively. However, the traditional media are committed to providing balanced
reporting, which leads to a bias against mainstream scientific findings. The
weights given to minority findings are too great. Scientists are much less
prepared for the traditional media, which focus more strongly on entertain-
ment, than for social media. Social media are not only easier to access, they are
also easier to use and communication is faster.
Inmy observation, policy-makers tend to use facts and scientific evidence, if
this supports their own ambitions, if it is unavoidable due to constraints or the
challenge has become unacceptable. A crisis is helpful to push for reforms.
Hence, explaining constraints and trade-offs is an important task; for instance,
outlining the existence of budget constraints, or explaining that following
one objective may often hurt another. Although migration is a very complex
topic, the policy-makers I have interacted with in all major parties understand
it. However, since the general public has a broad misperception of the need of
migrants and their economic effects, the policy-makers often only engage in
low-dimensional or simplistic migration policies. Over the years, I have seen
few German politicians who regard themselves capable of explaining the
benefits of mobility for society to their voters. An example is that immigration
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can fight unemployment if migrants help to create jobs; since this is more
difficult to explain, it is easier to argue that migrants are not needed if the
country faces a large unemployment level. On the contrary, some take the
easy way to collecting votes by following the prejudices of their voters, instead
of convincing them about true insights. It is, however, the job of policy-
makers to make it transparent to voters where society’s long-term needs are.
It is of major importance to reach society and the voters directly—in par-
ticular, since policy-makers are caught in the political trap of short-term
decision-making and muddling-through. The broad misperception in the
population about the economic consequences of migration is one point that
it is necessary to address. The understanding in society is often that migration
causes economic problems for natives, and that migrants make excessive use
of the welfare state. Others are just not aware of the large potential economic
benefits mobility and migration can have (van Noort 2016). This stands
against broad academic evidence that migrants are economically successful
and do not take jobs but, rather, stimulate the economy and are needed in
the long term—see, among many sources, Zimmermann (2005, 2014a);
Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009, 2016); EU Commission (2011); Constant
and Zimmermann (2013); Blau and Mackie (2016); Wadsworth et al. (2016).
Migrants can reduce native unemployment if they are complements in the
production of goods and services, and not substitutes for native workers. As a
consequence, more employed migrants may cause a larger labour demand for
natives. Besides public fears, the risk of welfare migration is also low (Giulietti
and Wahba 2013; Giulietti et al. 2013).
Another point is to take the fears and concerns of people seriously and
introduce them to realities that can generate positive affections: for example,
to make transparent the misery of war and flight—solidarity with and respon-
sibility for the fate of refugees can be strong incentives for acceptance and
support; and informing the public about the success story of migrants in
society and employment, and their usefulness for the economy demonstrated
through the presentation of real-life migrant role models. As an example, the
German Federal Railway recently advertised their services using the real-world
example of amigrant born in Africa, who became popular as the rolemodel for
a helpful and service-oriented train conductor. Globally seen, concerns about
migrants and refugees are often the largest in geographical areas where no
migrants or refugees live.11 Anecdotal evidence for Germany illustrates this.
The infamous anti-migration Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against
the Islamisation of the West) started in Dresden, the capital of Saxony, in
2014. In the 2017 federal elections, the AfD, having won 27.0 per cent of the
votes (Germany: 12.6 per cent), became the largest (!) party in that German
state, while the share of foreigners in that year in Saxony was 3.9 per cent
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(Germany: 10.5 per cent). Integration policies and practices in companies
need to take this as a starting point to expose role models in society and in
workplaces, and to mobilize and involve ethnic networks or diaspora.
Simply teaching facts about migration does not help. It is also important
that migration policy is consistent, persistent, and transparent (Zimmermann
2017). Points systems in immigration laws, for instance, provide transparency
for migrants and the host country. They have been effective in screening and
guiding mobility for regular migrants. This enables a government to base the
selection criteria on integration indicators such as education, language profi-
ciency, job characteristics, the professions needed and social activities. This
transparency is not only good for the migrant for guidance and orientation;
it also helps natives to understand that the newcomers are of value for
the receiving society. Using the labour market as a filter for the selection of
non-humanitarian migrants ensures that the inflow focuses on people who
are likely to have a job, are able to finance their own life, and are useful for
society. Research has shown that countries that have clear labour immigration
policies exhibit less negative attitudes to foreigners (Bauer et al. 2000). Follow-
ing the public German migration debate, it seems that these insights have
been understood by major policy-makers. Therefore, Germany is expected
to improve its immigration law in the near future as has been announced in
the coalition contract of the new government.
Similarly, access to employment needs to be discussed in the context of
forced migration (Constant and Zimmermann 2016; Zimmermann 2017).
First, one has to respect and accept that all refugees and asylum seekers also
have economic needs—they need an income source to maintain their lives.
Early access to the labour market is essential for this; poor immigration regu-
lations at entry into the host country are often partly responsible for a slow
rise in labour market performance when recognized later. Germany already
allows asylum seekers to work soon after filing a refugee application. It tries
to profile them upon entry to understand the abilities and qualifications
requirements for educational interventions and placement services. Providing
language classes is important, and the quality of the courses in Germany needs
to be improved. Access to the labour market is not only an integration policy,
it also becomes a development policy if the asylum seeker is not recognized
later as a refugee or, if recognized, themigrantmoves back home or further on.
Forced migrants should also have the option to transfer to a regular labour
immigration scheme if they qualify.
This all suggests that, and describes how, humanitarian and work-related
migration can be integrated in one immigration concept where forced
migrants are given the right early on to accept jobs temporarily and enter
channels to regular immigration if they meet the requested criteria. Of course,
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asylum seekers have to leave the country when not recognized. Guided by
research starting with Bauer et al. (2000), I expect that this labour market
orientation could also raise the social acceptance of humanitarian migration.
Conclusion
The virtue of openmarkets and free labourmobility is not easily understood in
society. A recent trend towards evidence-free policy-making and a rising
mistrust about globalization is strengthening this. Against this background,
this chapter has studied Germany’s long path towards being a well-managed
immigration country. Despite broad academic evidence of positive effects,
resistance against migration remains strong in society—witnessed by the
many recent election results; for instance, in Germany, Austria, France, and
Italy. To reduce the gap between facts and misperceptions, the combined
promotion of knowledge about the effects of migration that have been men-
tioned and the social identity of successful migrant workers (‘role models’) is
suggested. How can the image of migrants be associated with being construc-
tion workers, artists, lawyers, and soccer players, for instance? This means
confronting prejudices about migrants with job performances demonstrating
that they are respected members of society.
Driven by questions raised about the economic consequences of migration,
the research community has provided a number of insights which are import-
ant for policy-making. Among those are that Germany has long been a coun-
try of immigration and could do so much better by means of improved
management through well-considered immigration legislation. Public debates
often focus on the inflow of people and ignore the large outflow of migrants.
Effective flexibility of labour increases the output of the economy and the
welfare of people. Restricting free labourmobilitymay force people to stay and
bring family members, which is against what policies were intended to
achieve. More migrants in jobs can increase the employment of natives
when they act as complements and not as substitutes. There is also no con-
vincing evidence that migrants overly exploit the welfare state. Hiring eco-
nomic migrants and finding jobs for asylum seekers help to reduce tensions in
the native population and strengthen the chances for successful economic
integration.
Nowadays, German policy-makers have understood that the country is an
immigration country; it benefits from open labour markets and needs more
migrant workers in the future, particularly skilled migrant workers. The aim
therefore is to modernize the country’s immigration legislation to allow for
selective labour immigration policies oriented towards short-term labour mar-
ket needs and long-term requirements. The refugee challenge needs to be
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approached in a framework of European solidarity, which could start with the
early access of refugees to the labour market. Researchers need to understand
that they should be ready with evidence when the right opportunity appears.
Until such time, it is important to communicate evidence repeatedly through
traditional and social media in order to prepare the background for change.
The time for evidence-based policy-making will probably return when polit-
ical realities clash with economic constraints.
Notes
1. This broader issue has been globally studied and forcefully reflected by Ruhs (2013).
2. Reviews of German migration history and policy can be found in Schmidt and
Zimmermann (1992) and Zimmermann (1996), among others.
3. Germany was therefore always a model case for the gap between facts and percep-
tions on migration and integration—described by Ruhs, Tamas, and Palme in their
introductory chapter to this book—long before the situation became globally even
more challenging in many countries around the world. This is very different from
labour market policies, where evidence-based policy-making played quite an
important role, at least for some time (Rinne and Zimmermann 2013).
4. For instance, see Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009, 2016) for the evaluation of the
consequences of EU Eastern Enlargement.
5. The refugee issue is a crucial topic for handling themigration issue in society. It can
only be approached successfully in a European or even worldwide context. This
has been analysed by Hatton (2013), Hinte et al. (2015), Rinne and Zimmermann
(2015), OECD (2016), and Zimmermann (2016). While of great importance, it can
only be a side topic in this chapter.
6. The book by Zimmermann et al. (2007) is based on analysis undertaken for the
Migration Commission and has been further developed propagating a modern
immigration law with a points system.
7. These and other consequences of the German closed-door policy were revealed in
the studies by Brenke et al. (2009) and Elsner and Zimmermann (2016). For more
details on the consequences of EU enlargements, see the various research contri-
butions in Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009, 2016).
8. Being the First Mayor and head of the city state of Hamburg for many years, he
became the new Finance Minister and Vice Chancellor in the new and third
cabinet of the Christian and Social Democrats in March 2018.
9. Arbeitsmigrationssteuergesetz, 20 December 2008 archived at: https://perma.cc/
2AF6-F72R. A more detailed analysis can be found in BAMF (2010: 97–101).
The cabinet had discussed the new high-skilled labour immigration strategy in
August 2007 and July 2008. Law and administrative regulations came into effect
on 1 January 2009.
10. Various influential groups in the Conservative and Social Democratic parties had,
at the time, invited me to explain what form new work-oriented immigration
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legislation could take following an outline provided by my research paper ‘Punkte
machen?! Warum Deutschland ein aktives Auswahlsystem für ausländische
Fachkräfte braucht und wie ein solches System aussehen kann’ (Hinte et al. 2016).
11. Esipova et al. (2015: 14), based on interviews with over 183,000 adults across more
than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014 surveyed in Gallup’s World Poll, find:
‘Countries where migrants constitute 10 per cent or more of the population are the
most likely to have an opinion about immigration levels, and they are more likely to
be positive (a combined 51 per cent favour keeping levels the same or increasing
them) than negative (43 per cent favour decreasing levels). One explanation for this
could be that in countries with higher percentages of migrants, the population has a
greater chance to interact withmigrants and thismight promote greater acceptance.’
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The Politicization of Evidence-based Policies
The Case of Swedish Committees
Kristof Tamas
Introduction
Purely scientifically based research funding in liberal democracies tends to
limit the utility of research for policy-making. As a result, part of government-
funded research is steered towards policy-oriented studies to cater for the
government’s interest as well as, allegedly, that of the public. Over the past
couple of decades there has also been a general growth in the interest in
producing more evidence-based policies (Davies et al. 2000: 2). Different
models have been developed in this regard in terms of organizational, insti-
tutional, and funding structures (cf. Hoppe 2005).
The Swedish experience of government committees offers interesting
examples of the diversity of efforts to make research relevant for policy-
making. The Swedish case is also an example of how the research–policy
dialogue may suffer from the gap between different research and policy ‘cul-
tures’. These need to be bridged through dialogue and exchange in order to
avoid the demise of relationships between researchers and policy-makers
(Davies et al. 2000: 360). The aim of this chapter is to draw on the Swedish
example of government committees to critically discuss the potential oppor-
tunities, benefits, and pitfalls when attempting to bridge the gap between
research and policy-making. The chapter will also cast some new light on
the claim that the research–policy nexus in liberal democracies is character-
ized by ‘the simultaneous scientification of politics and the politicisation of
science’ (Weingart 1999: 151–61).
After a brief conceptual introduction, I will review the Swedish committee
system, in general, and the functioning ofmigration and integration committees
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/1/2019, SPi
working in the 1970s through to the 1990s, in particular. I then discuss a
specific case of a committee where this form of research led to a major public
controversy. I also discuss the pros and cons of another approach, whereby
policy-makers pick and choose from the menu of interpretations offered by
think tanks funded by non-governmental sources, or by academia. The chap-
ter concludes by considering alternative forms of policy-driven research in
more recent committees.
The Research–Policy Nexus
It is clear that policy-makers often refrain from taking into account available
evidence, or even go against sound evidence provided by the academic com-
munity, as ‘many alternative examples of policy initiatives . . . seem to either
fly in the face of the best available research evidence on effectiveness or, at the
very best, are based on flimsy evidence’ (Nutley and Webb 2000: 13). While
thismay have contributed tomore widespread post-factual politics (Villumsen
Berling and Bueger 2017: 332–41), the public trust in science varies according
to political ideology and interest group, and also according to social class,
ethnicity, and gender, which may also lead to political divisions influencing
policy-making (Gauchat 2012).
Existing research has proposed a range of different conceptualizations and
‘models’ of the research–policy nexus. Hoppe (2005) makes a broad distinc-
tion between ‘advocacy models’ and ‘learning models’:
In advocacy models, science is considered one among multiple political voices
that enable political debate, judgment, and decision. In the learning models, all
actors are constructed as ‘inquirers’ engaged in a process of social learning through
social debate. (Hoppe 2005: 211)
The advocacy models portray the research–policy nexus as a non-exclusive
relationship, where researchers compete with other actors attempting to
influence policy-makers (Tellmann 2016: 14). Researchers are thus not
entirely neutral and objective as ‘each voice in the political arena is considered
to be an advocacy plea in favour or against positions defended by other
political actors’ (Hoppe 2005: 210). In the learning models, research, and
policy communities are regarded as equal participants in a forum for debate
in the quest to find acceptable solutions to identified problems. Studies of
‘enlightenment’, ‘knowledge creep’, ‘knowledge shifts’, or ‘research as ideas’,
have shown how scientific research historically has had various, sometimes
unintended, impacts on policy-making. For some researchers, such impacts
could probably be welcome if their findings are used as an aid in defining
problems and policy options. They could, however, also be detrimental in
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cases where research is being over-simplified and reshaped into unscientific
arguments, or used selectively merely to legitimize predefined political posi-
tions (Hoppe 2005: 203; Daviter 2015; see also Weiss 1977, 1980, 1991: 311).
While researchers often want to avoid secluding themselves in an ‘ivory
tower’ and cannot always control how their output will be used or inter-
preted, they need to maintain their autonomy in relation to policy-makers
(Villumsen Berling and Bueger 2017: 115–19). Moreover, there are also risks
with Wildavsky’s notion of ‘speaking truth to power’ (Wildavsky 1979), as
an exaggerated emphasis on the production of knowledge for policy-making
as steering primarily through knowledge and experts could be to the detri-
ment of open and more inclusive political, democratic deliberations.
A further risk would be if the evidence produced for the sake of reinforced
policy-making were to end up in the form of empty rituals that policy-
makers came to ignore (Ahlbäck Öberg 2011: 764).
Assessments of research–policy dialogues have also pinpointed the different
‘cultures’ that need to be bridged through open exchange and improved
commissioning of research in order to close the existing gaps. Davies et al.
(2000) consider that:
policy makers and practitioners complain that research is, among other things,
slow, impenetrable, irrelevant, expensive, and inconvenient or uncomfortable.
However, to some extent this reflects failures in the commissioning process
and failures to understand the nature of research rather than failures of research.
(Davies et al. 2000: 360)
Finally, research may become politicized, especially in highly contested issue
areas such as migration and integration. However, politicization does not
necessarily mean reduced utilization of knowledge or evidence in policy-
making. It may, nevertheless, shift the position of utilization from instrumen-
tal to symbolic. Symbolic utilization either substantiates pre-existing policy
positions, or is used to legitimize policy positions (Boswell 2009; Scholten and
Verbeek 2015; Chapter 2 in this book).
The Swedish Tradition of Government-funded
Committees: Functioning and Critiques
There is a 400-year tradition in Sweden of relying on committees (similar to
those in Norway and Denmark) in order to collect information and research,
analyse data and prepare proposals as an input to processes of legislative
change and broader policy-making. These committees represent different
forms of bridging the research–policy gaps.1 Therefore, they serve as a good
case for analysing the extent to which they may be mainly characterized as
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advocacy models or learning models, and the extent to which they may avoid
politicization.
Most of the major legislative and policy reforms in Sweden have been based
on the report of a committee of some sort (ESO 1998: 57). Committees of
inquiry, commissions, more long-standing delegations or expert groups may
be led by professional experts, such as professors or legal experts, or politicians
within the theme to be covered.2 This is a useful aid since Swedish ministries
in international comparison have been small in terms of staffing and resources
(SOU 2016: 338). This injection of knowledge and evidence could, in an
optimistic scenario, bring more well-founded decisions (Zetterberg 1990:
307; Amnå 2010: 556).
The proposals put forward by committees are usually circulated to all
concerned stakeholders for input, including government ministries and agen-
cies, labour market bodies (employers’ associations and unions), organiza-
tions, civil society, and the private sector. Committees, in the sense of
Bordieau’s concept of social capital and from a broader research perspective
on social trust, may be seen as instruments for political deliberations with
the aim of bringing opposing views closer together (Trägårdh 2007: 254,
see also 261).
In recent decades, there have been important changes in the way that
committees have worked and in the way they have influenced policy-making.
For example, there has been a relative reduction in the share of parliamentary
committees involving both political parties and organized interest groups in
relation to inquiries headed by a special investigator (ESO 1998: 57). In
addition, Swedish interest groups have noted deterioration in the opportun-
ities to influence government policy-making through the committees
(Lundberg 2015a: 44, 56; 2015b). There has also been a relative reduction in
the share of committees that take on the major political challenges, while
there is an increasing share of committees dealing with somewhat marginal
and technical issues (ESO 1998: 57).
An evaluation of the committee system in 1997 by the Parliament’s Audi-
tors, found that the quality of the committees’work had deteriorated, partly as
a result of reduced time given to the committees in which to prepare their
analysis and provide their results. A 2004 follow-up evaluation by the Swedish
National Audit Office noted that these deficiencies remain, that the remit with
which working committees are tasked does not correspond to the time
allowed for delivery, and that several committees have deficiencies in the
data they use as background to the analysis and proposals (Riksdagens
revisorer 1997/98: 12; Riksrevisionen 2004: 8). The appointed researchers do
not manage to contribute with novel research and analysis, and then the
committees, become more reliant on expertise from within the ministries
(Amnå 2010: 558). Indeed, one study has shown that Swedish governments
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have exercised increasingly tighter control over the committees (Riksdagens
revisorer 1997/98: 70, referring to Johansson 1992).
Similarly, the Administrative Policy Commission (Förvaltningspolitiska kommis-
sionen) noted in its report that, since the 1980s, the committees had been increas-
ingly brought closer to the government offices and that they were compiling
existing research, rather than collecting their own primary data and analysing it
to generate newknowledge. It argued that the government should, instead,make
greater use of the committees to undertake independent evaluations and take on
board the full value of research (SOU 1997: 98–9). The Control Commission
(Styrutredningen) suggested that the committees should be usedmore strategically
to compile knowledge as counter-narratives whenever a reform of government
agencies and their work is to be considered (SOU 2007: 260, 264–5).
It has also been argued that cases of mounted political steering—preordained
results and the premature preparation of legislative proposals before commit-
tees’ final proposals are completed—risk damaging the overall political system
(Erlingsson 2016). In contrast, it has been suggested that it is a myth that the
government has good control over and the ability to direct Swedish commit-
tees. This is illustrated by how directives are often rather vague and ambiguous,
and, in addition, are frequently not properly applied by the committees. Never-
theless, the government continues to appoint committees regularly, as there are
relatively few alternatives in Sweden compared to other countries as far as think
tanks and other independent foundations for research are concerned (ESO
1998: 57).
To conclude this broad review of committees in Swedish policy-making: in
its ideal form, the Swedish committee system may function as a depoliticized
forum from which the government may harvest science-based analysis and
preparatory work for its legislative reforms and policy development. Recent
critiques have, however, pointed to considerable challenges with this system.
Moreover, what happens when the policy field to be analysed by a committee
becomes highly politicized, as in the case of migration and integration?
Government-funded Migration Research in Sweden
The Swedish government, as well as the Swedish media, started to show an
interest in migration research in the 1970s. The government wanted close
cooperation between government officials and researchers with a view to
providing an improved knowledge-base for policy reforms, and to evaluate
ongoing policy frameworks. Researchers, in general, still had a limited impact
on the policy-making process, however. The Swedish government, neverthe-
less, took the initiative to commission various sector-based research projects
that would otherwise not have been carried out within the regular university
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system. Such commissioned research encouraged a burgeoning group of
scholars to explore the field of migration research. This period was character-
ized by a realization that immigrants who had arrived as temporarily needed
labour were likely to remain for the long term, and that more systematic
policy-making and planning was now a necessity. The government asked
researchers for empirical analyses of past and contemporary migration pat-
terns, trends, and consequences. The resulting research provided input to the
preparations for both integration and migration control policies (Hammar
2003: 10; 2004: 19).
In the period 1975–1983, the government appointed an expert group
(Eifo—the Expert Group on Immigration Research) within the government
offices to work on immigration and integration issues. It initiated, coordin-
ated, and published policy-relevant studies on the emerging integration issues
in Sweden (Hammar 2003: 10; 2004: 19). Several of the researchers employed
by Eifo were moved to Stockholm University in 1983, where a new centre
(Ceifo—the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Rela-
tions) was established. At the same time, Deifo (the Delegation of Immigration
Research) was set up to initiate and share information about research in the
area of migration and integration. A government decision in 1990 trans-
formed this body, together with the Delegation for Social Research, into a
social sciences research council.3
These changes had partly been motivated by the view that research also
needed to be established in this field within the more regular university
research structures. It was probably also due to the need to make research
more independent from the government. For a period, however, much
research continued to be initiated by the government. For instance, the first
professorship in research into International Migration and Ethnic Relations
(IMER) was set up in 1988 on the basis of a political initiative in the Swedish
Parliament (Riksdag) (Hammar 2004: 30, 33).
In the 1980s and 1990s, migration started to become much more of a
politicized issue in Sweden (Byström and Frohnert 2017). An increase in
immigration, especially that of refugees and family members, from a much
wider range of source countries and regions gave rise to a range of challenges
for integration, such as segregation, unemployment among immigrants, and
xenophobia. Some parliamentarians and researchers were quite critical of
what they saw as an increasingly restrictive migration and integration policy
at the end of the 1980s (Spång 2008). This was perhaps one reason why the
different governments around that time became more sceptical of approach-
ing academic researchers and asking for advice:
Maybe policy makers in this new restrictive migration period give less priority to
migration research, not because the field has become less important for politicians
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and for all of us, but quite the reverse, because it has become a politicized and
politically sensitive issue. (Hammar 2003: 11)
TomasHammarhasnoted that, sometimes, politicians appoint a committee and
commission research merely as a means of prolonging the decision-making
period, or as an excuse for inaction. Nevertheless, commissioned research initi-
ated by politicians, he argued, should be open-ended and not designed in a way
that a ready-made answer must be sought by the researchers. He believed that
researchers need to be allowed to apply their regular methods of inquiry, seek
new knowledge, and interpret it with the same high scientific standards that
they would normally apply in a university environment (Hammar 1982: 22).
Overall, the experiences from theperiodwith Eifo,Deifo, andCeifo in Sweden
were—according to Hammar, who was very much involved with all three
entities—that research conducted under these premises remained independent
and of high quality. The political steering wasmainly limited to the themes and
topics chosen for the studies, which were often outlined in a very broad, sweep-
ingmanner (Hammar1988: 19).However, the relationshipbetween thepolitical
leadership in theministry and the appointed researchers was also criticized after
a while. At the time, there was a lack of immigration research at the universities
in Sweden; in addition, there were requests from various stakeholders that the
policy-relevant research should be conducted at a university rather than within
the structure of a ministry (leading to the setting up of Ceifo) (Wigerfelt and
Peterson 2010; see also Hammar 1994: 13–18; 2008: 61).
During this period, relations between researchers and policy-makers were,
in general, good, thanks to the engagement of numerous researchers in the
work of committees. This enabled many researchers to participate in the
ongoing ‘problem definition’: ‘Swedish migration researchers have made crit-
ical assessments of migration and integration policies and even highly critical
positions seem to have been taken into account’ ( Jørgensen 2011: 103). In the
early part of the period, the nexus was characterized by consensus, whereby
researchers informed policy-makers. Subsequently, however, conflicting
researcher positions emerged, which also had an impact on the overall
research–policy dialogue ( Jørgensen 2011: 105).
This observation regarding the conflicting research positions motivates the
case study in the following section, which is presented in order to illustrate the
more recent characteristics of the research–policy nexus in the field of migra-
tion and integration policies in Sweden.
The Committee that Capsized
A low degree of politicization in the migration field seems to have enabled a
larger share of learning (a forum for debate) than advocacy (competition),
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according to themodels initially outlined in the research–policy nexus.4What
happens, however, when migration becomes much more politicized, as has
been the case in recent decades? It has been noted that ‘[i]n politicized
settings, research and expertise are much less likely to be used as an authori-
tative source of policy-making, as this could be interpreted as a threat to
political primacy’ (Scholten and Verbeek 2015: 2, referring to Hoppe 2005).
We shall now take an in-depth look at a case where the research, the commit-
tee, and the ensuing debate became highly politicized, and the use of know-
ledge became more symbolic.
An unusual form of committee in Sweden is one constructed in such a way
that it should entirely focus on knowledge-production. The government has,
in these cases, chosen to make the committee researcher-driven. Work is often
linked to an academic environment, or based on reports being commissioned
from external researchers. Some of these committees have not even been
called upon to make concrete proposals for changes in policy or legislation,
in order to make them even more independent, only being requested to take
into account research and knowledge, and not being required to take respon-
sibility for policy-making decisions (Ahlbäck Öberg 2004).
One example is the Integration Policy Power Commission (Ministry of
Culture 2000). It was set up in 2000 as an important inquiry into integration
policy, including discrimination, in Sweden. The head of the committee was
Anders Westholm, a professor in political science and a well-known and
highly respected researcher on power and influence. Two of the researchers
who were appointed as experts on multiculturalism and discrimination in the
committee—Paulina de los Reyes, an economic historian, andMasoud Kamali,
professor at the Centre for Multiethnic Research—chose to resign after having
expressed concerns regarding the working methods and priorities of the
committee.
The critique also centred around the argument from de los Reyes and Kamali
that the committee’s researchhad taken a faulty path due toWestholm’s alleged
lack of expertise in research on discrimination andmulticulturalism. According
to de los Reyes and Kamali, too few researchers with adequate research expertise
and an immigrant background were involved (SvT Nyheter 2004). When resign-
ing in April 2003, they published a debate article in the daily newspaperDagens
Nyheter (Daily News). They claimed that the committee was driven by the norm
that ‘Swedishness’ is self-evident and natural, while immigrants are different
and thus subordinated to others in mainstream society. They claimed this to
be an example of the very institutional, structural discrimination that should
be the realmission of the committee’s study. This was also the reasonwhy, they
stated, they chose to resign (Dagens Nyheter 2003).
These claims were refuted by Anders Westholm. The committee had been
tasked with analysing the distribution of power resources and influence
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among people with a foreign background and the rest of the population, and
to develop and test hypotheses around what affects the power and influence
of immigrant groups in Swedish society (Dagens Nyheter 2003). The minister
responsible, Mona Sahlin, a Social Democrat, agreed with de los Reyes and
Kamali in much of their critique, including their observation that there is
structural discrimination in Swedish society. She argued that she did not take
sides in the academic debate but, rather, that she wanted to highlight not only
the conflict itself, but also that there is structural discrimination within the
academic world (Dagens Nyheter 2004a; 2006). Westholm felt compelled to
resign (Ahlbäck Öberg 2004) and the government announced the appoint-
ment of Kamali to a new committee on Power, Integration and Structural
Discrimination ( Justitiedepartementet 2004). Moreover, the terms of refer-
ence for Kamali’s new inquiry stated basically, as self-evident, that there is
structural discrimination in Sweden (Justitiedepartementet 2004).
Subsequently, the eight researchers who remained on the Integration Policy
Power Commission wrote a debate article in Dagens Nyheter. They defended
Westholm (Dagens Nyheter 2004b), and his interpretation of the terms of
reference. They were critical of integration minister Mona Sahlin, arguing
that, instead of meeting her responsibility and creating an atmosphere
where Westholm could go on working, she had acted in a way that forced
Westholm to resign, as he had sensed that she did not trust him to complete
his mission. Those researchers in the expert group who had not resigned tried
to meet with Sahlin to discuss the matter but they were not presented with
any opportunity to do so, according to media sources (Dagens Nyheter 2004b).
Finally, according to the eight researchers, the government should instead
have given the research councils (forskningsråden)—for instance, the research
council for working life and social sciences (forskningsrådet för arbetsliv och
socialvetenskap)—the task of distributing research funding for these kinds
of special requests. Researchers could then apply for funding in the usual
competitive environment. They stated that the politicization of research by
minister Sahlin was very worrying and could harm both the legitimacy of
research and the committee system itself (Dagens Nyheter 2004b). As a result,
there was extensive criticism of the minister, mainly from conservative media
and commentators (Söderlund 2005). Around seventy researchers—among
them very senior members of high-profile academia such as political science
professors Bo Rothstein and Olof Petersson—wrote to minister Sahlin protest-
ing against the politicization of the committee’s working methods, a situation
which the actions of the minister had allegedly created (Svenska Dagbladet
2003; Dagens Nyheter 2004b; Rothstein 2010).
One observer—the political scientist Shirin Ahlbäck Öberg—argued boldly
that ‘with her conduct, Sahlin dictates the scientific formulation of concepts
and approaches and points out the “right” research orientation. You get the
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impression that the government with such a decision marks what kind of
response they want on the questions formulated in the terms of reference’ to
the commission (quoted in Borg 2006: 12).5 However, at the same time, many
of the academics who took part in the debate reflected a scientific, rather than
political, gap between a positivist epistemology and ontology (represented by
Westholm) and critical, postmodern, and postcolonial approaches (as pro-
moted by Kamali) (see, e.g., Svenska Dagbladet 2003). A later study questioned
whether there was a ‘danger of explaining too much’ in the Kamali approach:
‘Is it possible to capture the empirical complexity of this field aided by one
diagnosis alone?’ (Brekke and Borchgrevink 2007: 38).
Kamali’s final report to the government was published in 2006 (SOU 2006),
but the responsible Social Democratic minister at that time, Jens Orback,
received it with great scepticism, arguing that it lacked clear legal proposals
and fundamental calculations of costs (SvT Nyheter 2006) and that many of its
suggestions already formed part of Swedish integration policy (Mavi 2007).
Meanwhile, Kamali referred to his results as having shown that structural
discrimination is both a cause and a consequence of inequality in Sweden,
and that it is created and made permanent through the complex interaction
between structural conditions, institutional arrangements, and individual
actions. Kamali saw current integration policy as counter-productive and as
having the wrong focus, and as having therefore stalled. He argued that radical
change, including affirmative action, was necessary (SOU 2006:79).
A few years later, the researcher Stefan Jonsson reasoned that, as soon as
the ‘immigrants’ had gained the right to formulate the problem of integra-
tion, ‘the political and media elite’ in Sweden had chosen to ignore the
problem. Jonsson began to argue that discrimination was not amajor problem
but, rather, only marginal ( Jonsson 2008). Despite this, Jonsson argued that
Kamali’s committee had not worked in vain. Although very little came out of
the committee’s proposals in terms of politics, the ideational and scientific
results were notable in that they moved from a narrow group of researchers
into a broader societal context ( Jonsson 2008).
A harsh verdict on the whole case was written by the political scientist
Ahlbäck Öberg (2004), who sided with Westholm. She argued that, in hind-
sight, it could be noted that the idea of investigations into power relations in
the form of major research programmes had been based on what transpired to
be a naive assumption: that, within the framework of the committee, it would
be possible to maintain a barrier between policy and research. If the govern-
ment wishes more research in a particular area, it would be better, she argued,
if they allocated funds to the traditional research councils instead.
This case has illustrated how the research–policy nexus became highly
politicized and how knowledge utilization became symbolic—politicians
using research-as-ammunition (cf. Chapters 2 and 3 in this book; Weiss
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1979). Considering this controversy, which I have depicted partly through
biased voices, we may draw the conclusion that governments should ensure
that the researchers they appoint to their committees are enabled to work
independently, so that any doubts about the legitimacy of their work and
findings can be eschewed. This would possibly require a broader reform of the
committee system to ensure greater transparency in the formulation of impar-
tial terms of reference for committees, as well as in the selection of their
members—for example, by consulting parliament and relevant research
councils.
Politicized Research Funded by Non-governmental
Think Tanks
It has been suggested that the politicization of a policy field reduces the extent
of institutionalized research–policy dialogues (e.g. through government-
funded committees) to the benefit of ad hoc ‘bridges’, such as think tanks
(Scholten and Verbeek 2015: 2–3). It could thus be argued that, as an alterna-
tive to government-funded committees, governments should turn to think
tanks or independent academic researchers when seeking scientific evidence
for their policy reforms. Government-funded research is, in this regard, sub-
ject to competition in the public arena from think tanks funded by other, non-
governmental actors.
This section will show, however, that such research is also frequently used
for political purposes in order to gain legitimacy for a proposed course of
action—the legitimizing function of symbolic knowledge as outlined by
Chapter 2 in this book. Moreover, we may also discern the second symbolic
use of knowledge as referred to in Chapter 2, the function of substantiation—
‘lending credibility to particular preferences or claims’. This case can therefore
also be instructive in relation to advocacy models—competition among vari-
ous research positions—concerning the research–policy nexus and, indirectly,
to the role of publicly funded research.
I will highlight these points by discussing the recent debate about low-
skilled jobs in Sweden as depicted in two reports. The debate raises questions
about the selectivity of research results, rather than the quality of research
itself. Political parties and the labour market parties (employers’ associations
and unions) use specific research to legitimize their arguments. The research
results referred to in the debate may be consistent but (depending on the
methods used, the discipline of the researchers, and the time-period covered)
results may be contradictory. This is quite common in daily political debate
but may be problematic from the perspective of public deliberation.
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The Swedish think tank, the Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS),
published their regular Economic Policy Council Report on the theme of
inclusive labour market policies in 2017. The report noted that wages in the
Swedish labour market are highly compressed and that the labour market is
characterized by very low wage dispersion, which has been more or less static
since early 2000. This had allegedly made it more difficult for immigrants and
newly arrived refugees to establish themselves in the labourmarket. Moreover,
there are very few jobs in Sweden that are suitable for low-skilled employees—
in fact, Sweden has the smallest share among all EU member states. The major
challenges in the labour market are concentrated on how to enable low-
qualified persons with a foreign background to enter the labour market
given the relatively high entry-level wages. Therefore, the study suggested
policy changes and adjustments in the approach of the labour market parties
aimed at lowering the barriers to enable the low-skilled to find jobs, including
by abandoning all unnecessary formal qualification requirements. According
to the report, ‘it is fully possible to differentiate wages more without lowering
the wages of experienced or qualified workers within the same agreements’
(SNS 2017: 4).
Creating more low-skilled jobs for immigrants in this way was a move that
would not be against the so-called ‘Swedish model’, whereby the labour
market parties agree on wage conditions in line with collective agreements.
Another report suggesting similar measures was also published in 2017 by the
Swedish Labour Policy Council (AER), set up in 2015 as an expert council,
funded by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise but officially working
independently from the funder. This report suggested similar ways to target
the non-natives with the weakest attachment to the labour market, including
the low-skilled. The report included a survey among employers, a significant
proportion of whom said that lower costs for salaries would induce them to
hire more low-skilled employees with subsidized employment. Consequently,
the report argued that the labour market parties should take the initiative to
encourage companies to hire newly arrived immigrants for subsidized employ-
ment, thus also assuming their social responsibility (AER 2017: 27).
Both proposals became part of the public debate. These are, however, very
controversial issues from the perspective of the labour market parties, as well
as in the opinion of the traditional left-wing and right-wing blocs in Swedish
politics. The issue of low-skilled jobs has been one of the most frequently
debated in Sweden in 2016–2018. Previous decades have seen a cemented
impasse between the left-wing (leftist, social democratic, and Green) and
right-wing (conservative, centre-right, and liberal) political parties in the coun-
try. Both sides tend to refer to research that supports their standpoint. Does
the lowering of entry level wages risk trapping non-natives in a permanent
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low-waged position? Would there be a risk of reduced wages across the line,
including for more well-established workers? Aremore low-skilled jobs the key
to reducing unemployment and exclusion among newly arrived non-natives?
What are the alternatives? Regarding these kinds of issues, it is likely that
evidence-based research becomes politicized, especially if provided by various
think tanks, but also if it originates at independent academic institutions. This
case is an illustration of an advocacy model, as described initially in this
chapter. It is also a case of research-as-ammunition in the symbolic use of
knowledge by policy-makers (cf. Chapter 2):
The struggle between group interests functions as variety generator and selection
environment for scientific arguments that underpin political positions and deci-
sions. Every interest involved will look for the type of scientific expertise that
harnesses and legitimizes its pre-formed political stance. (Hoppe 2005: 210)
Government-funded committees may want to join the debate by presenting
balanced research, showing the pros and cons of the various policy alterna-
tives, or they may abstain from participating in the debate so as not to be
dragged into the process of politicization. The next section will discuss what is
already being done in a few policy-oriented committees in order to avoid the
politicization of government-funded research outputs.
Committees that Enable Policy-relevant Research
without Direct Political Involvement
A more recent form of committee is characterized by broad and open terms of
reference, encouraging the committee to assign external, independent
researchers to produce reports over a longer period of time. This could be
one way to generate guidance for policy development, as well as evaluations
of the policy that has been implemented. There are currently three such
committees in Sweden: the Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi) under the
Ministry of Justice and the Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) under the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (both set up in 2013), and the Expert Group on
Public Economics (ESO), under the Ministry of Finance,6 which was up and
running in the period 1981–2003, and has again been in place since 2007. The
ESO was inspired by the model of the Netherlands Scientific Council for
Government Policy (WRR), discussed in Chapter 6 by Monique Kremer.
As I am the current Director of Delmi, these committees will be discussed on
amore personal note. All three committees have boardmembers appointed by
the government, but their terms of reference are defined in a way that enables
the committees to work independently from both the government and the
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researchers they assign to carry out research. Their tasks include evaluating
current policy-making, compiling relevant research in their areas of expertise,
and commissioning and producing research reports as an input both to policy-
makers and to the broader public debate. In theory, there remain some hazards
with this model, although it bears the potential to contribute a sought-after
evidence base to permit more balanced policy decisions. Arguably, there is still
the danger that these committees may sometimes be too close to the govern-
ment, presenting a risk that they may abstain from criticism of the policies
carried out. At the same time, there may sometimes be the risk that they are
too distanced from the government to the extent that their research becomes
too theoretical and conceptual, and thus of less value for the daily challenges
of a government.
The case of the ESO has been analysed with regard to its position—either too
close to or too far removed from the government in its non-traditional task of
questioning government policies and programmes, and their implementation
(Lemne 2010). Tensions between various categories of actors—politicians,
civil servants, and experts who were involved in the committee’s work—has
been a recurring phenomenon. Its influence on day-to-day government
policy-making was somewhat hampered by the fact that it usually worked
more slowly with a more in-depth focus than was normally the case among
civil servants within the government offices. A somewhat paradoxical
outcome of the ESO’s role in the public debate was that, although it func-
tioned under the leadership of the government, its critical reports instead
often became a tool in the hands of the opposition. That the ESO was a
government-funded committee was hence both a strength and a weakness
for its policy relevance.
Nevertheless, I argue that these committees are closer to the idea of the
learning model, which I regard as a more ideal kind of research–policy nexus
than the advocacy model in the highly politicized field of migration. In this
regard, I agree with Hoppe that policy-making could be likened to social
experimentation:
the learning model treats the policy process as a sort of research process in two
respects: first, a policy or policy program is viewed as a set of hypotheses about the
causal links between certain (collective, organizational) acts and a specified (desir-
able) future state of affairs. Second, policymaking is social experimentation. By
close monitoring of the degree of goals achievement and a careful analysis of the
causes of deviation, errors can gradually be eliminated. (Hoppe 2005: 211)
The research–policy nexus is thus, as always, filled with potential pitfalls. The
policy-making process is characterized by gradual learning and indirect effects
from research. When there is more politicization, research and policy dia-
logues tend to become more fragmented, while the use of knowledge in
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policy-making tends to become more symbolic (Scholten and Verbeek 2015;
Chapter 2 in this book). Therefore, even if researchers take the opportunity
to engage in commissioned studies, they need to stay detached in order
to maintain their scientific independence and legitimacy in relation to
government-funded committees.
Conclusion
The Swedish case includes, at least, three types of research–policy interactions.
The first model is the traditional Swedish government-funded committee that
can be steered politically in terms of members and research assignment, and
where the results are to be reported to the government and dealt with within a
formal process. The second model concerns research by think tanks which
receive funding from, for example, the private sector or various interest
groups, but which may nevertheless be selectively interpreted and politicized
by various political interest groups. The third model entails a more independ-
ent form of government-funded committee that has no direct political
involvement.
In conclusion, it is clear that one lesson learned for today’s policy relevant
research in the area of migration and integration is that government commit-
tees benefit a great deal from being able to work independently, without direct
political steering. This is in contrast to research from think tanks, which is
often politicized and therefore does not provide a real alternative to publicly
funded research. Research at universities tends to be carried out at a distance
from the daily policy challenges, with the risk of being driven by intrinsic
issues and being inaccessible to policy-makers as well as the general public.
The field of migration should strive towards the learning models and try to
minimize the risks associated with the advocacy models. I see Delmi as an
attempt to establish such a learning model if it succeeds in balancing its
output accordingly.
According to the initially discussed advocacy models, the research–policy
nexus often shows that researchers merely play a complementary role to the
sources of influence or inspiration of policy-makers. Still, the learning models
tell us that research may not only bring indirect effects, but also have unin-
tended effects on policy-making and the research–policy nexus—such as
committee research results being used by the opposition rather than only by
the government, thus becoming part of broader political deliberations. Here,
there is much to learn from experiences of how committees have been set up
and how they functioned in the past. While many researchers would like to
contribute to policy-making, they have good reason to be aware that their
research may become over-simplified and be remoulded into unscientific
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arguments, or used selectively merely to legitimize predetermined political
positions. Such risks are heightened when the field of enquiry itself is highly
politicized, such as in the fields of migration and integration.
The experience from the Integration Policy Power Commission illustrates
the risks of politicians steering research in a political direction. Politics-based
evidence may undermine the legitimacy of policy-making. This is why we
needmore transparency in the committee systemwhen formulating the terms
of reference and selecting the researchers tasked with an enquiry. Committees
need to remain at a distance from the government. Their reports should be
permitted to be either critical or supportive of government policies. As long as
such reports are solid, they nevertheless carry the potential to contribute to
policy learning, from failures as well as from good (if not best) practices.
Notes





4. The title of this section is taken from a report by the Swedish television station SvT
Nyheter (2004).
5. My translation.
6. These three committees work in a similar way to Eifo and Deifo, although more
independently from the government.
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Migration Research and Policy
in the United States
Between Admissionists and Restrictionists
Philip Martin
Introduction
Experience in the United States suggests that bridging the gap between
research and policy is far easier on demographics (including the number of
legal and unauthorized foreigners, and their age structure, fertility, and
internal mobility) than on the socio-economic impacts of migrants. This
chapter reviews examples of government-funded efforts to develop consensus
among researchers on the number and impacts of foreign-born persons in the
United States, including the Bi-National Commission on Mexico–US Migra-
tion and National Academy of Sciences studies released in 1997 and 2016.
The US experience demonstrates that, even when researchers achieve con-
sensus on the socio-economic impacts of migrants, the results can be inter-
preted very differently by admissionists (who favour more immigration and
the legalization of unauthorized foreigners) and restrictionists (who oppose
amnesty and want to reduce immigration). For example, the consensus of
social scientists in the 1997 National Academy study was that the 15 million
foreign-born workers in the US labour force in 1996 depressed average hourly
earnings by 3 per cent and led to a net expansion of US gross domestic product
(GDP) of $8 billion. Admissionists touted the $8 billion net gain from immi-
gration, while restrictionists emphasized that the then $8 trillion US economy
was growing by 3 per cent ($240 billion) per year, making the net gain due
to immigration equivalent to 12 days of US economic growth (Migration
News 1997).
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The effect of economic research on policy-making in the United States is
muted because migration’s major economic effects are (re)distributional, with
migrants and owners of capital the major winners. Admissionists stress the
gains to individual migrants, the minimal costs to US workers, and other
benefits of immigration ranging from preserving industries to repopulating
cities and increasing diversity. Restrictionists highlight migration as a key
reason, along with technology and trade, for depressing wages and hurting
low-skilled Americans, increasing inequality, and reducing social trust.
As immigration numbers and impacts rise, the debate over migration policy
is increasingly dominated by the most extreme admissionists and restriction-
ists. Researchers are also tugged toward these ‘no borders’ and ‘no migrants’
extremes by the funders who support and publicize their work. If current
trends continue, migration risks joining abortion, guns, and other issues on
which Americans are very polarized, and migration research risks joining
other issues where links between funders and researchers make research find-
ings suspect, reducing the credibility of experts and research in a wide range
of fields.
The chapter begins with discussions of US immigration patterns and
research during the periods 1970–2000 and 2000–2016. It then provides a
brief reflection on recent developments under the presidency of Donald
Trump before concluding with implications for bridging the gaps between
research, public debates, and policy-making on immigration.
Immigration Patterns and Research: 1970–2000
The United States is a nation of immigrants whose motto, E pluribus unum
(from many, one), reflects openness to newcomers.1 The United States had
42 million foreign-born residents in 2014, almost 20 per cent of the world’s
international migrants. Over 50 per cent were from Latin America and the
Caribbean, including 28 per cent from Mexico.2 A further 25 per cent were
from Asia, the major source countries being China, India, and the Philippines.
Almost 50 per cent of all foreign-born residents are naturalized US citizens
(Brown and Stepler 2016).
Immigration to the United States occurred in four major waves, beginning
with the largely British wave before immigrant admissions began to be
recorded in 1820. A secondwavewas dominated by Irish andGermanCatholics
in the 1840s and 1850s, a third wave included many southern and eastern
Europeans between 1880 and 1914, and a fourth wave was set in motion
by 1965 laws that switched priority for admission from a migrant’s country
of origin to US sponsors requesting the admission of relatives or needed
workers. Waves suggest peaks and troughs, with troughs in the aftermath of
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the Civil War in the 1860s and World War I in 1914, followed by legislation
in the 1920s that prevented a resumption of large-scale immigration from
Europe (Martin and Midgley 2010).
There is no end in sight to the immigration wave launched by the 1965
switch from favouring Europeans to giving priority to foreigners whose US
relatives sponsored them for immigrant visas. The change from national
origins to family unification was not expected to change immigration patterns,
but it did. There was little research to counter the assertion of Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-MA) in 1965 that a family unification based selection system
would not change ‘the ethnic mix of this country’ (Congressional Digest
1965; CIS 1995).
Kennedy was wrong. During the 1950s, 56 per cent of the 2.5 million
immigrants were from Europe; by the 1970s, fewer than 20 per cent of 4.2
million immigrants were from Europe (DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,
table 2).3 Chain migration—as when immigrants and naturalized US citizens
sponsor their relatives for visas—was soon apparent, especially because the
United States has one of the world’s most expansive definitions of immediate
family, including children up to the age of 21 and the parents of US citizens.
The United States allows US citizens to sponsor their adult children as well
as their adult brothers and sisters for immigrant visas, resulting in some-
times twenty-year waits for visas to become available. The United States offers
50,000 ‘diversity immigrant visas’ awarded by lottery to citizens of countries
that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United States during the
previous five years, creating new family networks to sponsor relatives for
immigration.
The 10 million foreign-born residents in 1970, the beginning of the fourth
and current wave of immigration, were about 5 per cent of US residents at the
time. Most immigration research until the 1970s involved historians who
explained the integration of third-wave immigrants who arrived before
1914, and debated the effects of very low levels of immigration between the
1920s and 1960s and efforts to ‘Americanize’ southern and eastern European
newcomers, many of whom were making a transition from agriculture abroad
to cities in the United States.
Researchers debated the factors most important for immigrant integration,
including factories and unions, mobilization for war, public schools, and
religious and ethnic organizations (Higham 1984).
Two immigration issues drew the attention of social scientists in the
1970s: farm workers and Asians. Between 1942 and 1964, the US government
allowed farmers to employ a total of 4.6 million Mexican guest workers under
a series of bilateral Bracero agreements. Most of these guest workers returned
year after year, but between 1 million and 2 million Mexicans worked in the
United States. Bracero admissions peaked in 1956, when 445,000 Braceros
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constituted 20 per cent of US hired farm workers. The number of Braceros
fell to fewer than 200,000 after 1962 as the US government tightened enforce-
ment of regulations aimed at protecting US and Bracero workers, and increased
the cost of Braceros and spurred labour-saving mechanization. The Bracero
programme was ended as a form of ‘civil rights for Hispanics’ in 1964.4
A combination of no new Bracero guest workers, few unauthorized workers,
and consumer support for farm worker boycotts during the civil rights era
brought about a golden age of rising wages for US farm workers. The United
Farm Workers won a 40 per cent wage increase in its first table grape contract
in 1966, and represented most Californian table grape and lettuce workers by
the early 1970s (Martin 2003). Rising labour costs encouraged labour-saving
mechanization, and rising demand for fruits and vegetables kept farm worker
employment expanding despite higher wages.
Farm employers knew there were experienced workers in rural Mexico,
and some encouraged their legal Mexican-born supervisors to recruit
friends and relatives in Mexico and encourage them to enter to the United
States illegally. There were no penalties on employers who knowingly hired
unauthorized workers until 1986, so rural Mexicans who faced a choice
between uncertain incomes in Mexico and a guaranteed job in the United
States moved north. Illegal immigration from Mexico surged in the 1980s,
especially after a short-lived oil-inspired Mexican government spending
boom in the late 1970s collapsed with the price of oil. Farm worker unions
protested that ‘illegal aliens’ were undercutting their demands for higher
wages and benefits, and demanded that the federal government impose
sanctions on employers who hired such workers, but Congress, at the behest
of farmers, refused to act.
The research that helped to end the Bracero programme showed that the
presence of Braceros depressed the wages of US farm workers, and seemed
vindicated by the sharp jump in farm wages in the late 1960s. Clemens et al.
(2017) contest this conclusion. They assembled data on farm employment
and wages before and after 1964, and concluded that average hourly earnings
in states with more Braceros rose at the same pace after 1964 as in states with
few or no Braceros, suggesting that removing Braceros did not lead to wage
spikes in states that could no longer employ Braceros.
There are several issues with such a before and after comparison as in
Clemens et al. (2017), including the fact that the Bracero programme had been
shrinking for a decade before it ended, so that state-wide labour markets—in
which Braceros constituted less than 5 per cent of farm workers—may be an
inappropriate unit with which to measure Bracero effects. Nonetheless, the
major response to rising wages demonstrated that flexibility to adjust to fewer
workers is mostly a demand side response, not a supply response. Reducing
the supply of farm workers does more to accelerate labour-saving substitution
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/1/2019, SPi
Migration Research and Policy in the United States
149
or to encourage farmers to switch to less labour-intensive crops than to draw
US workers into the farm workforce.
During the 1970s and 1980s, research played little role in the debate over
unauthorized migrants in agriculture despite case study analyses of how
unauthorized workers replaced US citizens and legal immigrants. Farmers
turned to contractors to obtain workers, rather than hiring them directly,
spurring indirect competition between employers to obtain jobs for crews
of legal versus illegal workers, rather than direct competition between legal
and illegal workers to be hired (Mines and Martin 1984). Contractors hiring
illegal workers contributed to the rising share of unauthorized California
crop workers, which jumped from less than 25 per cent in the mid-1980s to
50 per cent a decade later.
The major intervening variable was the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) of 1986, a compromise between restrictionists (whose priority was
to reduce illegal migration) and admissionists (who wanted to legalize the
estimated 3–5million unauthorized foreigners in the United States). The IRCA
imposed federal sanctions on employers who knowingly hired unauthorized
workers, and allowed unauthorized foreigners who had lived in the United
States for at least five years or who had worked in agriculture for at least
90 days to become legal immigrants.
The IRCA proved to be a victory for admissionists. Some 2.7 million
unauthorized foreigners, 85 per cent of whom were Mexicans, were legalized,
and the widespread use of false documents to obtain legalization under the
farm worker programme, which accounted for 40 per cent of all legalizations,
taught low-skilled Mexicans that they could continue to get US jobs by
providing false documents to their employers (Martin 1994). Legal and
unauthorizedMexicans spread throughout the United States, from agriculture
to construction, manufacturing and services.
The IRCA unleashed a wave of research. One strand asked how employers
adjusted to employer sanctions, and found that labour costs fell because of the
upsurge in illegal migration (Martin 1994). However, the National Academies
found that the earnings of newly legalized foreigners increased by 10 per cent
to 15 per cent, largely because legal status increased their mobility in the US
labour market, allowing them to seek jobs with ‘better employers’ (Smith and
Edmonston 1997). Farm worker unions shrank due to increased illegal migra-
tion, with their problems compounded by internal union problems and the
rise of labour contractors and other intermediaries (Martin 2003).
The second major area of research involved the economic progress of,
especially, Asian immigrants. Newcomers to the United States typically earn
less than similar US-born workers, but the earnings gap narrows over time.
Chiswick examined various cohorts of immigrants, such as those arriving in
the 1960s and 1970s. He concluded that newcomers arriving in the 1960s
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experienced rapid income gains, catching up to similar US-born workers
within thirteen years and then surpassing their US peers, suggesting that
average US incomes could be raised via immigration (Chiswick 1978).
Borjas (2016) extended the analysis and concluded that ‘immigrant quality’
as measured by earnings growth in the United States was falling. Chiswick’s
data analysis was correct, but reflected a unique and one-time event. Asians
found it hard to immigrate until 1965, and those who arrived in the 1960s
were especially talented. As immigration from Latin America surged in the
1970s, the initial earnings gap betweennewcomers and similar US-bornworkers
widened, and immigrant earnings rose much more slowly. Immigrants who
arrived in the five years before the 1960 census earned 10 per cent less than
US-born workers in 1960, while those who arrived between 1995 and 2000
earned 30 per cent less in 2000 (Borjas 2016).
The legalization of 2.7 million mostly low-skilled Mexicans together
with the continued arrival of unauthorized foreigners raised questions
about how low-skilled migrants affected similar US workers. Case studies
from the 1970s and 1980s suggested that the availability of low-skilled new-
comers, legal or illegal, displaced similar US workers and depressed their
wages (GAO 1988). However, comparisons of cities with more and fewer
immigrants, and studies that compared the wages and unemployment rates
of US workers who were assumed to be similar to immigrants in a particular
city, could not detect wage depression and displacement, which led to the
conclusion that low-skilled migrants do not hurt similar US workers (Smith
and Edmonston 1997).
The best-known study of migrant impacts on US workers involved the
‘natural experiment’ of 125,000 Cuban Marielito migrants who arrived in
Miami between April and September 1980, increasing Miami’s labour force
by 7 per cent. Card (1989) found that the unemployment rate of Blacks in
Miami rose more slowly than in several comparison cities that did not receive
Cuban migrants, suggesting that the Marielitos benefited, rather than hurt,
Blacks in Miami.
Borjas (2016) disagreed with this ‘no-harm-and-perhaps-benefit from
migrants’ conclusion. He noted that, when another wave of Cubans tried to
reach Florida in 1994, the US Coast Guard intercepted them and sent them
to Guantanamo, a US naval base at the eastern end of Cuba. In 1994, the
unemployment rate of equal Blacks in Miami rose, while it fell for Blacks in
comparison cities. This prompted scepticism of the validity of natural experi-
ments in 1980 and 1994 that failed to find the impacts predicted by economic
theory—first, rising unemployment and, then, falling unemployment when
migrants did not arrive. One could conclude that there are many factors in
addition to migration that affect the unemployment rate of Blacks and other
similar US workers.
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The Mariel controversy has become a symbol of the debate over whether
the arrival of low-skilled migrants hurts or helps similar US workers. Card’s
conclusions bolstered so-called immigrant supply siders, who believe that
migrants add to economic activity, and benefit themselves and other resi-
dents, analogous to supply-side economists who believe that tax cuts encour-
age additional work, benefiting those whose taxes go down and others via the
multiplier effects of increased economic activities. Borjas, by contrast, believes
that the demand curve for labour is downward sloping; that is, adding to the
supply of labour reduces wages, especially in the short run.
Leubsdorf (2017) reviews the arguments over the Marielitos, emphasizing
that the comparison group of US workers selected to check for the impacts of
migrants affects the conclusions drawn. Analysts who use more inclusive
groups of Americans, such as women and teens still in school, are less likely
to find negative effects of the Marielitos than those who focus only on adults
who did not finish high school. Borjas (2017) dismissed a suggestion that a
change in the number of Blacks in the sample led to his conclusion that the
arrival of Marielitos reduced the wages of similar Blacks, emphasizing that the
wages of Blacks must be constructed, rather than measured by the survey. By
this, he meant that analysts are estimating the effects of Marielitos on a
constructed, rather than measured, wage of US Blacks. This debate is still
ongoing.
The second major focus of research during the 1990s involved the fiscal
impacts of immigrants—the question of whether immigrants pay more in
taxes than they receive in tax-supported benefits. California Republican
Governor Pete Wilson blamed the need to provide services to unauthorized
foreigners for the state’s budget deficit in the early 1990s, and won re-election
in November 1994 as voters approved Proposition 187 by 59–41 per cent to
deny state benefits to unauthorized foreigners, including K-12 education to
unauthorized children (Migration News 1994).
Most of Proposition 187 was declared unconstitutional, but law suits
demanding that the federal government reimburse states for the cost of pro-
viding services to unauthorized foreigners prompted studies of the fiscal
impacts of immigrants. The Republican-controlled Congress, in response to
Proposition 187, enacted several laws in 1996 tomake it more difficult for low-
income residents to sponsor their relatives for immigrant visas, and denied
federal welfare benefits to legal immigrants arriving after 23 August 1996. At a
time when 11 per cent of US residents were foreign-born, 45 per cent of the
estimated federal savings from the newwelfare systemwere estimated to come
from denying benefits to immigrants until they had worked in the United
States for at least 10 years or had become naturalized US citizens after five years
(Migration News 1996).
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In response to Proposition 187 and the 1996 immigration laws, the Com-
mission on Immigration Reform sponsored the first National Academies
study. It concluded the US economy was $1 billion to $10 billion larger in
1996 than it would have been with no immigrants, with the best estimate that
immigrants were responsible for a net $8 billion gain (Smith and Edmonston
1997).
Themodel for estimating the net economic gain from immigration assumed
that adding immigrants to the labour force reduced average wages by 3 per
cent, from an assumed $13 an hour to the actual $12.60 in 1996. The lower
wages of all workers expanded the economy and increased the returns to
owners of capital, making them and the immigrants whomoved to the United
States for higher wages and more opportunities the major beneficiaries of
immigration.
Estimating the public finance effects of immigrants required more assump-
tions. The study by the National Academies calculated the net present value
(NPV) of the average immigrant in 1996 by assuming that the earnings of
immigrants will catch up to those of similar US workers, and that the children
and grandchildren of immigrants will have the same average profiles with
regard to earnings, taxes paid, and benefits received as the children and
grandchildren of native-born children (Smith and Edmonston 1997). The
study further assumed that immigration did not raise the cost of public
goods such as defence, and that persisting federal government budget deficits
would force the government to raise taxes and reduce benefits, rather than
continue to borrow to provide benefits for ageing residents, meaning that
both young immigrants and young US-born workers would pay more in
taxes and receive fewer benefits.
These assumptions helped generate two major findings. First, the average
immigrant had a positive NPV of $78,000, meaning that a typical immigrant
was expected to pay $78,000 more in federal taxes than they would receive in
federal benefits in 1996 dollars over their lifetimes and those of their children
and grandchildren. The NPV of immigrants with more than a high school
education was plus $198,000, while the NPV of immigrants with less than a
high school education was minus $13,000; that is, even assuming that the
children of low-educated immigrants have the same average earnings, taxes,
and benefits as US-born children, low-skilled immigrants and their children
impose a net cost on US taxpayers.
The study led to an obvious conclusion: to generate the maximum eco-
nomic benefits from immigrants for US-born residents, the selection system
should favour young and well-educated newcomers who are most likely to
earn higher incomes, pay more in taxes, and consume fewer tax-supported
benefits. This recommendation was rejected, as those favouring the current
system—including advocates for particular migrant groups, churches, and
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immigration lawyers—argued that levels of immigration should be increased
to accommodate more high-skilled foreigners, rather than introduce a points-
selection system that would admit more high-skilled and relatively fewer
family immigrants. Furthermore, many US employers preferred the current
demand-oriented system under which they sponsor foreigners who have
temporary work permits for immigrant visas, a system that ties foreigners to
a particular employer for years as guest workers. By contrast, a Canadian-style
supply-oriented points-selection system would allow newcomers to move
from one employer to another.
During the three decades from 1970 to 2000, the share of foreign-born
residents in the US population doubled from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. The
number of unauthorized foreigners, after dipping briefly with legalization in
the late 1980s, more than doubled from 3.5 million in 1990 to 8.6 million in
2000. The effects of legal and unauthorized foreigners were debated. Most
economists agreed with Card that, since they could not find the expected
negative effects of low-skilled foreigners on similar US workers, there were few
or no such effects. There was more consensus among demographers on the
number of unauthorized foreigners and more agreement on public finances,
since it was easy to visualize how higher levels of education and higher
incomes would mean more taxes paid and less reliance on welfare benefits.
Immigration Patterns and Research: 2000–2016
The election of Presidents Vincente Fox in Mexico and George W. Bush in the
United States in 2000 was expected to usher in a new era in Mexico–USA
migration, marked by cooperation to reduce illegal migration and violence
along the Mexico–USA border, legalization of unauthorized foreigners in the
United States, and new guest worker programmes. Indeed, just before the
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Fox was in Washington, DC, implor-
ing Bush and the US government to enact immigration reforms that would
legalize unauthorized foreigners before the end of 2001 (Migration News 2001).
Instead, security took centre stage after the attacks on 11 September 2001,
and several laws led to increasedmonitoring of immigrants and visitors. As the
US economy recovered from recession and as illegal immigration rose, there
were renewed calls for legalization for unauthorized foreigners. However,
there was deadlock in Congress between restrictionists, who emphasized the
need for enforcement to deter unauthorized foreigners, and admissionists,
who wanted to legalize unauthorized foreigners.
Economists were also deadlocked over the impacts of low-skilled foreign
workers on similar US workers. Borjas published an influential article that
reinforced economic theory. Given the mobility in the US labour market,
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Borjas argued that the effects of immigrants on US workers must be studied
nationally, rather than in any particular city.
Borjas (2003) divided foreign- and native-born workers into age and educa-
tion cells, so that workers aged 25–30 years with less than a secondary school
education were in one cell, and those aged 30–35 years in another; he found
up to 10 per cent lower wages for the US-born workers in the young and less-
educated cells due to the presence of immigrants. Foged and Peri (2015)
disputed Borjas’ conclusion. They suggested that if migrants and natives
within each age and education cell were complements, rather than substi-
tutes, playing different labour market roles despite similarities in age and
education, and if employers responded to the arrival of migrants by investing
more to create jobs for them and US workers, the presence of immigrants
raised, rather than lowered, the wages of similar US workers.
The debate over the impacts of low-skilled migrants was mirrored in a
similar debate over high-skilled migrants. The United States created the H-1B
programme in 1990, at a time when there were believed to be sufficient US
workers, as indicated by the unemployment rate of 5.6 per cent, but not
enough to fill all of the jobs being created in the rapidly expanding informa-
tion technology (IT) sector. Some 20,000 temporary foreign workers with
college degrees and fashion models were being admitted at the time, and the
H-1B programme made it easy for US employers to recruit and employ up to
65,000 per year in the expectation that the number of H-1B visas would begin
high and fall over time as US colleges and universities ramped up training and
Americans filled more IT jobs.
Instead, the H-1B programme expanded slowly, not reaching the 65,000 cap
until 1997 (Martin 2012). At a time of low unemployment and in anticipation
of the Y2K problem of computers not adjusting to the year 2000 properly, US
employers persuaded Congress to raise the cap, add 20,000 H-1B visas for
foreigners who earned Master’s degrees from US universities, and exempt
non-profit employers such as universities from the visa cap, allowing over
200,000 H-1B workers per year to enter. Since each H-1B worker can stay up to
six years, the United States soon had over a million H-1B visa holders.
Researchers studied the impacts of H-1B workers and reached opposing
conclusions. Some found that US employers preferred to hire H-1B workers
because they were younger and cheaper than similar US workers. In an IT
labour market experiencing considerable mobility, H-1B workers were ‘loyal’
to a particular employer since most wanted to be sponsored for a permanent
immigrant visa. Critics called H-1B workers high-tech Braceros, a reference to
the by then discredited programme that brought Mexican farm workers to the
United States under what are now seen as exploitative circumstances, and
found that the presence of H-1B workers reduced wages and the employment
of US workers (Bound et al. 2017).
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Other researchers stressed the spill-over effects of highly skilled foreigners
with H-1B visas (Peri et al. 2015). They found, inter alia, that cities with
more H-1B foreigners generated more patents and experienced faster wage
and job growth—findings that supported employers who wanted to raise the
cap on visas (Nell and Sherk 2008). Some researchers echoed employers
in arguing that it made no sense for US universities to educate foreigners
in STEM-related fields and deny them an opportunity to stay in the United
States and work.
Employers have resisted efforts to link more protection for US workers with
an increase in the number of H-1B visas available, arguing that requiring
employers initially to try to recruit US workers would slow down their need
to hire H-1B workers quickly. Instead, they persuaded the DHS, in 2005, to
allow foreign students who graduate from US universities with STEM (science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics) degrees to remain in the United
States and work in jobs related to their degree for up to 30 months, so-called
‘optional practical training’ (OPT), giving these foreign graduates time to find
a US employer to offer them H-1B visas valid for six years.5 The Trump
administration in 2018 proposed that the period of OPT for all fresh graduates
be decreased to twelve months.
By 2005, when Congress began to consider immigration reforms to deal
with unauthorized foreigners, most social science researchers agreed that any
negative economic effects of low-skilled migrants on similar US workers were
small; that high-skilled migrants had positive spill-over economic effects; and
that legalization of unauthorized foreigners would increase their mobility and
wages, as well as expand the US economy. However, restrictionists in the
House of Representatives approved an enforcement-only bill in December
2005 that would have increased enforcement on the Mexico–USA border,
required all employers to use the internet-based E-Verify system to check the
legal status of new hires, and made illegal presence in the United States a
crime, perhaps hindering the ability of unauthorized foreigners to become
legal immigrants in the future.
This enforcement-only bill was widely denounced as ignoring the benefits
of migration and culminated in a ‘day without migrants’ on 1 May 2006
that involved many businesses closing for the day to highlight the contribu-
tions of migrants. In May 2006, the Senate enacted a three-pronged compre-
hensive immigration bill favoured by President Bush and many social science
researchers; in other words, increase enforcement to deter illegal migration,
legalize most unauthorized foreigners and put them on a path to US citizen-
ship, and create new guest worker programmes for low-skilled workers. The
House refused to act. A similar comprehensive immigration reform bill failed
in the Senate in 2007, but was approved in 2013 with the support of President
Obama; the House again refused to act and there was no reform.
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During these immigration reform debates, most social scientists supported
the legalization of unauthorized workers and more guest workers. There was
very little research on how employers, labour markets, and the economy
might adjust to fewer foreign-born workers, since immigration reforms were
expected to legalize current workers and admit more.
Trump and Migration
In 2015–2016, Donald Trump campaigned on seven major issues, two of
which involved migration: have the United States build and Mexico pay for
a wall on the 2,000 mile Mexico–USA border and deport the 11 million
unauthorized foreigners in the United States. President Trump issued three
executive orders during his first week in office, planning a wall on theMexico–
USA border, increasing deportations and dealing with sanctuary cities, and
reducing refugee admissions. Trump said: ‘Beginning today, the United States
of America gets back control of its borders.’
Trump launched his bid for the Republican presidential nomination in June
2015 by accusing unauthorized Mexicans of ‘bringing drugs. They are bring-
ing crime. They’re rapists . . . but some, I assume, are good people’ (Rural
Migration News 2015). There was an immediate negative reaction. Most pun-
dits thought that Trump’s inflammatory comments would doom his first
campaign for elective office, especially since he was competing with well-
known senators and the brother of ex-President George W. Bush.
Trump won the most votes in state-by-state primaries and became the
Republican candidate for President in July 2016 with a nationalist platform
that centred on the slogan, ‘Make America Great Again’. After a short visit to
Mexico, candidate Trump outlined a 10-point immigration plan on 31 August
2016 that began with a wall on the Mexican border and ended in ambiguity
about what would happen to unauthorized foreigners in the United States. He
said ‘No citizenship. They’ll pay back taxes. . . . There’s no amnesty, but we will
work with them’ (Rural Migration News 2016).
The National Academies released its second consensus report on immigra-
tion in September 2016 during the presidential election campaign (Blau and
Mackie 2016). The report estimated that immigrants generated up to $54
billion in benefits for Americans in 2015, equivalent to 0.3 per cent of US
GDP of $17.5 trillion in 2015. This net benefit reflects a loss in wages to US
workers of $494 billion and a gain in profits for the United States of $548
billion. The conclusion: ‘the immigration surplus stems from the increase in
the return to capital that results from the increased supply of labor and the
subsequent fall in wages’—meaning that the arrival of immigrants depresses
wages, expands the economy, and increases profits.
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The report concluded that immigration bolsters ‘economic growth, innov-
ation and entrepreneurship’, and has ‘little to no’ negative effect on US wages
in the long term, largely because the models used to estimate immigra-
tion’s impacts on the labour market assume that there will be no long-run
impacts on wages.6 The report highlighted negative impacts of newcomers on
previous immigrants and US-born workers with little education, including
teenagers.
The report found slowing rates of wage convergence, meaning that new-
comers to the United States begin their American journeys with a larger
earnings gap than previous arrivals, and are slower to close this gap as they
integrate into the United States. One reason for this widening earnings gap is
that a higher share of newcomers to the United States has low levels of
education, and most are learning English more slowly than earlier arrivals.
The National Academies report concluded that immigrants pay less in taxes
than the cost of the public services they receive, and their US-born children do
not close this gap because the federal government runs a deficit, meaning that
all of the taxes paid by all residents do not cover federal government expend-
itures. At the state and local levels, where governments generally must have
balanced budgets, immigrants pay less in taxes than the cost of their tax-
supported services, and this immigrant deficit is covered by taxes paid by
natives. If the US-born children of immigrants fare as well as other US-born
children, over 75 years this immigrant fiscal deficit disappears at the federal
level but persists at the state level.
The National Academies report was used selectively in the political debate
(Edsall 2016). Restrictionist oriented think tanks such as the Center for Immi-
gration Studies welcomed the report, summarizing it as follows: ‘Immigration
is primarily a redistributive policy, transferring income from workers to
owners of capital and from taxpayers to low-income immigrant families. The
information in the new report will help Americans think about these tradeoffs
in a constructive way’ (Camarota 2016).
Admissionist oriented groups such as the American Immigration Lawyers
Association said that ‘the study found that immigrant workers expand the
size of the U.S. economy by an estimated 11 per cent each year, translating to
$2 trillion in 2016 alone. In fact, the children of immigrants are the largest net
fiscal contributors among any group, native or foreign-born, creating signifi-
cant economic benefits for every American’ (American Immigration Lawyers
Association 2016). The Migration Policy Institute did not review the report.
Neither candidate Clinton nor candidate Trump responded to the National
Academies report when it was released but, in January 2017, President Trump
ordered the DHS to plan for construction of a wall on the Mexico–USA border
and to beef up interior enforcement by adding 10,000 agents to the current
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10,000 to detect and remove unauthorized foreigners convicted of US crimes.
Trump said that Mexico would pay for the wall.
Trump also reinstated a programme that allows federal immigration agents
to train state and local police officers to detect unauthorized foreigners and to
hold them for federal agents, or involves state and local police joining task
forces with federal enforcement agents to pursue criminal gangs. Trump’s
order expanded the definition of criminals who are the highest priorities for
deportation to include those charged with, but not necessarily convicted of,
US crimes.7 Trump threatened to withhold federal grants from sanctuary cities
that ‘willfully refuse’ to cooperate with the DHS, prompting Californian legis-
lators to say they would nonetheless defy Trump and prohibit state and local
police from cooperating with federal immigration enforcement agents.8
Trump sought to suspend the admission of refugees for 120 days, block the
entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely, reduce planned refugee resettlements in
the United States in financial year 17 from 110,000 to 50,000, and ban entries
for ninety days from seven countries: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Libya,
and Yemen.9 However, this executive order was blocked by the courts, leading
to a revised order issued in March 2017 to block only new entries from six
countries, with Iraq removed from the list. This revised order was also blocked
by the courts, and re-issued in September 2017; the US Supreme Court is
expected to confirm Trump’s authority to regulate the admission of foreign
visitors before 1 July 2018.
Trump’s executive orders were widely condemned bymost researchers, who
emphasize that unauthorized Mexico–USA migration has fallen to historic
lows as Mexico completes its fertility transition, and better education and
more jobs in Mexico keep most potential migrants at home. Most researchers
conclude that migrants are less likely to commit crimes than similar US-born
persons, and that efforts to detect and remove unauthorized foreigners would
be costly10 and break up mixed families, those in which some members are
unauthorized while others are US-born and thus US citizens. Finally, some
researchers decried reducing refugee admissions, arguing that the United
States has long been a haven for those seeking refuge, and that most refugees
integrate successfully and are not terrorist threats.
The United States does not have a governmental migration commission
that studies the socio-economic effects of migration on an ongoing basis.
Each House of Congress has an immigration sub-committee that conducts
oversight hearings onmigration-related issues that range from visa issuance to
unauthorized migration to guest workers. Researchers are often invited to
testify, although the majority party controls most of the witnesses who are
allowed to testify, and most witnesses are either employers of or advocates for
migrants. Private foundations and the federal government support a wide
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range of migration research, most of which concludes that migrants and their
children are integrating successfully, with few adverse and many positive
effects on the US economy and society.
Conclusions: Bridging the Gap
Most social science research on migration is optimistic, finding that immi-
grants help themselves by moving to the United States, and enrich the US
economy and society. There are several reasons for this optimism, including
the fact that migrants expand the labour force and the economy. Economists
find that migrants promote growth without hurting US workers significantly;
sociologists find that most newcomers integrate successfully; and political
scientists are more likely to celebrate the benefits of diversity, rather than
emphasize its potential loss of social capital and trust (Blau and Mackie 2016).
There are three major lessons to be learned from the US experience on
bridging the gap between migration research and policy. First, the locus of
migration research shifted from history to contemporary migration. When
immigration was at a low point in 1970, migration research was dominated by
historians who examined how immigrants integrated into and changed US
society; these were studies of past events. By 1990, a new generation of non-
historians focused on the impacts of contemporary migration. Many were
immigrants, including George Borjas (from Cuba), David Card (Canada),
Alejandro Portes (Cuba), and Giovanni Peri (Italy).
Second, most government- and foundation-supported migration research
concluded that immigration was beneficial for the migrants and the US econ-
omy and society, supporting those who wanted to expand immigration and
legalize unauthorized foreigners. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP), sup-
ported by the US government, obtained work and migration histories from
thousands ofMexicans inMexico who had been in the United States. Analyses
using MMP data concluded that Mexico–USA migration had mutually benefi-
cial effects as Mexicans circulated between Mexican homes and US jobs until
the US government stepped up border enforcement in the 1990s, ‘trapping’
unauthorized Mexicans in the United States (Massey et al. 2002).
The general theme of social science research today is that immigrants
generate more benefits than costs, and that these benefits could be increased
if unauthorized foreigners were allowed to legalize their status, which would
give them more mobility in the US labour market and provide incentives to
learn English. Researchers acknowledge the risk of segmented assimilation, as
when frustrated immigrant children or the children of immigrants who iden-
tify with US minorities feel unable to get ahead, drop out of school, and,
perhaps, join gangs (Blau and Mackie 2016; Meissner et al. 2006).
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Third, unauthorized migration, especially, has become an increasingly
contentious issue. The research and elite consensus was that three-pronged
comprehensive immigration reforms—namely, more enforcement, legaliza-
tion for unauthorized foreigners, and new guest worker programmes—would
be enacted after Hillary Clinton was elected president in 2016. In anticipa-
tion of Clinton’s election, many of the major foundations supporting migra-
tion research shifted funding to implement legalization.11
This meant that there was little research on what is happening as a result of
increased enforcement under President Trump. Preliminary research suggests
that employers are reacting as economic theory would predict. As wages rise,
employers are substituting capital for labour in industries from agriculture and
care giving to construction and restaurants (Martin 2017).
Bridging the gap between research and policy is often difficult. For two
centuries, economists have preached the virtues of freer trade, arguing that
comparative advantage ensures that most people in trading countries are
better off because winners win more than losers lose, so that winners can
compensate losers and leave everyone better off. Free trade became themantra
of opinion leaders in both major political parties and all significant research
institutions; most paid only lip service to the need to compensate the losers
from freer trade by retraining displaced workers for new jobs. Opposition to
freer trade came largely from unions representing manufacturing workers,
who found that displaced manufacturing workers who were forced into
service jobs generally had lower wages, even after retraining, belying the
promise that trade’s winners would fully compensate losers.
Bridging the gap is similarly difficult in climate change. Even with research
agreement that the climate is warming, there is disagreement over how much
of this warming is due to human activities and the appropriate policy response
in which to invest now to avoid problems in the future. Most researchers
conclude that human activities are a major cause of climate change and urge a
significant investment now to minimize future adjustment costs. As with
migration, the few researchers who disagree on the need for a carbon tax or
other investments now to avoid future problems are considered out of the
mainstream; their research is often dismissed because some was funded by
energy firms that would be adversely affected by carbon taxes.
It is sometimes said that, in economics, it is easy to become famous without
ever being right. Many migration researchers reach the same conclusion in
each of their papers and some of those who make false predictions seem to
incur no penalties. In most cases, one needs to read only the name of the
researcher to know the conclusions, as with economists who consistently find
that low-skilledmigrants help or hurt similar US workers. Second, there appear
to be few penalties for false predictions, as illustrated by the careers of those
who confidently predicted in the 1970s, when there were fewer than 2million
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Mexican-born US residents, that Mexicans were sojourners, not settlers, and
would not settle in the United States. Forty years later, there were 12 million
Mexican-born persons in the United States, plus an additional 18 million
children born to them in the United States.
Americans are better educated than ever before, there is more scientific
research than ever, and many research-influenced policies are ever more
contentious. One reason may be that better educated voters and politicians
realize that research generally, and migration research in particular, rarely
reaches truly definitive answers. Researchers who oversell their results, and
the think tanks, media, and politicians who amplify their message, may wind
up reducing the credibility of all research on contentious issues.
Notes
1. The original meaning of E pluribus unum was that one nation emerged from the
thirteen colonies, but the phrase has evolved to symbolize unity from diversity, or
the ability of the United States to integrate newcomers (Martin 2011).
2. There were 11.7 million Mexican-born residents in 2014: 4 million born in the
Caribbean, 3.3 million born in Central America, and 2.8 million born in South
America. That is, 21.8 million (52 per cent) of all foreign-born residents were from
Latin America.
3. Stocks changed slower than flows. In 1960, 85 per cent of the 9.7 million foreign-
born residentswere fromEuropeorCanada; by1980, their share dropped to43per cent
of 14 million (Brown and Stepler 2016).
4. The average employment of hired workers on US farms in the early 1960s was
2.5 million. http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?
documentID=1063
5. Employers do not have to try to recruit US workers before hiring OPT graduates, and
there are no special wages that must be paid to OPT employees. www.uscis.
gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/students-and-
employment/stem-opt
6. ‘In the case of structural studies, when capital is assumed to be perfectly flexible,
[average] wage effects on natives are zero, although this result is built in by theoret-
ical assumptions’ (National Academies 2016).
7. Two-thirds of the 2million foreignerswhowereput in removal proceedings after being
detected by Secure Communities enforcement had committed only misdemeanour
crimes. The Priority Enforcement Program unveiled in November 2014 targeted for-
eigners convicted of felonies (640,000) and thosewho arrived in theUnited States after
1 January 2014 (640,000). In July 2015, the Migration Policy Institute noted that the
Priority Enforcement Program made one-eighth of the 11 million unauthorized for-
eigners in the United States priorities for DHS enforcement.
8. Sanctuaries are states, counties, and cities that limit their cooperation with the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency of the DHS. In 2015, there
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were four states, 326 counties, and thirty-two cities that had declared themselves to
be sanctuaries for unauthorized foreigners (www.americanimmigrationcouncil.
org/research/sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-and-community-policing-explained).
9. The United States has admitted 785,000 refugees since 11 September 2001, includ-
ing twelve who were arrested or removed from the United States due to concerns
over terrorism. Some 3.2 million refugees have been admitted since 1975, includ-
ing 85,000 in financial year 16, of whom 72 per cent were women and children. In
financial year 16, 38,900 Muslim and 37,500 Christian refugees were admitted.
10. In 2016, ICE estimated that it costs $12,200 to identify and remove each unauthor-
ized foreigner, a cost that could drop if state and local governments cooperated
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Understanding the Role of Evidence
in EU Policy Development
A Case Study of the ‘Migration Crisis’
Elizabeth Collett
Introduction
One of the most frequently uttered phrases in Brussels in late 2015 was ‘Why
didn’t we see this coming?’ While heads of state focused on the dangerous
dynamics of maritime migration across the central Mediterranean from
Libya, a sharp increase in the number of those boarding boats on the Turkish
coast for a short journey to the cluster of Aegean islands nearby took
them by surprise. And not only were policy-makers taken by surprise: the
Greek government, European Union (EU) agencies, and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), among others, all found themselves
caught inadequately prepared for an emergency response in a remote location
with limited resources and significant, immediate needs.
In reality, most of those working in the field of immigration and asylum
policy, including senior policy-makers from a range of EUmember states, were
aware that the combination of continued Syrian conflict, poor conditions in
neighbouring countries, and increased smuggling activities in Turkey would
likely lead to an increase in arrivals in the short to medium term. They did not
base this on specific research but, rather, a combination of experience,
instinct, and anecdotal evidence, supplemented by reporting from key inter-
national agencies and NGOs. Policy-makers were also aware that existing EU
policies, if tested, were likely to crumble in the face of significant pressure
(Collett 2015). But despite this foreboding, and despite strong evidence from
academic, civil society, and unofficial data sources that a significant shift in
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arrival flows was likely to occur in 2015, it proved difficult to bring these
together to effectively catalyse a timely policy response.
As researchers and policy-makers alike begin to autopsy the crisis, this chapter
unpacks the role that evidence and data play in EUpolicy development, and the
ways in which policy-makers are now making use of information, including
their ability to make projections regarding future migration flow. This chapter
looks at the formal and informal modes of research–policy interaction at EU
level that have developed since the late 2000s, and assesses the relativemerits of
each. Which processes are ‘pro-forma’ and which genuinely inform policy-
makers and influence their approach? How do the various constituencies—EU
officials, national civil servants, politicians, academics, and civil society—
interact, and through what means is evidence acknowledged and incorporated
into decision-making? This chapter looks particularly at the events of the period
2015–2018—with a focus on the ‘refugee crisis’—to assess how the utilization of
data and research is changing, and what lessons might now be learned for the
next generation of European policy-makers, and researchers.
The analysis in this chapter is based on thirteen years of work managing
migration programming in several Brussels-based think tanks—including the
European Policy Centre (2005–2010) and the Migration Policy Institute Europe
(2010–2018)—and interacting with both researchers and policy-makers.
Disconnected Policy-making in Brussels
The interaction between publics, policy, and evidence in the Brussels envir-
onment suffers from a number of disconnects peculiar to the European Union
project. This is particularly the case regarding migration. Until recently, the
EU institutions have remained largely insulated from the impacts of decisions
made in the area of Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA), at least in terms of public
debate and scrutiny. The technical complexity inherent in the development
of key instruments—from the Dublin Regulation to Eurodac—means that few
media outlets reported on policy developments on migration and asylum
prior to 2015. Indeed, Brussels-based journalists have highlighted the difficul-
ties in ‘selling’ national editors JHA stories with no human content that have
been based on dry, technical press releases.1 This goes some way to explaining
why EU migration policy only came to the forefront in the spring of 2015,
following a series of harrowing incidents in the Mediterranean. Although the
situation in the southern ‘front-line’ EU member states had been periodically
reported in the media since the mid-2000s, it was the news coverage of the
large-scale tragedies from 2013 onwards which became the eventual catalyst
for political and policy responses.
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The complexity of the policy portfolio has also insulated many policy-
makers from top-down political scrutiny (in the absence of notable misadven-
ture). Until recently, a relatively small number of EU and national officials,
alongside specialized non-governmental actors—including academics, have
developed expertise in the substance, mechanics, and process of EU-level
policy on migration and asylum. As a result, this group has had relatively
disproportionate influence over the direction and development of a large area
of policy: many innovations can be traced back to a small group, generating
support for a new policy idea within a limited and closed network of experts.
For example, a ‘like-minded’ group of predominantly north-west European
governments that meet prior to meetings of the Strategic Committee on
Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) (which are held in the European
Council) to discuss common positions and potential new initiatives. Similar
dynamics exist within the EU institutions, either within a single Directorate-
General (typically, the Directorate-General for Home Affairs HOME), or across
EU institutions at the political level. Few outside of government have up-to-
date insight regarding those who are making the key-decisions, and at what
moment: the circle of influence is thus hard to penetrate.
Since 2015, the number of those involved in migration policy develop-
ment has increased significantly and the issue is now subject to more intense
scrutiny.2 Yet, this is not necessarily supported by a concomitant broaden-
ing of expertise across the EU institutions and its member states, or broadened
circles of consultation. Indeed, there is often an inverse correlation between
the level and urgency of political decision-making and the breadth of expert
consultation undertaken, sometimes out of necessity—and, sometimes, panic.
The inclusion of new actors in immigration policy-making has revealed
additional mismatches in expertise. First, the vast majority of those develop-
ing (and commenting upon) policy on migration and asylum in Brussels have
historically been legal experts, charged with drafting standard-setting legisla-
tion on a range of policy areas from border management to the reception of
asylum seekers.3 Today, a broader range of portfolios is integrally involved in
migration policy, including the European External Action Service (European
Commission 2016a). Yet, as with any institution that is ‘learning’ about a new
issue, the desire to draw linear conclusions and find simple solutions can be
tempting (Gentiloni and Avramopoulos 2016). For example, external experts
have continually had to highlight that policy-makers cannot simply address
the ‘root causes’ of migration by increasing development investments across
the board, and that the drivers of migration from less developed countries may
be more complex than mere income inequality (Fratzke and Salant 2018).
Meanwhile, on the Interior side, policy-makers have sometimes struggled to
adapt to the complexities of foreign policy diplomacy and to incorporate the
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complex interests of partner countries with starkly different politics, socio-
economics, and outlook.
In addition, the Directorate-General HOME itself has had to become oper-
ational on the ground in EU member states for the first time, coordinating
maritime operations, managing an ‘emergency’ relocation scheme (Council of
the EU 2015a) and developing ‘hotspots’ in Greece and Italy (Collett and LeCoz
2018). This, again, requires different types of expertise about what will, or will
not, be successful, and the learning curve has been steep. Indeed, the European
Commission has needed to rely heavily on the front-line knowledge amassed
within its own agencies—notably Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum
Support Office (EASO), international and non-governmental organizations—
such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM), and International Rescue Commit-
tee (IRC), and EUMember States offering crisis response expertise.
This shift in substance of EU policy-making during the ‘crisis’ period has also
thrown into relief some of the core goals that had previously evaded strong
examination. At national level, the core philosophy of ‘good’ immigration
policy-making is (or should be) the maintenance of a robust system capable of
managing the entry and residence of foreign nationals according to defined cri-
teria. At EU level, this goal has often been subsumed within a more philosophical
desire tobring theEUmember states ever closer together through thedevelopment
of ‘common’ policies. Research and evidence (and sometimes even basic common
sense) can on occasion be set aside in the pursuit of ‘the European project’.
Finally, while the EU is responsible for drafting and promulgating legisla-
tion, it is the EU member states that are responsible for translating and
implementing those rules into very different national systems. National gov-
ernments may or may not have the capacity and resources to discharge this
responsibility effectively; also, the consequences of an EU-wide policy may
have uneven effects, sometimes strongly negative, in particular geographies,
sub-national regions, or among particular migrant groups. It has become ever
more important for the EU institutions to collect evidence on national imple-
mentation and resource allocation (ECRE/UNHCR 2018). The systemic weak-
nesses within the Greek asylum system demonstrate that peer review of
member state practice has proved inadequate; however, there are few inde-
pendent evaluations with concrete recommendations that can help close the
gap (and lag) between policy on paper and policy in practice.
Research and Evidence at EU Level: A Brief Typology
EU-level utilization of research and evidence has been haphazard and uneven,
with a strong emphasis on process rather than evidence. This is not to say that
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there is a paucity of EU-funded research but, rather, that its incorporation
within the policy-making process is largely due to factors beyond the tangible
relevance that an individual piece of research might have for improving
policy. Authorship, purpose, and proximity to policy-makers all play a role
in whether it will be ‘heard’ (cf. the discussion in Chapter 14 in this volume).
There are a number of different categories of research and evidence that
policy-makers find valuable. First, there is basic information and data onmigra-
tion flows, stocks, and the key characteristics of migrant groups; these help
policy-makers understand the challenges at hand (such as gaps in employment
rates between native and foreign-born groups).4 Second, there is a vast range of
research that investigates the efficacy of particular policy choices, either before
or after it has been negotiated. These can take many forms, including impact
assessments, evaluations, and reports on implementation. Finally, and more
amorphously, there is the broader body of more complex research that investi-
gates the impacts of migration on societies, economies, and individuals them-
selves. While policy-makers may have a general research agenda and questions
they would like answered, it is impossible for them to know what will be most
valuable until research has been completed and communicated.
Unlike most résumés of EU research (Singleton 2009; King and Lulle 2016),
the following typology does not follow a thematic approach; rather, it looks at
where and how research connects with the policy-making environment.
Commissioned and In-house Research
Both the European Commission and European Parliament have significant
budgets for commissioning research, whether as part of a formal policy
process, such as the pre-proposal impact assessments or evaluations of imple-
mented policy, or more general investigations into issues prioritized within
the Commission’s annual work programme. Both institutions offer
multi-year framework contracts to consortia of research organizations (most
commonly led by for-profit consultancy firms), each of whom can then bid
for tenders for specific studies. The expertise required for such a potentially
broad range of topics is hard to maintain within a single consortium, and
lead times are frequently short. Lead partners in Home Affairs framework con-
tracts are often dependent onfinding high-quality partners and sub-contracting
external experts. The most relevant experts—frequently, former practitioners
and academics—can be hard to bring in at short notice. In addition, although
framework contracts come with potentially large budgets,5 the tendering pro-
cess is competitive (albeit limited) and bids have to ensure cost effectiveness.
Commissioned research of this type can be very influential, particularly if it
forms part of the formal policy cycle, or is timed to coincide with relevant
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internal discussions. Typically, the ‘preferred option’ outlined in an impact
assessment becomes the template upon which legislation is drafted (although
impact assessments usually contain multiple options). However, this type of
research has its own limitations. Impact assessments rarely, if ever, recom-
mend the status quo (inaction), or suggest that an initiative be discontinued.
While a broader academic community may argue that an EU proposal is
unwarranted or wrong-headed, EU processes tend to have neither a brake,
nor a reverse gear. This pre-determined narrowing of the policy optionsmeans
that studies tend to begin with a justificatory framing that may exclude
particular evidence in order to allow for expected recommendations (see also
Chapter 2 in this volume).
Politics can also affect whether evidence translates into policy action. For
example, despite an evaluation of the implementation of the Family Reunifi-
cation Directive in 2013, which highlighted a number of deficiencies in its
functioning (European Commission 2008), a recast of the legislation was
shelved amid fears that re-opening the legislation would lead to further dilu-
tion, rather than a strengthening, of standards. Conversely, some initiatives
have continued to be pushed despite deep scepticism about their value. The
now adopted proposals for an EU-wide Entry–Exit system endured three
separate impact assessments (in 2006, 2013, and 2016), while several European
Parliament studies ( Jeandesboz et al. 2013) and a European Data Protection
Supervisor assessment (European Data Protection Supervisor 2013) high-
lighted issues of cost, privacy, and proportionality (issues echoed by numerous
EU member states). Rather than abandon the endeavour, proposals were re-
worked and re-tabled, and were eventually adopted in late 2017, due in part to
the weight of these critiques. This demonstrates the value of having commis-
sioned research emanate from multiple institutions. European Parliament
studies are often more critical (and more creative) than those produced for
the European Commission.
Alongside research associated with policy processes, the European Commis-
sion maintains agreements with key international organizations, including
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Centre
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), and the International Labour
Organization (ILO), which allows them to commission research without a
tendering process. These organizations tend to have stronger access to the
institutions when offering evidence; also, they have played an increasing role
in providing data and analysis in recent years.
EU agencies responsible for migration have developed research, mostly
in-house. EASO offers month-to-month data on asylum applications and
outcomes, and is developing a repository of country of origin information.
EASO has also initiated a bespoke outsourced research programme focused on
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the drivers of migration, although the budget for this research currently allows
for littlemore than small grants for theoretical review. Frontex invests in a series
of risk analyses—for example, the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint
Report (Frontex 2014)—which outlines the trends, nationalities, means, and
conditions of those taking the main migratory routes to the European Union,
and includes analysis of regional instability and security risks in the Africa-
Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC) region. These risk analyses are primar-
ily concerned with mixed flows to Europe. While they are tuned into changing
routes for smuggling and trafficking in a particular region, and ruminate as to
the cause, they do not look deeply at the drivers of mass movement emanating
from broader socio-economic or political instability. Meanwhile, the Funda-
mental Rights Agency presents periodic data on the situation for migrants
themselves, with a particular focus on those affected by ‘large migration move-
ments’ (Fundamental Rights Agency 2018).6 Finally, the European Court of
Auditors has undertaken studies on the implementation of hotspots in Greece
and Italy, and the efficacy of spending on migration within European Neigh-
bourhood policy (European Court of Auditors 2016, 2017).
Commissioned research is supplemented by the use of expert groups, public
consultations, and formal and informal public hearings. Non-governmental
actors frequently argue that public consultations perform little more than a
legitimizing function in the development of legislation (cf. Chapter 2 in this
book). Online consultations rely on the activism of outside organizations in
responding to questionnaires and submitting evidence. The European Migra-
tion Forum—an annual two-daymeeting gathering policy-makers, NGOs, and
experts to discuss various elements of policy—is one of a number of physical
meetings hosted by the European institutions (European Economic and Social
Committee 2018). However, while useful for networking, it is unclear how
much influence these discussions have on policy. At the other end of the scale,
involvement in thematic expert groups is by invitation only, and restricted to
those deemed by the European Commission to be knowledgeable on the
topics at hand. For example, the Expert Group on Economic Migration
includes experts from the OECD, Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI
Europe), the IOM and leading academic institutions such as Oxford Univer-
sity. Discussions are led by the European Commission, but can influence their
thinking very directly (European Commission 2015). As such, they offer
exclusive access to a select few, with relatively little investment on either side.
Mechanisms for Knowledge-gathering
Since the turn of the millennium, the European Commission has supported
the development of a number of academic research networks and multi-year
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research projects designed to inform national and European policy-makers.
These include open-ended academic networks such as International Migra-
tion, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe (IMISCOE—a pan-European
network of migration research centres, launched in 2004) (IMISCOE n.d.) and
long-term investments such as CARIM (a consortium of researchers focused
on analysing migration trends first to the South, later to the East, launched in
2004) (CARIM-East n.d., see Chapter 12 in this book), as well as multi-year,
multi-disciplinary research projects such as MAFE (assessing migration drivers
between Africa and Europe) (Institut National d’Études Demographiques
2014) and CLANDESTINO (assessing the size of the undocumented popula-
tion in Europe) (ELIAMEP n.d.). Beyond this, there are hundreds of smaller
research projects covering all aspects of migration and asylum, undertaken by
groups of research organizations supported through funding programmes
disbursed directly at EU level (King and Lulle 2016).
EU support has been a strong driver in the development of comparative
research on trends in migration, asylum, and integration, and on policy
impacts, largely through consecutive seven-year research framework pro-
grammes (which follow the seven-year EU budget cycle: 2014–2020).7 They
have fostered stronger cross-national and cross-disciplinary research ties
between researchers across Europe, as well as with researchers residing in
the European neighbourhood. EU support has contributed to a substantial
increase in comparative research (albeit with a strong western European
focus), subsequently disseminated in national and local policy debates. How-
ever, in my view, the resultant canon of research has had an underwhelming
impact on policy. There are a number of reasons for this.
Many academics question whether policy impact should be a research
priority (even when focused on key public policy questions). Reports are
often long and written in technical and/or opaque language, impenetrable
for time-limited policy-makers looking for quick illumination of a policy
problem, and frequently lack usable policy recommendations. In addition,
there is often a gap of up to five years between the initial call for research
proposals and the first research outputs from successful proposals. This is too
long a cycle for policy-makers confronted with fast-paced change.
But there is also little capacity within the EU institutions themselves to
accumulate knowledge over time, or to build on existing work. While most
projects funded by the European Union typically involve a dissemination
phase, a final report, and conference, these are last-minute affairs and it is
often the case that most researchers have already moved on to the next
project. Until recently, there was no central repository for EU-funded research
on migration,8 and the internet is littered with lapsed project websites. Few
officials are able to draw on research stemming back more than a couple
of years.
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In an effort to bring more consistent evidence to the policy-making process,
the European Commission created the EuropeanMigration Network (EMN) in
2008. Coordinated by an external organization,9 the EMN brings together
nationally appointed government (and sub-contracted) researchers to prod-
uce information on topics set through an annual work programme, and as
needs arise. The EMN produces national and synthesis reports on specific
policy areas and publishes annual national reports outlining reforms, and
curates answers to ad hoc queries from EU member states as to how other
governments address particular policy issues. Over time, the body of work
published by the EMN has become more comparative and is valuable in
informing other member states about the policies of their peers. However,
while the EMN collates information on practice, it does not generally offer
policy recommendations, or draw upon empirical analysis to ascertain the
effects of particular policy choices.
Communicating Independent Research
While the EU is a driver of research in many countries—and an increasingly
critical source of funding—it is by no means the sole catalyst for research
relevant to EU policy-making. There is a glut of research, from legal analysis
through to fieldwork with migrant groups, that can inform policy-makers’
understanding of migration. Given the abundance of research, policy-makers
are reliant on trusted interlocutors to filter significant research results and
communicate them effectively and in a timely manner. Several Directorates-
General in the European Commission have attempted to take on this role and
have organized academic conferences on migration; however, these tend to
cram togethermultiple presentations on diverse topics, leaving the few policy-
makers in attendance dizzy with a vast array of evidence, which may or may
not have relevance to their work. The European Parliament political groupings
host frequent hearings to showcase research, but these are often poorly
attended.
In this context, think tanks and other policy-focused research institutes
have emerged as key interlocutors, particularly those based in Brussels. With
a primary focus on policy, and with networks across the broader research
community, these organizations can connect relevant, high-quality research
to burning policy questions. To be successful, such interlocutors have to be
credible, independent, and without a strong political agenda; they must be
able to draw on thick networks of policy-makers and other stakeholders from
civil society, media, and the private sector; and be capable of extracting policy-
relevant conclusions from the evidence presented. This is not a simple task,
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and requires time and effort to keep abreast of new research and emerging
policy issues.
For academics with a strong reputation and an established catalogue of
work, there is often no need for an interlocutor. But this can also lead to a
bias in the voices that are heard in Brussels: experts with a media presence can
find themselves invited to present to policy-makers who have become familiar
with their work through the press and, increasingly, social media, Meanwhile,
emerging, young, and minority researchers with nascent networks can strug-
gle. This brings home the fact that not only can research, media, and policy
influence be mutually reinforcing, but it can also side-line those with less
capacity for the active dissemination of their work.10 Sadly, media and policy
influence is not always a strong indicator of quality, knowledge, and expertise;
in some cases, it may merely indicate a loud voice.
A Crisis Realization
As the crisis unfolded in 2015, policy-makers quickly realized the inadequacy
of the evidence-gathering mechanisms at their disposal. Real-time data from
national and international sources were frequently inconsistent, and were not
packaged or analysed in a way that could flag key shifts in movement.11
Information was not effectively communicated between countries concern-
ing arrivals and onward movement. This is not an insurmountable task, or
one which necessarily requires deep investment. For example, the Swedish
Migration Agency developed models to predict future flows to the country,
incorporating factors—for example, regional instability—to build a series of
scenarios that were periodically adjusted to account for new events and chan-
ging factors along the migration journey.12 However, few other countries had
similar capacity. At the EU level, not only were there no mechanisms in place
to manage a pan-European early warning network, but to put them in place
would be to explicitly accept the existence of onward movement within the
EU. Countries such as Greece and Italy had no incentive to monitor either
arrivals or onward movement. Thus, during the summer of 2015, NGOs and
volunteers were often in command of the best information about arrivals on
the Greek islands and along the Western Balkan route. Subsequently, UNHCR
and others began to collate flow information.13
For the EU institutions, the triggering of the Integrated Political Crisis
Response (IPCR) system in October 2015 became a critical catalyst for improv-
ing information flow between officials, at both national and EU level (Council
of the EU 2015b). One of the enduring benefits of the activation of the IPCR
has been the development of Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis
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(ISAA) reports, collating data from affected EU member states and providing
updates on key changes and responses; this report is distributed weekly to
officials. Described by officials as ‘the saviour of 2015’, the ISAA reports
ensured everyone had access to the same data at the same time, and allowed
actors to identify key knowledge gaps and to seek further information (Collett
and Le Coz 2018). While this seems basic, it did not exist in a usable consoli-
dated format prior to the crisis.
Separately, while proliferating instability within the European neighbour-
hood has increased the risk of additional mass movements of displaced
people, whether primary or secondary movements, interior policy-makers in
charge of migration portfolios have few tools to predict—and thus prepare
for—the effects of external events on inflow. The earliest warning occurred
when people had already reached European borders, when it was too late to
put in place appropriate and timely responses. While immigration policy-
makers instinctively understood that dynamics were likely to change in
2015, they had little data that would help them predict scale, composition,
and route.
Early warning systems exist across the EU institutions. For example, the EU
Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) is designed to provide the European
External Action Service (EEAS) and EU member states with early warning
analysis and response. Effects on migrants and refugees are included in the
analysis, which is mostly limited to the region in question, and dissemination
to interior actors is limited. The development of the EU Conflict Early Warn-
ing System (EWS) in 2014 was, in part, to redress criticisms that the EU’s
approach to early warning had been ad hoc and scattered. Within the
Directorate-General ECHO, analysts from the Emergency Response Coordin-
ation Centre publish a ‘daily map’ of situations to watch. This can include a
damage assessment after a major natural disaster, or forecasts of dangerous
weather systems affecting Europe (European Commission Directorate-General
for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection n.d.).
At agency level, EASO has now been tasked with supporting the develop-
ment of an early warning, preparedness, and crisis management mechan-
ism.14 As such, the agency produces regular analyses of trend, push–pull
factors, and risk scenarios based on information from EU member states and
other agencies, including UNHCR, IOM, and Frontex. In 2016, Europol
established the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) to help member
states target and dismantle the organized crime networks involved in human
smuggling and trafficking. The EMSC also produces Migrant SmugglingMoni-
toring Reports—delivering 174 in its first year of operation (Europol 2017).
The existing infrastructure is geared towards sharing information that could
indicate the evolution of a migration crisis but it has limited predictive
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capacity. For example, neither Frontex nor EASO engage in scenario building;
where this capacity exists in the EEAS, foresight capacity is narrow due to weak
links to broader geopolitical conflict and instability.
Increasing the Use of Research and Evidence
Post-crisis: A Mixed Bag
In an effort to address what quickly became a political concern about the
availability of evidence on flows, since 2015 the European Union has initiated
a number of new mechanisms to gather and improve the use of evidence for
policy-making across the European Union.
Between institutions, it is clear that the crisis has created a habit of infor-
mation exchange on a regular basis, rather than ad hoc. Two weaknesses
persist. First, the value of information exchange relies on accurate reporting
from EU member states. It became clear in the autumn of 2016 that reported
numbers in Greek mainland reception centres were far higher than the num-
bers witnessed on the ground; concerned by the conditions of continued
onward movement through the Western Balkans, it was UNHCR and
non-state actors that raised the alarm, rather than the Greek government
(UNHCR 2015). Second, issues flagged through the IPCR and other coordin-
ating groups translate into improved policy outcomes. The continued docu-
mentation of poor conditions on the Greek islands and along the borders of
south-east Europe, for example, reflect a lingering gap between communicat-
ing a problem and finding ways to address it effectively when there is political
resistance to doing so.
There has also been a concerted effort to gather ‘upstream’ data on flows.
The European Commission has joined various EU member states in funding
the IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix to begin monitoring a number of
countries seen to be key origin and transit countries along the central Medi-
terranean route to the EU.15 This investment marks a significant upgrade in
interest in terms of research: prior to 2016, the major investment from the
European Commission had been the development of ‘migration profiles’ of
key sending and transit countries, lengthy reports outlining stocks, flows, and
socio-economic data, which tended not to be used by policy-makers (Global
Forum on Migration and Development n.d.). However, there have been ques-
tions over the quality of some of the data produced and uncertainty over who
to believe when data conflict with that produced by national agencies.
Interpretation remains challenging. While there is now perhaps even a
surfeit of information available to officials, there is little systematic analysis
of that data. It is left to policy-makers to select the data they deem most
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pertinent and to draw their own policy and operational conclusions, poten-
tially erroneously.16
Beyond this, the European Commission has developed a renewed, almost
repentant, appreciation of broader migration research and has developed a
new range of initiatives (some of whichmay turn out to be duplicative). This is
driven by a desire by numerous Directorates-General within the Commission
to ensure their own continued relevance on a topic with high salience as
much as it is about improving policy on the basis of evidence. Central
among these is the creation in 2016 of a Knowledge Centre of Migration and
Demography (KCMD). The Centre is tasked with collating what it perceives to
be fragmented knowledge on migration, rather than generating new informa-
tion, and it has launched a dynamic data hub that presents stock and flow data
culled from Eurostat, the OECD, the United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs (UNDESA), and others (Knowledge Centre onMigration and
Demography n.d.). Based in Italy, it is not yet clear how close its links with
policy-makers will be, or whether the primary audience for its data will be in
policy or academic circles. Certainly, much of the information published is
already circulating in a different form at meetings such as the IPCR, although
not sourced via the KCMD.17 Separately, the Directorate-General Research has
created a Migration Research Platform that brings together all the various
research projects supported under the preceding research frameworks, as
well as the various EU-led sources of information, including (somewhat circu-
larly) the KCMD.
More meaningfully, the amount of funding earmarked for independent
migration research under the Horizon 2020 research programme has been
increased significantly.18 This includes the development of an externally
managed migration research platform designed to make evidence more com-
parable across countries (CROSS-MIGRATION) and a ‘stakeholders’ platform
that will bring together researchers, NGOs, and local authorities on social
issues related to migration (RESOMA) (European Commission Directorate-
General for Research and Innovation 2016). At the same time, under the
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa—launched to improve cooperation with
sending and transit countries across the continent—a Research and Evidence
Facility has been created under the aegis of the School of Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS) to look at, inter alia, the drivers of migration (SOAS University
of London n.d.).
It is still unclear how these reinvigorated efforts will function alongside the
existing mechanisms—from the EMN through to the consultancies tasked
with developing impact assessments—and play a concrete role in developing
policy, and the EU institutions may be mistaking a flurry of action for pro-
gress. These efforts can also be critiqued on the basis of ‘too little, too late’; the
original Horizon 2020 programme contained little focus on migration, and
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first results from the new calls for proposals will take several years to emerge.
Although the Directorate-General Research has hosted several conferences
designed to reflect on the use of evidence in policy-making,19 there has been
little broader reflection within the EU institutions as to how research, once
collected, is used to design and reform policy, despite increasing demands
from leaders for ‘data’.
Conclusion: Challenges to Incorporating Evidence
in EU Policy-making Processes
Overall, as one might expect, there is a strong correlation between how far the
EU institutions are actively invested in external expertise and how far that
expertise can then influence its own policy work. The exception to this is work
commissioned by the Directorate-General Research, which is, too often,
viewed as sitting outside policy circles. Proximity to policy-makers (how far
experts are embedded in a policy-making network at EU or national level),
reputation (the canon of expertise that researchers bring to the table) and
familiarity (whether the research framing fits within the pre-existing views of
policy-makers) are all factors affecting influence. This last criterion is particu-
larly important: there has been a surfeit of critical analysis of EU policy during
the crisis period and yet very little of it has affected the overall policy direc-
tion;20 instead, it has often led to a withdrawal of openness on the part of
policy-makers to interact.
To be effective, researchers and experts need to provide information that is
not readily available to policy-makers. This includes not only primary on-the-
ground research, but also ensuring that the voices of those affected by migra-
tion (notably, migrants themselves) are heard, as noted by Singleton (2015).
Policy-makers are ready to hear from civil society and academic actors who can
offer a first-hand account of policy effects, or raise issues that otherwise do not
reach Brussels. This creates a paradox: access to EU policy-makers is hugely
advanced by regular presence in the policy-making environment—whether
Brussels or a national capital—and by the development of networks that are
constantly in flux.21 Thus, researchers who are predominantly undertaking
fieldwork tend to have limited access to the policy-making environment. This
is an issue replicated in civil society, where local NGOs are reliant on platform
NGOs in Brussels effectively translating and communicating their concerns.
As the scope of EU interest in migration broadens to non-EU countries and
to the implementation of EU policy at local level, the gap between knowl-
edge and access is likely to broaden. This means that the role of effective
interlocutors—beyond occasional conferences and presentations—who can
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distil information and draw relevant policy conclusions has become evermore
important.
Reputation and trust are key. Expertise must be seen as independent, or
clearly marked otherwise. This has become increasingly problematic in aca-
demic circles where researchers’ ideologies are frequently set in opposition to
those of policy-makers. The use of charged terms such as ‘Fortress Europe’ and
‘externalization agenda’ has given policy-makers the impression that research
conclusions may not be objective—which, in turn, has affected levels of trust
between the policy and academic worlds. There is a need for an open conver-
sation within academia about core goals of research, about the desirability and
function of policy influence and, if deemed a valid objective, about the
creation of constructive environments to communicate necessary critique to
policy-makers. The relationship is under strain, but there is an opportunity to
repair it.
When a policy area is politically sensitive and contested, it is not only hard
for policy-makers to review and absorb critique, but also to take on board
contradictory evidence. This is also related to the level of direct policy respon-
sibility that the EU institutions have over a topic. Since the late 2000s, it has
proved far easier for the European Commission to commission and reflect
upon public research related to immigrant integration outcomes, as it merely
has a loose coordinating role. Conversely, policy-makers are far less likely to
commission public research on border management or security issues, prefer-
ring to commission private consultancies; for example, McKinsey was com-
missioned to review asylum procedures in Greece in late 2016, in order to
develop means of accelerating the implementation of the EU–Turkey state-
ment. Proximity to decision-making also affects how far research is taken on
board: the European Parliament—furthest from the hot-seat—commissions
more critical research than the Commission which, in turn, commissions
more research than the Council, which relies primarily on information com-
municated by EU and international agencies through briefings and memos
(and, now, ISAA reports). But policy-makers must become more open to new
information and be willing to adapt policy based on what it tells them.
The European institutions have clearly identified a need for greater levels of
forward-looking evidence on migration, and the willingness to invest in it—
specifically, the impact that demographic change, conflict, and instability
might have on future flows to Europe, and means through which migrants
may use particular regular and irregular pathways. One of the most frequently
uttered preoccupations, post-crisis, is the number of migrants who may seek
passage to Europe over the next couple of decades.22 Not only is this an impos-
sible question to answer, given the large number of variables inherent in deter-
mining such a figure, but to put forward a static prediction also risks fossilizing a
politically sensitive debate around a single piece of data. Thus, researchers and
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experts will need to find ways to help shape the most important future research
questions, rather than merely react to those developed in political circles. They
will also need to be clear about questions that cannot be effectively answered.
This requires not only an understanding of future policy issues, but also a
comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge.
As the migration policy domain is unlikely to reduce in political salience and
scrutiny in the near future, experts are in a contradictory position: on the one
hand, researchers will find that support for large-scale data and evidence collec-
tion is higher than it has ever been at EU level, including financial support; on
the other hand, itmay be harder than ever to influence a policy-making domain
that has become path dependent and constrained by national politics. To affect
policydesign, researchwill have tobe communicated in amanner that is smartly
framed, iterative and capable of acknowledging political realities while not
conforming to them. In a context where expertise is increasingly framed as
advocacy, providing objective evidence and policy relevant, constructive solu-
tions for policy-makers will be both challenging and essential.
Notes
1. Interviews undertaken in 2008 with Brussels-based journalists, unpublished MPI
memo, Transatlantic Council on Migration.
2. The staff of the Directorate-General HOME has grown significantly since 2015; this
has involved the establishment of a new unit on migration management support,
producing information reports for distribution within the European Commission
and elsewhere.
3. While the Global Approach to Migration (and later Mobility)—the EU’s effort to
develop a foreign policy agenda—has existed since 2005, it was considered amarginal
and marginally successful policy with little buy-in from those outside the JHA arena.
4. Eurostat gathers much of this information from EU Member States, including the
Labour Force Survey, the European Social Survey and various national population
surveys.
5. The European Commission has estimated commissioned work on irregular migra-
tion between 2017 and 2021 to be worth up to €6 million, while €3 million have
been earmarked for research on legal migration and integration. For original
tender specifications, see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/
files/financing/tenders/2017/20170310_tender_specifications_en.pdf (Accessed
7 May 2018).
6. This reporting commenced on a weekly basis in September 2015 and is now pre-
sented on a monthly basis.
7. The framework programme in 2018 is Horizon 2020, a fund of nearly €80 billion,
managed by the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation.
8. The Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography is attempting to rectify this.
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9. Currently, the EMN is managed by ICF, a for-profit consultancy.
10. This is particularly problematic when academic institutions view policy engage-
ment as an extra-curricular activity.
11. This section draws upon research conducted for Collett and Le Coz (2018).
12. Indeed, the October 2012 prediction for asylum applications in 2013 was accurate
to within 259 applications. For more detail on the process, see UNHCR (2013).
13. See, for example, UNHCR’s Daily Estimated Arrivals per Country—Flows through
Western Balkans Route, 24 April 2016.
14. As mandated through Article 33 of the recast Dublin Regulation (European Union
2013).
15. Originally conceived as a tool to helpmonitor displacement in conflict and disaster
regions, Directorate-General ECHO has funded the monitoring of transit flows
through Libya (co-funded by the UK government) since January 2016 (IOM
2018a), Niger (co-funded by the German government) since February 2016 (IOM
2018b), and Mali (co-funded by the UK and US governments) since June 2016
(IOM 2018c). The IOM not only monitors inflows and outflows; and demographic
data, including nationality, age and purpose of travel; and tracks changes in route;
it also produces short, frequent updates of the data.
16. Indeed, the European Commission’s Second Report on the Migration Partnership
Framework implied that a drop in border crossings in Niger from 70,000 in May
2016 to 1,500 in November of the same year was due to efforts pursued under the
proposed migration partnership with the country (launched in June 2016), ignor-
ing other possible factors such as seasonal fluctuation. This data was, in any case,
later revised (European Commission 2016b).
17. Interviews with officials in the European Commission conducted during April 2018
suggested thatknowledgeof theKCMD,andhence theuseof itsproducts,wasvery low.
18. The EU announced in 2017 that they would allocate over €200 million for
migration-related research in 2018–2020 (European Commission Directorate-
General for Research and Innovation 2017).
19. See, for example, the Directorate-General Research Workshop on Migration Gov-
ernance: Europe and Africa, hosted in Brussels on 10 July 2017.
20. See, for example, extensive research on NGO search and rescue activities in the
Mediterranean. Despite several research projects—such as MEDMIG—disputing
the ‘pull factor’ role played by such activities, Italian and EU policies have con-
tinued in the direction of curtailing those activities.
21. This is reflected in literature reviewing the use of evidence (Oliver et al. 2014).
22. A question that the Joint Research Centre has briefly attempted to answer ( Joint
Research Centre 2018).
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A Knowledge-base for the EU External
Migration Policy
The Case of the CARIM Observatories
Agnieszka Weinar
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been gradually developing its external migra-
tion policy, a process that has involved the use of various sources of know-
ledge over time. EU funding of research projects and research cooperation on
migration showed a steep increase in the early 2000s, when the Global
Approach to Migration was being crafted (European Commission 2008a;
Weinar 2011). This increase in EU-level policy interest and funding—
undertaken by many actors including academia, civil society, and inter-
national organizations—boosted the international efforts of data creation,
translation, and adaptation. The policy-makers who, in 2002, put together
the first Commission communication on cooperation with third countries on
migration, were hard pressed to find a comprehensive analysis of trends in
migration from Africa to Europe.1 By 2018, that information was much more
easily available from a variety of actors and in a variety of forms. Sources
include migration profiles from the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development
(ICMPD),2 the Migration Policy Centre’s series of migration reports,3 research
reports on migration coming from dozens of projects funded by the external
cooperation funds of the EU,4 not to mention the information gathered and
adapted by EU agencies such as Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office
(EASO) or the European Training Foundation (ETF). It seems today that a
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myriad of knowledge-brokers stand ready to assist EU policy-makers (Korneev
2018).
This chapter discusses the experiences of one of these knowledge-brokers:
the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM)
Observatories at the European University Institute (EUI), funded by the
European Commission between 2004 and 2013. The Observatories were
tasked with building a knowledge base on migration in the Southern and
Eastern neighbourhoods of the EU, and also in India. In this chapter, I focus
mainly on the case of the CARIM-South and CARIM-East Observatories. My
main objective is the critical discussion of the experiences of these two pro-
jects, and to identify key insights and lessons for consideration regarding the
relationship between research and policy-making. I will discuss the Observa-
tories in the wider context of EU policy developments and then reflect on the
processes of building a knowledge base for policy-making in an international
context. The chapter reflects on the challenges of collaborative research in a
complex international environment. It identifies the risks that can hamper
this collaboration, such as the language of knowledge production and the
research culture, as well as the ways such risks can be minimized. It also
provides insights into challenges with linking and communicating research
to policy in the European context.
The Role of Research in the EU Global Approach
to Migration and Mobility
The EU has consistently emphasized evidence-based policy-making as an
important element of the EU external migration policy, going back to the
early 2000s (European Commission 2002, 2006, 2008a). The ‘remote control’
of the EU borders required building relationships with the neighbouring
countries, but also having a clearer view of the migration patterns in the
European neighbourhood. This policy—the Global Approach to Migration
and Mobility (GAMM)5—acknowledged the need to engage in bilateral and
multilateral relations with the neighbouring countries based on three prin-
ciples: partnership, conditionality, and sustainability (Kunz et al. 2011).
Hence, the GAMM created the concept of ‘partner countries’—countries
which should be partnering with the EU on migration policy. This cooper-
ation is intended to cover all the countries of the world which either send
migrants to the EU, or are transit countries for such migration. GAMM pro-
posed a holistic approach to migration issues that goes beyond simple cooper-
ation on border management, and can foster democratic and economic
development of the countries of origin (Weinar 2011; Reslow and Vink
2015). Since the European Commission has dedicated significant financial
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means to support this approach, building the knowledge base onmigration in
the partner countries was seen as crucial for the allocation of funds where they
were most needed and for the assurance of policy effectiveness (European
Court of Auditors 2016).
Initially, however, the knowledge base on migration—its trends, but also its
causes and effects—was either non-existent or inaccessible in many countries.
This was partly because not all the partner countries in the neighbourhood
saw migration as an issue meriting research funding with other areas, often
presenting more pressing needs in the context of scarce resources. Also, the
existing research often employed local concepts and practices that were not
always easily translatable to the EU-based concepts and practices (e.g. different
legal frameworks resulting in different definitions, different methodological
approaches). More often thannot, such informationwas unavailable in English
or French. Therefore, it was up to the EU to create the information to underpin
its new policies. The first knowledge-building tool that the European Com-
mission invented in 2005 was ‘Migration Profiles’, first proposed as an instru-
ment to collect information on African countries in the Communication on
migration and development:
The Commission also proposes the establishment of a Migration Profile (MP) for
each interested developing country. Such a document would bring together all
information relevant to the design and management of an effective policy on
migration and development. This could help define a policy response which
would tailor to the situation and needs of the country or countries concerned
the instruments presented in a generic manner in this Communication and its
annexes. (European Commission 2005: 36)
Annex 8 of the Communication further elaborated what type of information
would be needed to support the EU (in its role as a donor) in deciding on
programming that would further support the migration and development
agenda. This informationwas required tobepresented in the formof ‘indicators’
that can be used to describe not only trends inmigration, but also the context in
whichmigrationoccurs; for example, immigration/emigrationflows and stocks,
migrants’ socio-economic characteristics, and labour market data (European
Commission 2005). These indicators were to form migration profiles for each
country receiving aid from the EU. Arguably, even the countries in the Organ-
isation for EconomicCo-operation andDevelopment (OECD)—countrieswith a
robust and capable administration—could have had problems compiling a list
of quality data and information required for such documents. In this instance,
the European Commission initially tasked itself with the delivery of migration
profiles, relying on the desk officers of its own delegations and, sometimes, the
administrations of the partner countries. Both had limited resources and skills
to dedicate to this task, and this situation posed a problem in the delivery of
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high-quality migrant profiles. It was only around 2007, when the EU made
funding available to develop migration profiles and when external providers
became engaged, that the situation improved.
The funding for the engagement of external actors and for relevant research
and data collection projects was mainstreamed in the external cooperation
funds of the European Commission; this included the Development Cooper-
ation Instrument (DCI). For example, the Prague Process, funded by the DCI,
produced a plethora of migration profiles as one of its deliverables.6 Interest-
ingly, the more research-oriented bodies of the European Commission (such
as DG Research or Eurostat) did not take a lead in the process of designing,
funding, and implementing this policy-focused research cooperation. Instead,
the building of a new knowledge base has been part of ‘development support’
within the EU’s migration and development agenda (European Court of
Auditors 2016). This approach involved several risks: for example, the DCI
funding instrument promoted the building of a knowledge base, but was not a
research programme, thus it lacked a solid analytical approach and the cap-
acity to evaluate the quality of research proposals submitted to the calls and
tenders. Furthermore, it required cooperation with the countries of origin on
research while, at the same time, assuming a very EU-centric view of the world
and migration research undertaken outside the EU. Finally, the DCI funding
instrument assumed that evidence in non-EU countries would be easily
accessible and digestible in the EU policy context. These risks had to be
mitigated by the actual implementing partners (in our case, the CARIMObser-
vatories). Indeed, it soon became obvious that migration data collection and
analysis in the partner countries required not only primary or secondary data
collection, but also extensive capacity building measures.
Migration Observatories as a Tool of the Global
Approach to Migration (and Mobility)
The first Migration Observatory at the EUI had its roots in the cooperation and
partnership agenda between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours. That
cooperation, dating back to the 1980s, only began to include migration in the
early 2000s, just after the Seville European Summit. The Euro-Med Migration
I was the first project that supported collaborative migration research between
all the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, and the EU (European
Commission 2008b). The first Consortium for Applied Research in the Medi-
terranean (the CARIM-South Observatory) was established at the EUI in 2004,
as a part of the Euro-Med project. Initially, its role was defined loosely as
building a knowledge base on migration that could serve both the EU and
the partner countries on the Southern rim of the Mediterranean. After 2005,
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however, and in light of the increased interest in migration profiles, CARIM
took on the creation of migration profiles for each of the countries it covered.
In 2011, the CARIMObservatory was expanded to the Eastern neighbourhood
(CARIM-East) and, in the same year, it also started data collection on India
(CARIM-India).
A key objective of the CARIM Migration Observatories was to establish
partnerships and collaboration on migration research with countries neigh-
bouring the EU. The partnership was reflected in the principles of ‘accessibil-
ity, ownership, and sustainability’. Accessibility meant that the data and
research collected by the Observatories should be accessible to policy-makers
and the public in both the EU and partner countries—this included linguistic
accessibility as well as conceptual accessibility (discussed later in this chapter).
Ownership meant that the stakeholders from the countries of origin should
recognize the value of the research and data collected by the Observatories, so
that the work is not seen as serving only the EU. Finally, the idea of sustain-
ability was that when EU funding ceases, the Observatories should be able to
sustain themselves.
To achieve these goals, a key strategy of the Migration Observatories was to
develop and engage a network of country experts connected across countries
and disciplines, thus allowing comparisons between countries and the multi-
disciplinary analysis of issues. The researchers from the neighbouring coun-
tries were invited to participate in a network of correspondents. They were
selected through the existing academic networks of the team of experts based
at the EUI and through literature reviews.
The architecture of the Observatories reflected three disciplinary divisions:
law, economics/demography, and social/political studies. The logic behind
this architecture was simple. First, the CARIM team followed the knowledge
management principle: a knowledge base should have a structure that can be
easily translated into a functional database. Second, the comparability prin-
ciple had to be reflected across countries and across disciplines. The three
disciplinary fields were covered by three teams comprised of an EUI leader
(expert in the discipline) and country experts for each participating country.
The teams collected data and performed analysis on a variety of migration
topics common to all the countries. Thus, the same research topics were
approached by disciplinary experts from the same country. Legal experts
collected relevant texts on laws and regulations; the economists/demograph-
ers collected relevant statistics; and political scientists/sociologists collected
policy papers, qualitative surveys, and reports. Each contribution was regis-
tered in CARIM’s online database, searchable by topic, country, or discipline.
It is crucial to note here that the data included in the database were not a result
of primary research; rather, they were a collection of existing information
scattered across countries and stakeholders. In addition, each expert would
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prepare a descriptive paper on the topic, to be published online. The results
included in-depth studies that, together, created a multidisciplinary report on
an issue, but that could also be compared along disciplinary lines across the
different countries. The country experts also contributed with research on
issues specific to their country, to fulfil the principle of ownership of know-
ledge production in the Observatories.
As will be discussed, the Observatories have been places of translation of
existing knowledge and assuring accessibility, but they also have been places of
knowledge production andmanagement, to foster ownership. Further, they also had
a role outside of academia: their activities targeted partner country political
and public discourses, to assure sustainability. This broad approach had imme-
diate benefits, but also carried important risks.
Translation of the Existing Knowledge
The idea behind the Observatories was that there was already a wealth of
knowledge produced by the academic institutions in the partner countries.
However, this knowledge was not easily accessible to EU policy-makers and
scholars for twomain reasons: language barriers, and the different cultural and
legal contexts in which scholarship was produced and practised. Translation—
understood as mainstreaming in English, and clarification of the context of
knowledge production—was thus the core task of the project. The same
concept was then expanded to the Eastern neighbourhood in CARIM-East.
Language: Language issues are by far the most important elements to consider
when talking about accessibility of both primary research and existing studies in
countries neighbouring the EU. The CARIMObservatory in the Southern neigh-
bourhoodpaid attention to the prevalence of French in the academic exchanges
across theMediterranean.However, thedominanceofEnglish in theproduction
and consumption of research across Europe had to be considered, together with
the fact that research produced in Frenchmay not have been accessible either to
the wider European public or more internationally. It is also important to note
that the prevalence of French language among the younger generations in the
Southern neighbourhood has been diminishing as the younger and skilled
people recognize the importance of English to accessing the global labour
market. This tension between two leading European languages became clear
with the development ofCARIM-South: eachyear thenumber of publications in
English increased, achieving a balance with the publications in French around
2011. The migration profiles produced for each of the countries (as well as
regional reports)wereproduced inEnglish to reach thewidest audience possible.
The CARIM-South database contained administrative data that were presented
in French or English, allowing for wider use by the international audience, but
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/1/2019, SPi
Agnieszka Weinar
194
the legal database contained documents in Arabic only, neither translated nor
described, and so of little use for non-Arabic speakers.
CARIM-South did not produce research papers in Arabic, relying on the
French and English language skills of the partner country academic results
and policy-making elites. This was possibly a barrier to the dissemination of
the results among those sections of the population that do not master these
languages.7
Over the years, the EU faced growing criticism of its partnership approach
inexternalmigrationpolicy-making (Carrera andHernández i Sagrera 2011;Van
Hüllen 2012; Wunderlich 2012). The key criticism concerning knowledge pro-
duction was that it serves only the objectives and interests of the EU. Thus, a
growing emphasis was put on the benefits to the partner countries in the Com-
munication of 2008 (European Commission 2008a). Observatories adjusted to
this requirement in their next wave of activities, notably at the inception of
CARIM-East in 2011.8 Tobenefit both the EUand thepartner countries alike, the
working languages needed to be adjusted. Indeed, Russian—not English—is the
lingua franca east of the EU border and thus the database inputs and multidis-
ciplinary research were produced consistently in English and Russian. The work
was done by the bilingual research teamand supported by translators and proof-
readers in both languages. This required the use of additional resources.
The adoption of Russian as the official project language also had another
advantage. When looking for scholars able to participate in a multinational
research network, the language criterion is usually a limiting factor. A research
coordinator can typically only use the pool of scholars who can write in good
English, which considerably limits the choices possible. English-speaking
researchers and consultants usually earn their credentials working for inter-
national organizations and producing informative reports, but not all can
produce analytical contributions. Very often, English-speaking researchers
unknowingly create research monopolies. This is a major unintended conse-
quence of international research networks, which only open up to people
with good English skills and previous experience working for international
organizations. Often, it is two or three individuals in a country who are used in
cross-country research projects, while arguably the possible pool of suitable
candidates could be much wider if knowledge of English were not a precon-
dition. So, the risk perpetuated by the international research networks is that
competency in English, rather than exceptional skill or unique knowledge,
gives a country expert their dominant position. Adopting Russian allowed us
to reach scholars and practitioners who did not work in English but who had a
required set of skills to contribute to the research.Most of themwere invited to
participate after a literature review of the Russian-language sources, performed
by the CARIM-East team in the first month of the project.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/1/2019, SPi
The Case of the CARIM Observatories
195
Cross-country comparisons: When establishing a network of collaborators, an
important translating function of the Observatories emerged. Even if the
working language were the same and understood by all the scholars involved,
the different traditions of scholarship made a truly comparative approach
difficult. The differences concerned both actual concepts used in data collec-
tion and analysis, and the standards of academic research and analysis. In my
experience, when EU decision-makers look for comparative studies in migra-
tion, they often aim to achieve the standards of OECD work on migration,
which effectively translates national differences in data collection into a
coherent annual International Migration Outlook report.9 The OECD first
reports pre-date EU-level efforts to harmonize migration statistics, and they
are comprehensive, including information on policy changes and social
issues. I believe that, for the time being, this standard is impossible to achieve
across various non-OECD countries, mainly due to the differences in data
collection methodologies (the definitions and modes of collection). Even in
continental Europe, these traditions differ (see Di Bartolomeo 2019).
Within the CARIM, we attempted to address this difficulty in two ways. The
first solution, adopted in the CARIM-South Observatory, saw the comparative
research delivered at the stage of Migration Profiles. The CARIM-South statis-
tical database contained table statistics from administrative sources and quali-
tative surveys for each country, but only the qualified teammembers were able
to provide a comparative analysis of the content (which they did in the
Migration Profiles). A lay person using the table ‘as is’ ran the risk of compar-
ing apples and oranges. The second solution was adopted in CARIM-East: each
data item included in the database was accompanied by adding explanatory
notes for each of the tables, which explained the content of the table and thus
aided its comparability across the countries.
It must be added here that the Observatories never aimed at offering a
comparative dataset with the statistics processed to achieve comparability
(as it is the case in the OECD reports or Eurostat reports). It has always been
understood that the national data reflect local specificity that is lost when we
try to use global, overarching definitions and concepts. A similar learning
process took place in the case of legal and socio-political components of the
database. In CARIM-East, the laws and policy documents written in local
languages were annotated in English (and in Russian, when needed) to
explain their content and importance. Also, newspaper articles in local lan-
guages were given a short explanation in English and Russian.
Knowledge Production and Management
To build the knowledge base of migration issues in the neighbourhood of the
EU, the EU institutions have been seeking information on very specific topics
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all linked to the main themes of the Global Approach to Migration, such as
irregular migration, remittances, circular migration, and so on. Consequently,
the CARIM Observatories focused on these topics in such a way as to make it
clear that the primary beneficiary of the research was the EU. Yet, these topics
were not always relevant for a given country: for example, the issue of asylum
seekers was not relevant for Georgia (with a handful of cases each year), while
the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was a real topic of concern. In
order to produce analytical reports and data on asylum seekers in Georgia,
primary research had to be conducted. This was a clear challenge for two
reasons: financial constraints regarding the primary research, and lack of
motivation to conduct such research due to its thematic irrelevance. It is
important to note, however, that only relatively few topics were considered
largely irrelevant for the partner countries. CARIM teams have tried to adjust
the thematic range and be open to other topics that are more important to the
partner countries (hence, for example, the research on IDPs conducted by
CARIM-East).
The financial instruments dedicated to migration policy at the EU level
are insufficient to support quality, large-scale primary data collection and
analysis.10 This is understandable, since primary research has not been an
objective in these instruments. Consequently, the Observatories were unable
to develop a fully fledged primary research programme. There have been
isolated cases of small-scale surveys undertaken in the framework of CARIM-
South involving selected countries, but usually primary research was funded
by other international donors (e.g. the IOM funding a survey of asylum
seekers in Italy). Indeed, more primary research could have been done in
the framework of Horizon 2020 but that programme has rarely followed the
Global Approach interests.11 Therefore, the Observatories could only engage
in limited original qualitative studies on an ad hoc basis.
The pooling of resources and optimizing the existing knowledge were thus a
key strategy. The belief underlying the functioning of the Observatories since
their conception was along the lines of the beliefs expressed in the Global
Approach policy documents: that the relevant research exists but is not easily
accessible. It transpired that this was, indeed, true—to a considerable extent.
Migration studies is a functioning field of research all over the world, albeit
that scholars can have different perspectives and be interested in different
facets of the phenomenon. A clear example of such differences is burgeoning
literature on immigration control in the countries of the Global North, while
the scholars in the Global South workmore on the effects of emigration. These
differences lead to inevitable gaps in the existing data and knowledge. The
main task of the Observatories was to identify and transmit research relevant
from the point of view of the EU and the partner country development
agenda. The problem was that the EU-centred view on what constitutes an
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important research question on migration would not always be met with
understanding, or be relevant to the reality of a partner country.
It is natural for researchers from the countries of origin, with a predomin-
ance ofmigration outflows, to be interested in emigration and its effects. Thus,
the knowledge base often exists, ready to be interpreted and shared inter-
nationally. However, in many cases the outflows are towards other regions
than the EU, as was the case in Armenia or Palestine. Thanks to their role as a
bridge between the EU and the partner countries, the Observatories were able
to generate a holistic image of migration in the wider EU neighbourhood, and
study flows towards other destinations (such as Russia or Turkey). In addition,
between 2004 and 2010, a significant evolution of the EU’s thinking about the
nature and extent of evidence that was needed for policy formulation
occurred. EU policy-makers became more interested in migration phenomena
in general, to contextualize the EU’s position. The work of the Observatories
was needed to provide that contextual information, which was a wider topic
than just studies of migration flows into the EU.
Yet, controversies arose in cases where a partner country had different
priorities and the available research did not fit the core topics of the research
agenda dictated by the EU. That was the situation with Libya and Russia—
both huge markets for immigration—where most scholars no longer under-
took research on either emigration or emigration to the EU. Arguably, the
primary research in Libya was very scarce on any topic related to migration.
Contrary to that, the research on immigration to Russia developed exponen-
tially in the early 2000s and thus there was a wealth of excellent primary
sources to tap into. But this required flexibility on the part of both the
Observatories and the EU policy-makers, and agreement that the Russian
team should take a different perspective—that of a host country. This helped
the CARIM-East team to open a new research field: the comparative analysis of
migration from Eastern partnership countries to the EU and the Russian
Federation. This became a win–win situation: it engaged Russian scholars
who perceived the comparative perspective as very useful for their own
work; it made the research produced by the migrant-sending countries more
relevant for them because it allowed a holistic view of migration in these
countries; and it helped to change the tone of the EU debate on migrations
from the Eastern partnership countries to the EU by recognizing the central
role of Russia.
Even so, among the partner country teams that were studying emigration,
the challenges prioritized by the EU were not the same as the perceived
challenges their countries faced. Irregular migration to the EU was probably
not an important research theme for Lebanese or Armenian scholars, neither
was irregular immigration to their countries. If the research was to benefit
them, the differences had to be recognized by the EU team coordinating the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/1/2019, SPi
Agnieszka Weinar
198
Observatories. In many instances, other issues related to migration were
considered more important. Among them were the IDPs, depopulation, and
the social impacts of emigration. Over the years, the Observatories adjusted
their methodologies to include the themes that were more relevant for the
partner countries than for the EU, thus fulfilling the promise of research
partnerships. In CARIM-East, the research themes were actually agreed by
the national teams themselves. They took the decision based on their know-
ledge of the existing research and its usefulness for comparative multidiscip-
linary work, thus taking full ownership of their work.
Apart from the thematic issues and data discrepancies, an important con-
sideration had to be taken into account when coordinating large international
networks: the different research cultures. The existing knowledge had to be
collected by the experts according to the common guidelines and then
adapted to the needs of the European policy-makers according to Western
European standards. Culturally responsive communication was thus the top
skill required from all the EUI teammembers. Indeed, a crucial element of the
success of the Observatories was the fact that they specialized in the regions
under study, had had experience of living in the countries participating in the
Observatories and, at the same time, had the Western European approach to
the research process and to academic publications. The translation of one
academic culture into another was far more important than simple language
translation. All differences had to be carefully managed and negotiated, espe-
cially when there was a different understanding of research standards, publi-
cation standards, and analysis. An important and delicate issue was the
variation in norms of academic freedom across countries. In a few extreme
cases, the political pressure on academics made meaningful cooperation
impossible—either because they felt obliged to insert political language (e.g.
praising a country leader) into academic papers, or because they did show
academic free thinking and risked political consequences.12
One of the goals of the Observatories was to build the capacities of the
researchers from the partner countries to enable them to function in the
Western European academic culture. Hence, the EUI teams engaged in ad
hoc training (e.g. on policy–research communication), as well as offering
support for publications in the English-language academic journals. That
part of the work was especially rewarding and had a visible impact on the
younger generation of scholars over the years.
Shaping the Political and Public Discourses
The knowledge base produced by the Observatories was primarily to serve the
European policy-makers but, in the spirit of the EU partnership, they were also
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intended to benefit the partner countries. As already alluded to earlier, this
part of the Observatories’ mission has been the most difficult to achieve.
The EU-level policy-makers were the most receptive targets for research–
policy communication. This came as no surprise, as they all read English and
French; in addition, immigration has been highly relevant for the EU institu-
tions. The Observatories thus served as a knowledge hub for migration-related
data and information for many European institutions, and the dialogue has
been ongoing. CARIM teams regularly prepared briefings and informa-
tion notes for the Commission officials, highlighting evidence on migration
in the neighbourhood. This work was often done through very informal
channels of communication. The team members regularly participated in
research–policy dialogues, contributing to the Commission working groups
and Council working group meetings. For example, the CARIM-East team was
one of the key stakeholders in the consultations on Schengen visa liberaliza-
tion with Ukraine and Moldova, supporting the Commission when it was
designing its Action Plans on Visa Liberalisation. Its members also participated
in the Eastern neighbourhood partnership meetings and Prague Process
meetings, as well as during European Parliament hearings.
Yet, for a variety of reasons, getting the national government officials to
engage actively in the debates resulting from the research was more challen-
ging. First, the European dimension of the research was not seen as necessarily
relevant at the national level in all instances. Second, not all the countries in
the EU are equally interested in migration from North Africa or Eastern
Europe. Italian policy-makers have been quite involved in the activities of
CARIM-South, while CARIM-East enjoyed high levels of support from the
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, as already explained, the lan-
guage barrier was decisive in limiting the possible impact of the results beyond
those able to speak English or French. However, the Observatories tried to
build bridges: it is important to note that CARIM-South supported the upcom-
ing Polish presidency when it was preparing its plan of action on the Medi-
terranean by contributing a policy paper (2011). The Observatories were also a
scientific partner of the POLITICALLY.EU Italian national debate on ‘Europe
and Migration Policies’ (2014).
Engaging with policy-makers in the partner countries was the main chal-
lenge faced by the Observatories. A tradition of an intensive research–policy
communication is not universally shared by all the countries of the world.
Indeed, more often than not scholars do not have access to policy-makers. If
anything, the fact that the Observatories were seen as an EU project opened
some doors for the dissemination activities. Nevertheless, the lack of deep
interest in migration matters was a major obstacle to fruitful research–policy
debate on migration issues. Morocco and Moldova have been the most inter-
ested in systematic and collaborative research on migration of their own
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citizens, while in other countries such interest was short-lived (e.g. in
Ukraine). Migration was not a top-priority and was seen as predominantly
an EU concern, to which the countries felt obliged to respond within clear
political limits—that is, participating in EU initiatives but not necessarily
engaging in the production of an EU-sponsored knowledge base. The know-
ledge base used by these governments was usually produced by United
Nations organizations or the IOM on an ad hoc basis, and that was clearly
perceived as sufficient.
The view that migration is mostly ‘the EU’s problem’ caused challenges for
the sustainability of the Observatories. At that time, the CARIM partner
countries did not invest in comprehensive migration research and the EU
funding could not replace sustained national support.
Conclusion
The work of the CARIM Observatories can shed light on the challenges faced
by EU policy-makers when trying to establish migration policy partnerships
with third countries. The key issue, in my view, is the true partnership in
collaborative research and research–policy communication. Such a partner-
ship relies on the acknowledgement of diversity, understood as linguistic,
cultural, and institutional diversity that impacts on research goals; its execu-
tion and the policy–research dialogue. This diversity needs to be negotiated to
satisfy all the partners. Such partnerships are complex: they involve academics
from different academic cultures, policy-makers from different institutional
settings and actors from other sectors that bring their own perspectives.
Collaborative research in such a context requires a team of knowledge
translators (or brokers). Their role is based on trust: the trust of the donor as
regards their academic credentials and capabilities to meet the expected stand-
ards and goals; and the trust of experts from the partner countries who
recognize the academic authority of the team members to the extent that
they accept the necessary adjustments and improvements of the produced
research. This was the case of the peer review process across languages and
cultures performed by the Observatories. The EUI-based teams elaborated a
model of cooperation that allowed the achievement of research excellence in a
complex environment.
Research–policy communication can be even more challenging. If the part-
ner countries do not have a tradition of research–policy communication, a
one-off external initiative will not change the status quo. The political support
of the donor can help foster the dialogue, but it may not be entirely successful
because of its perceived imposed character. In the case of the CARIM Observa-
tories, the main beneficiaries of the knowledge base were the EU institutions,
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network members from the EU and the partner countries, and numerous
academics and students from all over the world (as documented by the data-
base statistics). The policy impact of the Observatories on the partner coun-
tries’ policies has never been measured in a systematic way.
Notes
1. In fact, the authors relied heavily on a report by the Centre for Development
Research in Copenhagen, which is the only research source quoted in the Com-
munication COM(2005) 390 Final (European Commission 2005).
2. See the migration profiles repository at: https://gfmd.org/pfp/policy-tools/
migration-profiles/repository (last accessed 3 June 2018).
3. The repository of the reports can be consulted at: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
publications/migration-report/ (last accessed 3 June 2018).
4. For example, the reports produced by the CARIM Observatories, to be consulted at:
www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/publications/
5. The original name figuring in EU documents since 2005 was the Global Approach
to Migration, but it was modified in 2011. However, it refers to the same policy
framework.
6. See, for example, https://www.pragueprocess.eu/en/migration-observatory/
migration-profile-light
7. However, there has been no evaluation study to provide an accurate assess ment of
the CARIM reception among the wider population in the countries of origin.
8. Language has never been an issue in CARIM-India because English is an official
language in India.
9. See, for example, www.oecd.org/migration/international-migration-outlook-
1999124x.htm
10. Unlike research funding available under purely research instruments; for example,
Horizon 2020.
11. A handful of large-scale projects were funded under the 7th Framework Pro-
gramme, specifically, Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) and Temper
projects.
12. For example, as is the well-known case of Arif Yunusov from Azerbaijan, a country
expert from CARIM-East who became a prisoner of conscience due to his critical
stance towards the country’s leadership.
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Metropolis and Post-truth Politics
‘Enhancing Policy through Research’
Howard Duncan
Introduction
In 1995, the government of Canada, concerned to shore up its stock of
evidence upon which to build immigration and integration policy, turned to
the academic community. Its approach was to offer incentives to social scien-
tists to turn their attention to immigration phenomena, an area that was little
studied at the time in Canada. Thus was created the Metropolis Project in
Canada, with its university-based Centres of Excellence and a broad partner-
ship of agencies of government at all levels and civil society organizations
across the country. Funding was provided to support research in areas of
direct relevance to policy development; also, the immigration ministry, Citi-
zenship and Immigration Canada, provided a Secretariat whose principal role
was to build bridges across which members of the three sectors (the academy,
government, and civil society) would travel to engage one another actively,
all with the ambition to improve the outcomes of immigration for both the
immigrants and the Canadian public.
At the same time, the government of Canada, in concert with the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, led the creation of an unfunded
correlate—the International Metropolis Project—to motivate international
comparative research and policy–research exchanges among an initial
group of organizations within countries belonging to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Metropolis Secretar-
iat at Citizenship and Immigration Canada (now Immigration, Refugees, and
Citizenship Canada) was responsible for managing operations, expanding
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membership of the network and supporting the Metropolis International
Steering Committee (ISC)—the Project’s governing body. Although the inter-
national project was and remains unfunded, it has been able to rely upon
the members of its Steering Committee to host and fund its activities—
principally, its annual conferences. The Canadian arm of Metropolis ceased
research operations in 2012 with the closing of the Centres of Excellence,
but the annual Canadian conference continues. The closing of the Canadian
arm had no effect upon the operations of the International Metropolis Project,
as it has always operated without core funding. The Metropolis model is
that of a special project that created a network, but not a formal organization
with independent legal status. The Project had dedicated research funding
for the Centres of Excellence, and they operated only in Canada. Both the
Canadian and the International Metropolis Projects had governance infra-
structure, but in neither case were they envisaged as formal organizations.
Metropolis adopted the motto, ‘Enhancing policy through research’, and
adopted a bridge motif for its logo. Of course, the bridge signifies the connec-
tions thatMetropolis has always tried to build across not only the three sectors
of its participants, but also within each of the sectors: across academic discip-
lines, across government ministries, and across civil society organizations, all
of which activity is on an international basis.
This chapter will emphasize the relations between the academy and gov-
ernments without going into detail about the substantial role of civil society.
It will begin by covering the workings of the Metropolis Project in Canada,
followed by an account of how it has worked—and continues to work—
internationally. Working internationally always brings special challenges,
some of which are highlighted. The chapter closes with a look at the recent
rise of populism, the implications for academics and academic research, and
whether theMetropolis model offers ways to diminish the impact of populism
on government and public discourse. It should be made plain that the author
is writing from a background of over twenty years with the Secretariat of
the Metropolis Project, both the Canadian and the international projects
which he continues to lead. For the first sixteen years, this direct involvement
was with the Metropolis Secretariat, which was part of the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration in Canada; since 2012, the Metropolis Secretar-
iat has been at Carleton University in Ottawa. Much of what follows is based
upon personal experiences and reflections of this time. Although a certain
amount of subjectivity is inevitable, the author has tried to retain a healthy
modesty in these remarks. The term ‘Metropolis’ is frequently used through-
out this chapter; when it is invoked in the context of positions or decisions
taken by Metropolis, the reference is to decisions made by the Metropolis
ISC or the Metropolis Secretariat acting on behalf of the ISC.
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Some Metropolis Basics
As befits an ambition of intellectual bridge-building and to emphasize a point
made earlier, Metropolis was conceived as a network, not as an organization.
Developing productive working relations among such an array of organiza-
tions was thought best done with the flexibility and informality of a network
rather than through the more formal structures of an organization, particu-
larly an organization that receives core funding from its member organiza-
tions. In particular, Metropolis has eschewed adopting specific positions on
migration and integration policy, choosing instead to remain non-partisan
and apolitical apart from one core foundation. That core foundation is the
belief that it is unhelpful for societies to attempt a full prevention of migration
into their territories and that, instead, so far as possible, migration ought to be
managed in the best interests of the receiving society and the migrants, and
that this management be carried out through policy grounded in empirical
research.
Metropolis has always recognized that how a society manages migration is
to be tailored to its particular social, political, economic, and demographic
situation and history. As a result, Metropolis has encouraged discussions that
compare and contrast national and local situations, seeking data, evidence,
and analyses that will help inform each other’s considerations and policy
development.1 Metropolis has avoided prescribing universal solutions or
even best practices, offering instead a fully neutral discussion forum. The
neutrality of Metropolis discussions has been one of the attractions, particu-
larly for governments who have long viewed academic research and civil
society as often being hostile to their actions and decisions. Metropolis neu-
trality offers them the confidence to participate both in the discussions and as
members of the Steering Committee.
That this project carries the name ‘Metropolis’ stems from the recognition
that most migration, whether international or internal, is now destined to the
cities of the world.2 The original intention was that Metropolis would encour-
age and support policy research on howmigration affects cities, and how cities
can best respond through the various mechanisms of integration available to
them and in partnership with higher levels of government. Over the years,
Metropolis’ reach grew beyond the interests of cities to embrace the interests
of national governments and the international community, and its subject
matter interests expanded well beyond integration to include the phenom-
enon of migration itself. Despite this expansion in the scope of Metropolis, its
name remains pertinent, as cities remain the principal destination of the vast
majority of the world’s migrants. Indeed, the international community is
looking ever more carefully at cities not only as destinations, but also as active
players in the management of migration.3
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Bridging the gap between research and policy has, then, been a principal
concern forMetropolis, which has always recognized that this matter of policy
relevance has what one may call epistemological aspects and also inter-
personal, psychological, and sociological aspects. In other words, to some
extent, this issue is one of relations between ideas—ideas from both research
and policy; but it is also, and significantly, a matter of relations between
persons, those who carry out research and those who develop policy.
Metropolis maintains that policy relevance is ‘in the eye of the beholder’
and not something simply delivered on a plate by a researcher to a policy
analyst or decision-maker. Because research does not alone determine policy,
empirical research findings are neutral with regard to policy, and their rele-
vance is a characteristic imposed either by the researcher who discerns a link
to a policy issue, or by a policy-maker who draws such a link.4 Metropolis has
purposely ignored the quest for a logic of policy-making and sees policy
development more from a psychological than an epistemological perspective.
There are numerous models of the policy–research relationship, referring to
such things as the policy cycle. These rational re-constructions are of little
interest to Metropolis because real-world policy-making is inherently messy
and iterative, not a clean matter of deductive, or even inductive, relations
between evidence and policy conclusion. There are many reasons for this,
among them that the determinants of policy go far beyond empirical evi-
dence, and those who influence policy go far beyond those who produce
empirical evidence. That the Metropolis Secretariat was located within the
Canadian immigration department for sixteen years has given us insights
into the actual workings of policy development. It has long been recognized
that traditional means of disseminating research articles and books is no
guarantee of influence or value-added. The busy schedules of most policy
officials leave them little, if any, time to read lengthy and complex material;
often, the language of the researcher is impenetrable to the official and, often,
the researcher is ill-equipped to explain the relevance to policy of their work.
Metropolis has found it more effective to bring the researchers and policy
officials into the same room for mutual engagement.
This requires no small amount of confidence-building and, one could say,
professional culture shift. The gap between research and policy is often, at
heart, a gap in trust. Government officials often view academic researchers
as, at best, uninterested in policy or, at worst, as hostile to it. Academic
researchers can view governments as targets and can feel that working with
them risks their academic integrity. Further, university reward systems do not
normally value work on the grounds that it has influenced policy, let alone
work directly with governments; reward systems continue to recognize pri-
marily peer-reviewed academic publications and not contributions to govern-
ment policy or publications in the grey literature. To some extent, this mutual
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suspicion is rooted in a lack of awareness of what each sector does. The
Metropolis approach to dealing with these inherent suspicions relied heavily
on in-person contact. But, in the case of the Canadian Metropolis Project and
its funded research programme, it took a specific administrativemeasure to get
the Project off the ground.
The Canadian Metropolis Project
Canada has a long experience with immigration—one that the national gov-
ernment has taken very seriously, as is evident in the investments that it has
made in creating a large supportive bureaucracy with offices not only in
Canada, but throughout the world. Canada’s immigration programme,
which is administered now by the federal government’s Department of Immi-
gration, Refugees, and Citizenship, has always had as its principal objective to
enhance the Canadian economy and to raise the standards of living for its
citizens. In other words, the programme has been run primarily for economic
rather than humanitarian purposes, although Canada has also long been one
of the world’s most open countries to re-settled refugees and asylum seekers.
Inmanaging such a large-scale economic programme, the government needed
an increasingly strong evidence base for setting and adjusting policy on the
numbers of immigrants to bring into Canada, for considering their human
capital characteristics and for enhancing their integration outcomes. The
Metropolis Project was intended to help the government deepen this
evidence base.
Like most OECD countries, Canada has a national social science research
funding agency, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
(SSHRC). This agency, although government funded and managed, had
earned the trust of Canadian researchers, most importantly with regard to
the protection of academic freedom and the integrity of the process for
selecting projects for funding. When Canada’s immigration ministry, Citizen-
ship and Immigration Canada, began exploring the idea of establishing
academic Centres of Excellence to stimulate migration research in the coun-
try, the flat response from Canadian universities was that they would only
participate if the funds flowed through the SSHRC. Otherwise, they feared that
the funds would be used to influence the directions and conclusions of the
research. As a result, Metropolis funds, which eventually came from fourteen
government agencies, were pooled at the SSHRC and distributed by the Coun-
cil using peer review adjudication of individual research proposals.5 This
measure satisfied the academic sector’s demand that academic freedom be
fully respected.
How, though, was the government’s demand that the research be policy
relevant satisfied? After all, the only reason for establishing the Metropolis
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research centres was to increase the amount of research done on immigration
and integration in Canada and, ultimately, to provide a stronger evidence base
for government policy. The government’s demandwasmet, first, in specifying
in the initial call for proposals to establish for the centres a set of broad
research areas within which the centres’ research activities were to take
place. Second, to reflect the dynamics of immigration and integration, the
research centres were to respond to an annual call for research projects in
which the themes of the year’s research were specified as a result of discussions
among the government and academic partners. The use of the SSHRC as an
intermediary of the funding was the foundation upon which the rest of the
edifice in Canada was built, and it was upon this foundation that the discus-
sions leading to the choice of annual research themes took place. Although
the university-based Centres of Excellence had academic freedom, they were
expected to work in partnership not only with the Metropolis Secretariat,
which was an arm of the government, but also with all of the federal govern-
ment funding partners. This was to ensure, so far as possible, that the research
was in areas that would best inform government policy, as well as providing
an effective means for communicating the results of the research and to
build trust among the players. Active committees were formed to make this
possible, some chaired by the government with others chaired by the five
research centres.
Over the first three years of the Project, the levels of trust, which were low at
the outset, began to build as a direct result of the in-person discussions, which
also came to include discussions of research results and how policy should
respond. On a broader scale, in my experience and assessment, it was the
annual conferences that made the greatest contribution to establishing trust
among the sectors. These events were organized as joint policy–research
events that also brought civil society organizations into the mix of voices.
Both the plenary sessions and the workshop (breakout) sessions required
exchanges among people from government and the academy, and it was
through these, especially the more intimate workshops, that trust was built
and significant working relationships established. The conferences functioned
as neutral discussion fora where all present were there to contribute to a shared
objective of improving the lives of immigrants in Canada, and to enhancing
their contributions to the Canadian society and its economy. The culture of
the conferences was one of cooperation and it was extremely rare that
exchanges became confrontational. This overt culture of cooperation allowed
the government officials to continue attending these events, about which
they were very sceptical early on.
Did the model work in Canada? The goal of increasing the amount of
research devoted to immigration and integration was certainly realized, with
hundreds of peer-reviewed publications as well as hundreds of working papers
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published. The number of researchers in the area grew substantially as a result
of the funding directed to these themes, as did the number of migration
programmes in Canadian universities. That the government indicated that it
was interested in this field of study was, in itself, a motivation for some
researchers. It is noteworthy that, since funding for the Metropolis Centres
ended in 2012, all but one of the research centres has closed and academic
interest in the subject is beginning to shift to other areas, especially those with
dedicated funding. Evaluations of the Metropolis Centres of Excellence pro-
gramme indicated that the government’s policy ambitions were largely satis-
fied. Officials’ understanding of immigration and integration phenomena was
thought to have been enhanced, and there were various specific policy influ-
ences that Metropolis research was credited for—among them with regard to
the importance of language abilities for integration, especially in the labour
market, the role of foreign credentials in labour market integration, and the
growth of ethnic enclaves in Canadian cities.6 Canada changed its selection
criteria for skilled workers as a result of this research and introduced significant
measures to manage the fact of foreign credentials and their degree of fit with
Canadian employer standards. We know that the research directly affected
policy development in these cases from the Metropolis Secretariat having
worked directly with government policy officials within the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration and from the evaluations that were conducted.
The Canadian project was shut down after seventeen years of funding from
the government. It was always conceived as a limited term experimental
project; although it had initially been intended to last five years, it was
renewed twice. After the seventeen years of public funding, the government
decided to turn to other areas of policy, also in the hope that Metropolis could
continue some of its operations independently. Although this could be seen as
a sign of failure, the fact that the Project was only intended to be a five-year
experiment suggests that it did better than was anticipated. Furthermore,
although the research funds have disappeared, along with four of the five
research centres (one in Toronto continues to function to a lesser degree), the
annual conference continues with strong participation from all three sectors
and a central emphasis on the various aspects of settlement and integration.
Such has been the impact of the personal and professional connections that
were established previously that the conference in 2017 attracted over 800
participants, the same level as during the years of full funding.
Institutions that support research tend not to support special projects for
long durations. Social science research institutions are no different. They may
have a long-standing open call for proposals that may endure for decades, but
a special project in a single area will only rarely continue for long. Research
institutions will be pressed by many other interests to invest special project
funds in other areas, especially when the competition for funds is high.
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The lesson for academics who rely upon funding from government research
granting institutions is not to expect indeterminate funding for special pro-
jects. Such special funding is best regarded as seed funding, and research
centres in receipt of these funds would do well to invest in their own institu-
tional capacities such that, when the dedicated funds come to an end, as they
almost certainly will, they are ready to secure financial support in other ways,
success here being grounded in the capacities developed over the period when
the institution received special funds.
The International Metropolis Project
The fundamental goals of the International Metropolis Project are the same as
those of its Canadian counterpart, but the mechanisms for achieving them
have been different because of the lack of core funding. Internationally,
Metropolis relies upon there being sufficient goodwill among the members
of the network to keep its operations going. Interest in migration has grown
dramatically across the globe since the late 1990s—not only among govern-
ments, but also among academic researchers, think tanks, and civil society
organizations. The rise of migration on the agenda of the international com-
munity has been remarkable, with now twenty-two members as compared
with only ten members in the original Geneva Migration Group.7 High-level
meetings of the international community have attracted not only a growing
number of government representatives, but also members of civil society and
the academy as well, such has been the appetite to participate in meetings of
the United Nations General Assembly, the Global Forum on Migration and
Development, theMayoral Forum onMigration and Development, and a host
of conferences and seminars offered by the members of the Global Migration
Group (GMG) and many other organizations worldwide. In 1996, when
Metropolis launched its first international conference, there were very few
organizations organizing regular conferences in the migration field. Metrop-
olis had little competition then but, today, faces a very different situation.
Given the lack of a formal organizational structure, notably the lack of a
budget for operations or research, Metropolis has had to be flexible and
responsive to the changing migration environment to remain competitive.
Members of the ISC contribute time and, when serving as hosts of a confer-
ence, seminar, or ISC meeting, the finances required by the event. The ISC
membership, together with the Secretariat offices in Ottawa, Amsterdam,
Manila, Seoul, Beijing, and New Delhi, form the core of the network. The
ISC membership includes organizations from each of the three sectors
and decides cooperatively on such matters as the conference host, themes
and speakers, and the strategic directions of the network—directions that
will allow Metropolis to maintain its perceived value to the international
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community, which increasingly has many options from which to choose to
whom to give their attention. The choice of conference themes is intended to
reflect not only Metropolis’ views on which are the issues of current import-
ance, but also what Metropolis sees as emerging issues to which government
policy-makers and researchers will need to pay attention. The choice of
themes not only provides a framework for selecting speakers, but also provides
a framework for the programme of workshops and serves as a signal to the
research community of what Metropolis regards as subjects most worthy of
empirical research.
The organization of conference workshops has been a significant instru-
ment for bridging the policy–research gap. Rather than the workshops being
put together by the central conference organizers, it is the Metropolis con-
stituency who does so, through a ‘Call for Workshop Proposals’ for each
conference. This means that there is a high degree of ownership of the
workshops by those who organize and participate in them. A central require-
ment of the application process is a demonstration that the discussion will
include a mix of academic, governmental, and civil society participants and
is conducted on an international basis. Those who wish to create a workshop
but who find this requirement difficult to meet can rely upon the confer-
ence organizers and Secretariats for help. The result of the decentralization of
the workshop programme was a steep increase in the number of conference
registrants, the repetition of workshops year after year for groups that were
established and that created their own policy–research plans, and a progres-
sive growth in the utility of these events as meeting grounds for researchers
and government officials. The strong connections between research and
policy that the conferences provide remain the hallmark of Metropolis.
One of the ambitions of the International Metropolis Project has been to
increase the overall level of understanding of the phenomena associated with
international migration, be they, for example, with regard to the flows of
people; their settlement and integration; their impacts on economies and
societies, especially those of cities; or the various forms that migration takes.
The assumption is that the more comprehensive the understanding of migra-
tion and its effects, the more effective will be policy based upon this
understanding.
The issues that Metropolis established for itself at its first conference held in
Milan in 1996 were, like those in the Canadian context, concerned with
integration in its essential guises of immigrants into OECD countries (labour
market, housing, and neighbourhoods, discrimination, education, access to
social services, and so on). But, in subsequent years, Metropolis gradually
enlarged the scope of its interests to include migration flows themselves,
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including not only South–North flows, but also flows South–South, North–
North, and North–South; the special circumstances of refugees; transnational
communities; multiple migration patterns; smuggling and trafficking; the
global competition for talent; the relation between war and migration; and
many more.
Metropolis and the Global South
The point is that, to attain a degree of comprehensiveness of understanding of
migration, Metropolis shifted from a network primarily interested in integra-
tion to one that sought to bring virtually all aspects of migration to bear on its
discussions. Furthermore, it began to enlarge its geographical scope beyond
the small number of national partners that it began with in 1996 to the same
end. Metropolis now has a more extensive presence in Europe, Latin America,
and especially Asia, having launched a special project, Metropolis Asia, with
Secretariat offices to sustain a programme of policy–research activity. The
partnership in Asia was also Metropolis’ first sustained foray into the Global
South, an ambition long-stalled for lack of funding to support the participa-
tion of organizations in those countries.
The introduction of members of the Metropolis ISC from Asia and the
Global South has strengthened the perspective that the South brings to the
table, a perspective that notably includes the relationship between migration
and development—at this time, a major focus of the international commu-
nity.8 Also, Metropolis has been able to increase the discussions from the
point of view of what some still think of as the sending countries, although
the distinction between sending and receiving countries is now so blurred as
to be almost without value.9 Regardless, understanding better how countries
of the Global South or traditional sending countries think about and develop
policy to manage out-migration is useful for those in the receiving countries.
For example, coming to realize that migration is increasingly multiple in its
direction, rather than a mostly one-way permanent change of home, is essen-
tial for receiving countries, especially those in the OECD whose migration
policies have long been premised on the permanency ofmigration. It has been
said that there is nothing more permanent than a temporary migrant, but one
could now say, without irony, that there is nothing more temporary than
permanent migration. The hope expressed in enlarging the discussion table
through a greater diversity of membership as well as subject matter is to
increase the sophistication of policy throughout the world through an
enlargement of the perspectives of the discussions.
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Remaining Challenges
Metropolis has achieved much of what it set out to do twenty years ago and
has expanded its scope in ways that it did not foresee when it began. Although
its model of bridging the policy–research gap through the engagement activ-
ities of the network, rather than through supply-driven dissemination, has
met with some degree of success, the challenge posed by historical mutual
suspicions continues as new members join. The task of trust-building is a
continuing one, and it is unlikely it will ever be fully resolved given the
normal changes in personnel, especially in the policy arena. The strategy of
sustained conversations in neutral settings among the three sectors, conver-
sations that would build trust and show the mutual value of collaboration,
requires constant attention and modernizing, if only to meet the dramatic
increase in competition for these sorts of discussion. And although many
academics chose to work in these discussion settings, intending to support
rational policy-making, others have deferred. The academic reward structure
that favours publication in academic journals and rarely recognizes work in
support of policy is a significant barrier, especially for early-career researchers.
Academics working from a critical theory perspective remain largely ignored
by the policy world, but those engaged in empirical and statistical studies
often find a receptive policy audience. Nevertheless, existing reward structures
remain a disincentive for many, especially younger, scholars.
One way that Metropolis assesses success is the extent to which participants
from the three main sectors establish enduring working relations through
which policy is enhanced by research. In general, Metropolis has seen more
success in the traditional migration regions of North America, Europe, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand, but has had less success in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. It has met with significant success in building policy–research part-
nerships on issues of migration flows, but integration has been the strongest
suit, with a considerable degree of cooperation on labour market integration,
the role of language in integration, foreign credentials and experience, media,
and discrimination. Metropolis has done less well on emerging integration
issues; for example, the societal effects of transnationalism and multiple
migration patterns. Governments tend to be conservative in their range of
interests and can be slow to embrace new fields developed by the research
community. Similarly, Metropolis has had less success on recent develop-
ments in trafficking and smuggling, international relations, demographic
trajectories, and the emerging global competition for talent.
Metropolis’ ambitions to reach countries in the Global South have met with
only limited success to date. To some extent, this is a result of the limited
funds that are available in those countries and the fact that Metropolis, being
but a network, has been unable to offer financial support to people and
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organizations from those parts of the world. Even in Asia, where Metropolis
has enjoyed more success than in Africa, most participation has been from the
wealthier countries such as Japan, China, South Korea, and the Philippines.
Countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar
have been unable to participate to date.
But finances are only part of the explanation, one could argue. The agenda
of most Metropolis discussions reflects the interests of primarily the OECD
countries, and those are the interests of destination societies: integration
and social cohesion, economic effects, demographic trends, smuggling and
trafficking, and managing undocumented migration. While there are ana-
logues to these issues from the point of view of countries in the South, their
issues havemore to dowith the protection of their émigrés; the right towork in
countries of destination, be they in the North or the South (South–South
migration is now at roughly the samemagnitude as South–Northmigration);10
the rights of migrant workers and their families (as presented in the UN
Convention in this area which has not yet been signed by any OECD country,
save Mexico which is also a major source country of migrants to the United
States);11 the size and speed of urbanization—that is, internal migration; and
the capacity of their cities to manage rapid population growth and so on.
The relation between migration and cities is quite different in the North
than it is in the South.12 Cities in the North are more concerned with matters
of social integration, inclusion, and the protection of rights, or, alternatively,
with the perceived risks and costs of migrants in their cities. For many cities in
the Global South, the issues aremore immediate; for example, the provision of
housing, drinking water, sanitation, transportation, electricity, and other
basic services. For many megacities and peri-urban settlements in the South,
concerns of inclusion are but a luxury. The point is that the themes of
Metropolis gatherings tend to be those of the Global North and that this
may stand as another reason for the relatively low participation of academics
and government officials from the South.
This is another form of the policy–research gap—the gap between the issues
of the North and those of the South. This gap in interests and priorities is also
evident in the global migration discussion that has been taking place since the
early 2000s. Many countries of the Global North were reluctant participants in
such exercises as the Global Commission on International Migration—fearing
that the emphasis would be on access to OECD economies for migrant workers
from the South (a hesitation that continues, although has somewhat abated,
through to today)—and the Global Forum on Migration and Development,
which has emphasized the rights of migrants, including even the right to
migrate—an issue only for the traditional countries of origin. Metropolis will
need to find more common ground between North and South if it is to bridge
this geographical gap and increase participation from non-OECD countries.
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Many in the migration field wish to bring the business community to the
discussion table, seeing business employers as a significant influence on
migration flows, as implicated in the observance of migrants’ rights, and as
having tacit responsibilities for immigrant integration. Some would suggest
that businesses have obligations to employ immigrants and refugees.13
Metropolis has had little success in attracting the private sector for the simple
reason that there is little clear advantage to their participation. As was the case
with relations between the academic and the policy sectors, trust may be a
barrier here. Many in the business community see the academic sector, espe-
cially the social sciences, as highly critical of business. Where businesses have
interests in immigration, they normally lie in government relations rather
than with the academic community, and the business sector already has a
significant lobby with governments. In other words, there is little in it for
business to join an exercise in policy–research relations as they are now
conceived. The private sector is, however, deeply engaged in research to
support its planning and operations; the challenge for Metropolis and others
in the migration field is to develop capacities that would appeal to the busi-
ness community.14 One such area could be the intensifying global competi-
tion for talent, a competition that appears to be affecting migration flows, for
example, through incentives to return migration by such rapidly developing
countries of origin as China, India, and Mexico.
The Rise of Populism
In 2016–2017, many felt the effects of a slowly but inexorably rising populist
politics throughout much of the world, a form of politics that has been deeply
suspicious of experts whomany populists see not as neutral arbiters of scientific
veracity but, rather, as the voices of an elite with a vested interest in the
outcomes of their research.What is sometimes referred to as ‘post-truth politics’
is an evolution of a long-held suspicion that academic research is biased either
politically or ideologically, or towards the interests of its funders, especially
when those funders are corporate. The global interest in migration has reached
a level perhaps never before experienced, partly because of governments’ grow-
ing interest, levels of migration much higher than even during the post-World
War I era, but also partly as a result of populist politicians and lobbies having
raised levels of fear regarding immigration among increasingly sceptical publics.
Mainstream media have become quite politically polarized in some coun-
tries, with some strongly favouring populist political parties in their reporting
as well as in their opinion pieces. More recently, as has been well-noted, social
media have begun to play an ever-stronger role in the formation—and, per-
haps, the hardening—of public attitudes. Many of these politically extreme
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mainstream and social media promulgate what could be termed ‘alternate
accounts’ of the workings of a society—spreading conspiracy theories; specu-
lations about the true intentions of governments and other members of the
‘elite’, including academic researchers; and spurious pseudo-science on just
about anything that one may imagine. Many share a view that academic
research is biased towards protecting the positions of the elite in a society.
There are but a very few governments that, in 2018, openly embrace immi-
gration and welcome refugees despite the messages of the benefits of migra-
tion from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United
Nations, and other members of the international community.
Metropolis has been only minimally affected by this rise of populism and
nationalism, including among its member countries. The reason is that, des-
pite a sizeable number of populist politicians and their supporters in the
public realm, few governments are anti-immigrant populist in their actual
policies. Most of those who participate in Metropolis activities support well-
managed migration and integration. The hosts of Metropolis conferences
have supported these events because they value the neutral exchanges
among academics, policy officials, and civil society. A small number of anti-
immigration demonstrations have occurred at Metropolis events, but little
else to cause the Project to steer a new course.
How does post-truth politics affect the relations between policy and
research? One way to look at this is from the point of view of the marketplace
of ideas, which has become increasingly competitive over time, especially
with the rise of information and communication technologies (ICT) and the
overall effectiveness of communications, including in politics. The sophisti-
cation with whichmessages can now be delivered and the extraordinary speed
with which ideas can be spread through ICT puts research back on its heels.
The academic community now faces competition to a degree that it has not
experienced since the beginnings of The Enlightenment. Scientific research
gains its credibility from the care with which it is pursued, as well as the
rigorous peer-review processes that must be gone through before results are
released to the public. The culture of the best science—social or physical—is
inherently conservative, which can mean that scientists are more reluctant
than political pundits, or even journalists, to offer public analyses of situations
and trends. Fear-laden accounts of migrants committing crimes, taking jobs,
eroding national identities, and so on are easy to make, but a responsible
rebuttal requires appeal to hard data and analysis, something that takes time
and is often more difficult for politicians and their publics to understand. The
‘sound bite’ style of much modern journalism favours the less-considered
opinion over the complex analyses of social scientists. The challenge is for
the academic research community to becomemore competitive in themarket-
place of ideas, if it is to be a force against populism and post-truth politics.
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This is not an easy matter. Most social scientists, whether in the field of
migration or otherwise, are not trained in communications—possibly even for
the classroom, let alone for the news media or policy officials. But more
universities are seeing communications with the public as of value to them;
they are offering media training to their faculty and encouraging the media to
call upon them for expert commentary. For public audiences as well as for
government officials, communicating through the media may be more effect-
ive than more academic forms of communication; for example, through
scholarly publications. Some scholars have taken to blogging their messages,
something that has a greater potential reach than academic journals. But the
competition in the blogosphere is similarly intense, with reasoned evidence-
based blogs having to vie for attention against all others, however rooted in
evidence they may or may not be.
Conclusion
There remains value in the Metropolis approach of direct engagement of
researchers with policy officials, especially when it endures over time.
Although politicians may react quickly to the dynamics of their societies,
the development of policy—and, especially, legislation—takes time, and it is
this time that offers opportunities for research to influence policy. Further, the
Metropolis approach is to enhance the overall level of understanding of
migration and integration among policy-makers—again, an exercise that
takes place over time, not in the heat of the moment, and that is best accom-
plished through conversation. Metropolis activities are designed to facilitate
these sorts of conversations by building a network characterized by mutual
trust among its members. By this means, we hope to provide some degree of
competition to the forces of populism and post-truth politics.
To some extent, this will depend upon national and institutional cultures
regarding the relationship between research and policy. Some countries have a
more easy relationship between the research and policy sectors, and a longer
history of collaboration and mutual respect. For others, there is considerable
discomfort and mistrust. Metropolis conferences and other activities have
been helpful in building bridges here because of the inherent interactions
between research and policy that these activities entail. By working together
on a problem of common interest, trust can be built and suspicions dispelled
and, along with this, an appetite for collaboration can emerge.
Ultimately, what is needed is for governments to accept that there is value
for policy-making in solid academic research and to support the research
community in ways that respect academic integrity while motivating policy
relevant academic work. To do this well, government policy units need to
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protect the time of some of their staff to allow them to read scientific research
and, perhaps even more effective, to have conversations with researchers
about their work and what it may imply for policy. Policy-makers normally
have little time to learn about contemporary research, let alone to think about
what it means for either long-term strategic policy or the short-term work that
usually dominates their day-to-day lives. Perhaps the contemporary backdrop
of post-truth politics will provide governments with a new motivation to
engage the research sector. There may be some comfort for governments to
be found in the neutrality and integrity that continues to characterize much,
although not necessarily all, academic research. Cultivating researchers whose
work is characterized by academic integrity will be in the long-term interests
of governments and those whose lives they so greatly affect.
Notes
1. Within Canada, for example, a great deal of comparative research was done on the
effects of official language competence on employment rates and income levels.
Geographers studied the residential settlement patterns of newcomers to the country,
noting where enclave formation was taking place and where greater dispersion was
evident. Internationally,Metropolismembershave focusedmuchof their attentionon
such matters as immigrant integration, the effects of naturalization policy and public
attitudes towards immigration. The principle vehicle for conveying Metropolis’
policy–research interests internationally is the annual conference, which selects its
plenary session themes partly to stimulate the interests of researchers in these themes.
2. See, for example, www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/how-migration-is-changing-
world-cities-charts/
3. Consider, for example, that the IOM convened a conference, Migrants and Cities,
in Geneva in 2015 at which they launched their 2015 World Migration Report
(www.iom.int/world-migration-report-2015), which was devoted to the same topic.
The UN Habitat 3 report included many references to cities, as did the Sutherland
Report (www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/coordination/
15/documents/Report%20of%20SRSG%20on%20Migration%20-%20A.71.728_
ADVANCE.pdf) prepared on the ending of Sir Peter Sutherland’s tenure as the Special
Representative of the Secretary General onmigration.
4. As philosophers of ethics—following David Hume—have said, one cannot derive an
‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Research tells us the nature of the case; policy decisions are
about what a government believes ought to be the case.
5. The federal government partners in Metropolis in its final stages were Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council,
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Human Resources and Skills Develop-
ment Canada, Justice Canada, Heritage Canada, Public Safety Canada, the Canada
Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Atlantic Canada
Opportunities Agency, FedNor, Western Economic Diversification, Status of
Women Canada, and the Public Health Agency of Canada.
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6. See, for example, this 2015 report of Professor Daniel Hiebert of the University of
British Columbia: http://irpp.org/research-studies/study-no52/
7. See, for example, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/GMG.htm, formore infor-
mation on the original Geneva Migration Group. For information on the Global
Migration Group of today, see www.globalmigrationgroup.org/
8. Consider only the United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Devel-
opment (2006 and 2013) (www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/), the Global
Forum on Migration and Development (https://gfmd.org/), the Joint Migration and
Development Initiative of the UNDP, and the IOM (www.migration4development.
org/en/content/about-jmdi).
9. Consider that North–North migration constitutes roughly one quarter of the





11. This Convention has only 39 signatories to date, none from developed countries.
See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&
chapter=4&clang=_en
12. The final report of the IOM conference, Migrants and Cities, held in Geneva in
2015, included in its conclusions that if there are to be further such conferences,
they should ‘recognize the different situations faced by lower and higher-income
cities’ (see p. 98. in www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/IDM/RB-
25-CMC-Report_web-final.pdf)
13. For example, the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) has as
its mandate to encourage businesses to hire immigrants. See http://triec.ca/
14. The Century Initiative in Canada, which supports significant population growth
through immigration, is led by the business sector in that country (www.
centuryinitiative.ca/). Some private sector think tanks, such as the Conference
Board and McKinsey & Company, are heavily involved in migration research and
policy advice.
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More Research and Fewer Experts
Global Governance and International Migration
Katy Long
Introduction
This chapter discusses the role that both research and researchers have played
in (re)forming the global governance of internationalmigration, with a special
focus on refugees.1 The chapter draws on my experiences while working as an
adviser to Peter Sutherland, the former United Nations Special Representative
for International Migration, as well as a decade working on both sides of the
policy–research gap, as an academic at Oxford, the London School of Eco-
nomics (LSE), and Edinburgh, and as consultant to the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); the UK Department of International
Development (DFID); and the World Bank.
I argue that, while research has played a vital role in identifying and sys-
tematizing the weaknesses within migration’s global governance systems,
research has an extremely limited ability to shape or effect reform directly,
except where it fits with pre-determined political agendas. Researchers can
certainly play a key role in conferring legitimacy on processes of migration
reform, as global governance ‘experts’. But it is questionable whether this
type of engagement has much impact in shaping global agendas, rather
than simply legitimizing existing political platforms (see also Chapter 2 in
this book).
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section,
I consider the motivations for researchers engaging in global governance
reform. In the second part, I survey the historical role of research in defining
policy. In the third section, I consider some of the problems faced by
researchers working in this area today.
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On 20 September 2016, I found myself standing in the lobby of a grand New
York hotel. The previous day had seen the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) issue the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, ostensibly
the culmination of international efforts since 2015 to address a whole set of
crises—dead bodies in the Mediterranean, neo-Nazis in Europe, and refugees
trapped in poverty in Jordan and Lebanon (UNGA 2016). Ultimately, the
Declaration amounted to little more than a scrap of paper, accompanied by
an agreement to return in two years’ time for further attempts at forging a
grand bargain (see, e.g., Borger and Kingsley 2016; Frelick 2016).
I was in New York working as an advisor to Sir Peter Sutherland, the then
United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for International
Migration, readying myself that day to attend the day-long Concordia Sum-
mit’s event on how the private sector could help to address these refugee and
migrant crises. I knew what was expected of me. The format—roundtables,
workshops, coffee breaks for networking—was familiar. The faces—mostly
white faces—were familiar, too. And that was the problem: I’d been here
before. I counted up airfares and hotel bills: I wondered by what metrics you
judge success. I wondered, not for the first time, where the refugees are in all
this. I wondered why I was here.
The question of why we do research is a complex one: there is no uniform
answer, just as there is no single homogenous ‘researcher’.2 Researchers also
make very different decisions about the relationship of their work with policy
(for further discussion of these issues, see Bakewell 2008; Van Hear 2011). For
some, research is an intellectual pursuit, with researchers driven by the con-
viction that pure scholarship will bring its own rewards in the fullness of time.
For some of these individuals, policy-makers are not so much to be courted as
to be avoided. At the other end of the spectrum are researchers whose careers
are entirely focused on having immediate impact—making a difference now.
These researchers may find employment directly with policy-making institu-
tions. However, researchers can also have an uneasy relationship with insti-
tutional stakeholders: some researchers are drawn to forcedmigration research
so as to ‘give voice to the voiceless’, seeing themselves as refugees’ advocates
working to holding powerful institutional stakeholders to account (see, e.g.,
Turton 1996; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014).
These categories are not always clear-cut. Many research careers fall some-
where between these two extremes, and can shift over time: few researchers
would insist that their chosen balance between policy and research is the only
correct approach.Many researchers with university careers will, at some point,
play a role in advising policy-makers, attracted by the idea of ‘making a
difference’, the offer of a seat at the table, and the promise of a pay cheque.
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Political views, the realities of think-tank finance, the structure of academic
careers and personal ambition may all play a role in shaping the choices
researchers make: what to research, where to publish, who to talk to. Similarly,
a host of factors—including but not limited to gender, ethnicity, institutional
reputation, and geography—play a role in determining who will listen. The
power of policy-makers to shape academic decision-making is multifaceted.
Policy-makers may simultaneously be the funders, the subject and the audi-
ence for research. These tensions and rivalries raise important questions about
how researchers choose (or are chosen) to wield influence, and whether
research has any significant impact in framing or shaping the global govern-
ance of migration.
Evidence-based Policy
Most obviously, research can provide important empirical foundations for
evidence-based policy. In a field such as migration and refugee protection,
where policy is subject to heavy political filters, particularly at national and
global levels, the normative contributions of philosophers and ethicists are
also important in helping to shape what these ‘commonly accepted goals’
should look like (e.g. Gibney 2004). The question of who is a ‘migrant’ and
who is a ‘refugee’, for instance, is not only fundamental to the architecture of
global governance in both areas, but also a question central to refugee research
(see, e.g., Zetter 2007; Long 2013).
Yet, the global governance of migration is often bureaucratic. Institutions
such as UNHCR or the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are
rarely the locus of political decision-making power, especially when—as
now—migration and refugee crises are heavily politicized. So, for researchers
interested in improving refugee protection or influencing global migration
regimes, the potential to effect change—particularly at a global level—seems
to rest far more in local action or national debates than in the global processes
that have, in 2017–2018, often seemed marginal in both political and
humanitarian terms.
Added to this is the difficulty of detecting and measuring something as
slippery and intangible as ‘influence’ or ‘impact’. A policy analyst may read a
paper or see a presentation; a conversation may be sparked over lunch; a
recommendation may appear years later. The positive connection between
migration and development, for instance—now mainstream in development
circles and made explicit in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (UNGA
2015)—was seeded by research carried out many years before this widespread
acceptance (Piper 2017). Another example of how research may eventually
influence policy can be seen in the long gestation period between the study of
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diaspora, and its emergence in the 2000s as a ‘hot’ development topic (Van
Hear 2014).
Nevertheless, the value placed on knowledge and expertise by those shaping
the structures that govern global migration and refugee policies means that
research is certainly understood to matter. The next section of this chapter
tries to understand how and why, by tracing a brief history of moments when
research has directly intersected with policy-making on refugee and displace-
ment issues.
Influence: Historical Case Studies
Since the 1930s, research has been variously used as a substitute for action, a
legitimizing force, and—very occasionally—the foundation for meaningful
reform of global migration and refugee governance structures.
1930s: Research as a Substitute for Action
By the 1930s, the global governance structures that had been established to try
and deal with those uprooted by the Russian revolution and the violent
demise of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s were clearly no longer fit for
purpose, even as a new European refugee crisis loomed (Skran 1995). Yet, in
the absence of politically feasible solutions, researchers were called on to study
the problem as policy-makers wrung their hands.
In 1938, Sir John Hope Simpson, a British-Canadian politician and states-
man, was charged with compiling a report—first, for the Evian Conference
held in July 1938 and, then, for the September meeting of the League of
Nations. The result was a comprehensive survey that blamed immigration
controls and nationalism for Europe’s new refugee problem: ‘before the war
refugee problems were avoided because frontiers were open. There was none
of the political, economic, and racial nationalism we have.’ Simpson’s inter-
ests were not purely analytical: the aim was to influence discussions by dem-
onstrating that any repatriation of Europe’s Jews to Germany belonged to
‘the realm of political prophecy and aspiration . . . a programme of action
cannot be based on uncontrollable speculation’ (Simpson 1939a, 1939b: 2,
174). Instead, Simpson argued for vastly expanded emigration, including to
Palestine.3
Much as academics in search of policy ‘impact’ today, Simpson toured the
lecture circuit, talking at venues such as Chatham House. His surveys were
published by the Institute of International Affairs and, later, by Oxford Uni-
versity Press. But his writings had little, if any, effect on refugee policy. The
Evian Conference failed to secure any serious commitments from states: hope
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for a solution to the flow of refugees from Germany dissolved. One year later,
Europe was at war. As a precedent for the influence of research upon the global
governance of migration, Simpson’s experience was not a hopeful one.
1950s–1970s: Research as Documentation and Legitimation
If, in the 1930s, research was used as a substitute for action, the career of Louise
Holborn sheds further light on the role that ‘inside’ academics can play in
legitimizing policy-makers and their institutions. Holborn—a tenured professor
at theConnecticutCollege forWomen from1947until her retirement in1972—
spent her career working with a number of refugee organizations, including the
UnitedNationsHighCommissioner for Refugees. In two ‘voluminous studies’of
UNHCR’s first decades (Elie 2014: 24), she documented their responding to
refugee crises and the expansion of the international refugee regime (Holborn
et al. 1975). Reading Holborn’s work today, what is striking is both the level
of access granted to Holborn by UNHCR and the lack of serious critical analysis.
Holborn’s work never seriously questions the policy-makers’ own legal-
institutional andWestern European-centric framing of ‘refugee crises’.
These two observations are not unconnected. Holborn’s research work con-
ferred legitimacy and authority on the actions of refugee organizations: it
aimed to preserve institutional memory, rather than to challenge institutions’
actions. In effect, Holborn’s access was quid pro quo for writing to explain,
rather than to challenge, the existing institutional arrangements. So, while
Holborn’s more descriptive writings reflect, in part, the time at which she was
writing (the post-War consensus era), they also speak to what remains a salient
question. Can researchers maintain critical independence while working
closely with institutional gatekeepers? And should the aim of research be to
record and analyse policy, or actively to lobby for change?
1990s: Research and Policy Reform—Cometh the Hour,
Cometh the Expert?
A third model—arguably the most positive in terms of research shaping
policy—is the commissioning of research that then guides the development
of new policies in politically open space. Perhaps the most obvious case—in
terms of refugee protection—is the emergence of ‘Internal Displacement’ as a
specific policy category in the 1990s, and the subsequent construction of
international architecture to respond to the needs of displaced persons.
Such architecture includes a United Nations Special Rapporteur on Internal
Displacement, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 2009
Kampala Convention on Internally Displaced People (IDPs). In this case,
there is little doubt that the work of Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng at the
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Brookings Institute played a significant role in helping to place internal
displacement so firmly on international agendas in the 1990s.
While internal displacement—the forced movement of people within a
state’s borders—is no new phenomenon, it was only with the end of the
Cold War and the emergence of more interventionist norms centred on
human rights doctrines that internal displacement came to be seen as a
salient problem. In 1994, Deng—a South Sudanese politician, diplomat, and
scholar—was appointed to the newly-created post of Special Rapporteur. He
faced a significant challenge. How should his office promote the framing of
‘Internal Displacement’ as a specific problem, one that required coordinated
international action, to a global community tired of refugee crises?
The answer lay in a decade-long partnership with Cohen. In 1996, Deng and
Cohen co-founded the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and, in
1998, co-authored the first major study of internal displacement, Masses in
Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, as well as co-editing a second
volume of case studies (Cohen and Deng 1998a, 1998b). The book combined
detailed research mapping of the phenomenon of internal displacement
alongside the development of concrete policy recommendations, including
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that Deng submitted to the
Human Rights Commission in 1998, and which formed the basis for the
Kampala Convention, which was adopted on 22 October 2009.
Scholarship has thus played an important role in shaping international
responses to internal displacement, first, by defining and framing the problem
of IDPs and, then, by conferring authority and a platform for human rights
advocacy. But what factors created the space for such influence? First, while
Deng and Cohen produced high-quality research into internal displacement,
they were not career researchers but, rather, a diplomat and a policy-maker
and political advisor. This meant that the two understood the complex nego-
tiations required to effect policy change and were well-placed to use their
research as a tool for advocacy. Second, the fact that the Brookings Institute
is a think tank, and not a university, reinforced this emphasis on producing
‘policy relevant research’. Deng and Cohen’s mission was explicitly to help
create a new global governance framework to address internal displacement.
Third, the particular contours of legal scholarship also helped to cement this
relationship between IDP advocacy and academia, especially during the ten-
ure of Deng’s successorWalter Kalin (2004–2010). Law is understood to be less
a theoretical study than a profession and, as a result, noted refugee and human
rights lawyers regularly cross between academia and practice, helping to foster
communication between ‘researchers’ and ‘policy-makers’. Alice Edwards,
Jean-Francois Durieux, and Volker Turk, for example, are among those who
have both published widely in an academic context, taught at respected
universities, and held senior positions at UNHCR.4
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Perhaps most important, however, was the political context within which
Deng and Cohen’s research-based advocacy occurred. The end of the Cold
War offered new opportunities to rethink displacement alongside the devel-
opment of new doctrines of humanitarian intervention and ‘the responsibility
to protect’. NGOs and international agencies—also recognizing that the pro-
found political shift around displacement was likely to influence their own
work—were also open to developing new labels and framing, helping to
facilitate a humanitarian ‘pivot’. Research processes certainly shaped the IDP
dialogue and directly influenced the resulting global governance framework.
But research did not initiate the conversation.
Research as Advocacy: Demanding Change from Outside
This very brief historical survey shows clearly that there is a risk research
commissioned or co-opted in the policy spaces opened by states and inter-
national organizations may lack independence. As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al.
(2014: 16)remind us, ‘the right conclusions are often those the powerful
least want to hear’. Many researchers in this field are drawn into their work
by a desire to represent marginalized migrants and refugees, and to challenge
the status quo, which they see as excessively deferential to state interests. So,
can research also be harnessed for more radical ends, to change the refugee
protection system from the outside?
There is a rich tradition of the academic advocate as righteous outsider. The
figure of Barbara Harrell-Bond looms large over any history of refugee studies,
not least because of her work in establishing the Refugee Studies Centre in
Oxford. However, she is also noted—particularly in policy circles—for her
virulent critiques of UNHCR and the international community’s institutional
failure to protect refugees adequately.
In 1986, Harrell-Bond’s seminal study Imposing Aid, a critique of humani-
tarian failings in refugee camps, established the foundations for a wider body
of research in this area and inspired a whole generation of researchers (Harrell-
Bond 1986). Over thirty years, this work has cumulatively contributed to
shifting international institutional perspectives on the use of refugee camps,
as evidenced in the publication of UNHCR’s 2014 paper UNHCR Policy on
Alternatives to Camps (UNHCR 2014). More broadly, Harrell-Bond’s work
belongs to a canon of refugee and migration research that has sought to give
refugees and other migrants a voice—often in opposition to the interests
controlling the process of global governance reform:Western states and global
capital. Today, it is rare for conferences or workshops not to include, at some
point, mention of the importance of inclusion of refugees and migrants in
framing their own lives. This critique has certainly permeated the conscious-
ness of those at the conference table. Care should be taken not to stretch this
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point too far: research has not somuch changedwho is sitting at the conference
table, as altered the discourse around who should be at the table. Nevertheless,
Harrell-Bond’s work is an important reminder that influencing policy-makers
to change direction usually involves debate and opposition, rather than an
easy welcome.
It is also important to consider how academic research and intervention can
also cause things not to happen. Researchers as advocate-critics have often
spoken out against proposed policy initiatives or perceived trends—for
instance, shifts in the language around ‘voluntary repatriation’ in the mid-
1990s that attempted to legitimize practices that amounted to refoulement
(the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are
liable to be subjected to persecution) (Long 2013). In cases such as this,
evidence-based advocacy can act either as a check against the erosion of
protection or as controversial reform. The work of organizations such as
Human Rights Watch (exemplified for many years by noted migrant advocate
and scholar Bill Frelick), has played an important role in recording the conse-
quences of the failure of global governance structures—from the rights of
labour migrants in the Gulf to refugees crossing the Mediterranean—and in
shaping responses to such abuse. While the influence of such critics is often
intangible, their role in calling out government intransigence—Amnesty
International called the 2016 New York summit an ‘abject failure’—is import-
ant, and their authority to do so rests in large part on fieldwork and research
(Amnesty International 2016).
Research and Policy Today: No Solution in Sight?
Research has been extraordinarily successful in documenting the institutional
failures of global migration policy. Today, in 2018, it is acknowledged by
virtually all researchers (and nearly all policy-makers) that today’s global
refugee and migrant protection system is dysfunctional. There are too many
refugees living for too long in overcrowded camps or stuck in overwhelmed
asylum systems, with no solution to their exile in sight, as too many countries
seek to evade admitting or caring for refugees. It is equally evident that too
many poor migrants are not refugees, that too many poor migrants have no
legal means to move in search of work and that too many poor migrants—
whether they fit the definition of refugee or not—die.
Yet, research has been less successful when it comes to developing workable
solutions to such failure. Why? Some researchers view this as a step beyond
their remit, offering analysis that is intended to explain and not to solve.
Others point to larger structural causes of refugee and migrant flows. Many
researchers working on refugee and migration issues see ‘the refugee problem’
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as inevitable in a world of nation-states (see, e.g., Haddad 2008), and policy-
makers as essentially compromised, with neither the power nor the will to do
more than make incremental and marginal progress.
The result is that the politics of national interest have drivenmost recent discus-
sions on global governance reform, often underpinned by the assumption—
not shared by all researchers—that migration can be stopped. The use of what
Alexander Betts identified as ‘linkages’ between North–South interests has
produced a number of agreements focused on the control and containment
of migration (see Betts 2008). The EU’s offshore processing and detention
facilities in West Africa, for example, have fundamentally shifted the notions
of asylum and return, central to refugee and forced migrant protection. Inter-
European cooperation through the expansion of FRONTEX provides another
example of how the supra-national management of migration is being
reformed and securitized. The Australia–Malaysia deal and the EU–Turkey
deal are examples of bilateral agreements that have significant global implica-
tions for how asylum is understood and practised.
These reforms have found little support among the broad refugee and
migration research community, who have, instead, focused on critiquing
both themoral and operational failings of such policies. This is partly political:
researchers in this field, especially at the global level, are overwhelmingly
concerned by the humanitarian consequences of such decisions. But it is
also because such policy changes have been driven less by evidence-based
research than by political calculation. For researchers seeking to influence
policy outcomes, since the mid-2000s, the locus of migration power has
continually shifted further away from international agencies towards national
governments playing to domestic audiences. The rise of nationalist politics
across the West means that states’ interests are collectively aligned—at least
temporarily—in ensuring that changes to global migration governance mech-
anisms remain limited.
Technical Reform
Without the political will to effect more broad-based change, global govern-
ance reform has become increasingly technical and bureaucratic in nature.
One example of such reform is the admission of the IOM to the United
Nations (UN) as a ‘related agency’ in September 2016 (IOM 2016).
Prior to 2016, the IOM was already a ‘permanent observer’ at the UN
General Assembly, and IOM staff were already working alongside UN staff in
many humanitarian crises. Yet, there was strong interest in promoting the
IOM’s admission to the UN from key political players and an equally strong
investment of political and reputational capital from those—such as IOM
Director General Bill Swing—who made the decision to support the IOM’s
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admission. Bringing the IOM into the UN was viewed as a means of achieving
visible ‘action’ in the face of a migration crisis with which the UN had
evidently struggled.
Researchers have often been among the IOM’s most virulent critics—citing
its lack of a norm-basedmandate, its chequerboard portfolio of projects and its
willingness to bend flexibly to meet states’ ‘migration management’ needs.
But research was largely irrelevant in discussions leading up to the IOM’s
September 2016 admission. At several workshops during 2015 and 2106, in
both New York and London, key proponents of the IOM joining the UN
struggled to articulate a clear sense of why such a change mattered, beyond
largely bureaucratic and technical questions of coordination, capacity, and
support. Hours were spent discussing the difference between a ‘specialized’
and a ‘related’ UN Agency, with few clear articulations of either the difference
between these two terms, or why it mattered. As one senior advisor remarked
in frustration in the summer of 2016, ‘OK, so IOM is joining the UN. Why
should anyone care? Why do I care?’ To date, large parts of both the activist
and academic communities seem to have largely greeted the IOM’s new UN
status with a collective shrug of their shoulders.
Sitting at the Table: Research as Echo
Nevertheless, despite deep flaws in the existing global governance system, and
considerable obstacles standing in the way of substantive reform, researchers
are still viewed as integral to the process of reforming migration and refugee
protection. The Sutherland Report, for instance—published by the UN at the
end of Sutherland’s decade-long contribution as the Secretary-General’s Spe-
cial Representative for International Migration—lists at least two dozen aca-
demic experts who were consulted during a two-year drafting process (UNGA
2017). The New York Declaration explicitly recognizes ‘academic institutions’
as ‘relevant stakeholders’ in the inter-governmental conference (UNGA 2016).
So, even if political decisions drive states’ migration policies and, conse-
quently, international frameworks for responding to crises, scientific know-
ledge is still recognized to be the more desirable basis for action—a marker of
reputation and authenticity.
This is important: as previously noted, influence is often intangible and
diffuse. Yet, there is also a clear risk that those invited to the table are those
whose conclusions echo what key stakeholderswant to hear: the ‘experts’who
are most adept at adapting their work for the audiences’ sensibilities, rather
than those best placed to offer academic critique.
The recent foray of Sir Paul Collier into migration policy provides one
example of this. An Oxford development economist with a considerable
public profile, Collier’s first book on migration, Exodus, attracted enormous
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attention in the UK, but was criticized by many migration experts for its
questionable theoretical assumptions (Collier 2013; Clemens and Sandfur
2014). In March 2017, Collier’s second work on migration, co-authored by
fellow Oxford Professor Alexander Betts, presented an excoriating critique of
UNHCR. Instead, it offered an alternative, work-centred model for protection,
focused on the promotion of special economic zones as a solution for Syrian
refugees in Jordan (Betts and Collier 2017).
Betts and Collier are high-profile academics: the Amazon page for Refuge:
Transforming a Broken Refugee System notes endorsements by International
Rescue Committee President David Miliband and former UK Prime Minister
David Cameron. The book received largely positive reviews from a number of
commentators and journalists (see, e.g., Crabtree 2017; Van Tulleken 2017).
Yet, these reviews in many ways illustrate the gap between the world of policy
and the world of research, with refugee and migration scholars far more
negative in their verdicts, labelling the book a poorly researched apologia for
containment policies, and heavily criticizing its thin fieldwork, research gaps,
and empirical errors (see Crawley 2017; Munro 2017; Yaghmaian 2017).
In a sense, this debate epitomizes the problematic relationship between
academic research and policy. In Refuge, Betts and Collier seek to present
themselves as challenging the comfortable orthodoxies of refugee protection
that no longer work. Theirs, they argue, is the role that scholarship should
play in shaping policy: testing inconvenient truths, presenting new ideas,
even if these do not fit well with the existing humanitarian consensus.
Certainly, Betts’ and Collier’s work achieves this, and should not be criti-
cized by academics just because it rejects some of the political orthodoxies
around which migration scholars have coalesced. Yet, the real problem with
Refuge—as identified by its critics—is not the nature of its conclusions but,
rather, the quality of its research, particularly given the limited impact of
special economic zones on the ground in Jordan (an area of which neither of
the authors have regional expertise but whose refugee crisis forms the lynch-
pin of Refuge’s arguments).
Refuge is therefore a good lesson in how, when well-connected researchers
become the advocates for policy (particularly when that policy is conveniently
close to the interests of governments), the substance of scholarly work may be
less important than the authors’ ability to promote it. The capacity of Betts
and Collier—both white, male, Oxbridge professors, and British citizens—to
be physically present at conferences and to build the social networks that
facilitate access is considerably greater than those who have to grapple per-
sonally with visa regimes, limited university funding, or difficult geography.
This underlines another problem. The success of Refuge reflects the fact
that researchers who find a seat at the global table are disproportionately
likely to be those whose views echo and reinforce the preformed views of
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policy-makers—in part, because they are drawn from a similar cultural elite.
This preferential access to power and influence is not simply a matter of
explicit political affiliation. Instead, it reflects much wider filtering and selec-
tion processes that act to limit the expression of dissent within fixed political
parameters, in line with the ‘propaganda model’ developed by Herman and
Chomsky (1988).
The lack of diversity among policy-makers, or the researchers they listen to,
is hardly an issue restricted to the world of refugees andmigration. However, it
does have particular resonance given the acute inequalities of power that
often characterize refugee crises. If refugees’ voices are only heard when they
are filtered not just through researchers’ words, but through the words of
privileged researchers selected by policy gatekeepers in the first place, then it
can be of little surprise that the reforms proposed in these settings often, even
when framed as ‘radical’, would, in fact, largely maintain intact existing
structures of global power.5
Inaction, Influence, Integrity
How, then, should researchers seek to influence much-needed reform of
global migration governance? Should they simply retreat to the libraries in
the face of political manoeuvring and a 24-hour news cycle? The charge of
inaction is one that all researchers working on refugee crises have grappled
with. Are theoretical papers a sufficient response to urgent human misery?
Contributing to policy debates can help to provide a sense of relevance: over
years, they may even help change the debate.
But policy work can feed not only relevance, but also self-importance.
Conference panels and workshops provide the necessary smoke and mirrors
to appear as if you are in ‘the room where it happens’. The trappings of self-
importance are seductive; they also genuinelymatter for ambitious academics,
whose careers are increasingly framed by grant applications and promotion
committees who count such things as markers of impact. All this ultimately
turns on a fundamental question. What does influence mean? Is influence a
seat at the table, playing by rules pre-determined by powerful stakeholders? Is
it an op-ed in The New York Times? A spot as a talking head on CNN?
In a world in which states’ migration policies are shaped by populist polit-
ical culture, a world whose constituents ‘have had enough of experts’, imme-
diate influence may well depend upon a newspaper column or interview,
rather than in-depth, high-quality, ethically-sensitive research. This is at best
a loss and at worst dangerous, both for the integrity of academic research and
the likely success of any reform of global governance machinery. Deng and
Cohen’sMasses in Flightwas a two-volume 2,000-page study. In contrast, Betts
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and Collier’s Refuge—a work specifically aimed at promoting a particular
policy prescription—is a slim volume of 160 pages.
The ‘dual imperative’ that drives refugee research—the need to contribute to
ameliorating humanmisery, as well as scholarship—has long been the subject
of interrogation, with Jacobsen and Landau (2003) among those who have
warned against sacrificing methodology in the pursuit of conviction. I am
accustomed to telling my students each year that passion is not enough; that
the best advocates for refugees are those whose research stands up to scrutiny
by opponents. We too rarely acknowledge that much of the research held up
by policy-makers is often equally flimsy, even if it is more palatable to existing
power brokers.
Conclusion: More Research, Fewer Experts
In 2018, the question of how ‘expertise’ permeates policy and politics has
become ever more urgent. Yet, it seems clear to me that research matters more
than ever, precisely because it offers no quick fixes.
On that Septembermorning in 2016, I did not doubt the value of research to
refugee or migrant protection. I can think of dozens of studies—from ethno-
graphic accounts of life in Somali refugee camps to quantitative analysis of the
impact of migration onwages in destination countries—that make fundamen-
tal contributions to our understanding of the way migration shapes our world
and how we respond to it. We need to understand more about the economics
of migration, the power structures that shape it, the causes and consequences
of the policies—political and humanitarian—that have been adopted to try
and contain, constrain, and cope with the movement of people, especially the
poor and the persecuted.
Research can be policy-relevant without being policy-driven: independence
is a virtue that does not necessarily consign scholarship to obscurity. But too
much good academic research is buried underneath dense postmodern phras-
ing, disseminated in terms that make no sense beyond the seminar room. This
is not to say that research must be distilled into bullet points in order to be
relevant but, rather, it is to acknowledge that there is too often a communi-
cation gap that allows policy-makers to set the narrative around what counts
as ‘important’ research.
There is also a tendency among academics to make good critics but
poor innovators—in part, because it is always easier to comment on others’
failures than risk your own. The work by Betts and Colliers—however flawed—
does underline the potential for more innovative collaborations between
researchers and policy-makers; collaborations in which researchers help
design and build projects, a sort of ‘Silicon Valley’ model in which research
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is not the precursor but the parallel to action. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that 80 per cent of technology start-ups fail. For researchers to become
innovators, a major cultural shift will be required—among researchers, policy-
makers, and the systems that review them—to allow room for failure.
I left NewYork in 2016 certain of very little, but certain that the improvement
of the lives of millions of migrants and billions of citizens will not be achieved
with polite round-tables and incremental pen-pushing. Researchers undoubt-
edly have a critical role to play in global governance reform, by analysing and
proposing radical change. But, if the world’s migrants and refugees need more
researchers, they alsoneed fewer ‘experts’. I am currently trying to bendmyown
career to fit this observation: it remains a work in progress.
Notes
1. While the examples discussed in this chapter primarily relate to the governance of
refugee and forced migration flows, the issues discussed are also relevant to other
forms of migration, including labour migration.
2. For the purposes of this chapter, research is defined as a process of systematic inquiry
resulting in the creation of new knowledge and/or the use of existing knowledge in a
new and creative way. Researchers—those who carry out such inquiry—can work in
purely academic university settings, but may also carry out their work inmore policy
oriented think tanks and institutional settings, or as independent consultants.
3. This was notable because, in 1930, Simpson had previously headed up a British
enquiry into immigration, land settlement, and development in Palestine, and had
recommended that limits be placed upon Jewish immigration.
4. For many years, Jeff Crisp similarly linked the non-legal academic and policy worlds
as Head of Evaluation and Policy at UNHCR.
5. It should be emphasized that privilege is, of course, structural. However, this means
that those of us who wish to pursue a social justice agenda, but who benefit
personally from the existence of such structures (and, as a wealthy, white, Western
citizen, I certainly includemyself in this group) have a responsibility to acknowledge
explicitly the ways in which we are privileged and, therefore, more easily able to
enter other privileged spaces.
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Bridging Research, Public Debates,
and Policies on Migration and Integration
Lessons Learnt and Ways Forward
Joakim Palme, Martin Ruhs, and Kristof Tamas
This book has provided a unique set of testimonies from researchers and
experts who have been deeply involved in attempts to bridge the gaps
between research and policy-making in the field of migration and integration.
In the introductory Chapter 1, we suggested a three-way conceptual frame-
work for the analyses of the various national and international level experi-
ences including research, public debate/media, and policy-making. This
conceptualization builds on the work of three thought-provoking contribu-
tions to this book: Chapter 2, by Christina Boswell on research, experts, and
the politics of migration; Chapter 3, by Han Entzinger and Peter Scholten, on
research–policy dialogues on integration; and Chapter 4, by William Allen,
Scott Blinder, and RobertMcNeil, on the relationship between research, public
opinion, and the media. Our ambition has hence been to generate new
insights about not only the direct relationship between research and policy-
making, but also the critical and potentially mediating role of the media, as
well as other features of the public debate.
In a variety of ways, this book has explored the interplay between the
production, dissemination, and uses of knowledge in the area of international
migration and integration. The chapters were written with three aims in
mind. The first intention was to contribute to the theorization and under-
standing of the role of research in public debate and policy-making on migra-
tion and integration. As previously noted, its main contribution is therefore to
frame research, public debate, and policy-making as a set of three-way rela-
tionships. The second aim was the critical discussion and identification of the
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reasons for the successes or failures of a range of national and international
initiatives to bridge the gaps between research, public debates, and policy-
making; we will return to some reflections about this issue later in the Con-
clusion. The third intention was to identify effective strategies for linking
research to public debates and policy-making on migration and integration
in different national and institutional contexts. We have been particularly
interested in exploring how to manage and strengthen these links in different
contexts, and to ask how transferable particular approaches are across borders
and institutional settings.
The role and uses of research in policy debates about migration and inte-
gration cannot be understood without considering the broader politics of
these issues. Migration and integration are phenomena that are at the top of
many national and international policy agendas and discussions. In addition
to their political importance and salience, public debates and attitudes to
migrants are often based, at least in part, on strong value-related emotions
that involve both hopes and fears. Processes ofmigration and integration have
consequences for the welfare and security of a number of different actors,
ranging from migrants themselves to members of communities in both host
countries and countries of origin. These processes also tend to raise classical
political economy issues, generating costs and benefits for different groups,
and involving potentially conflicting interests—for example, those of domes-
tic workers, employers, andmigrants. The role of research and knowledge thus
comes into play in a political (mine)field that is full of different and frequently
diverging, or even conflicting, values and interests. As a consequence, the
research itself might become politicized.
Whether and how research is used in public debates and policy-making is
also influenced by the specific institutional context. Migration and integra-
tion do not happen in a vacuum. They are embedded in broader institutional
and structural contexts, such as national institutions for regulating labour
markets and social security, that can and typically do differ across countries
and change over time. This means that debates about migration are never just
about migration but also about many other related public policy issues. How
national, regional, and international institutions and policies are designed are
political issues at heart; however, specific institutional designs can also have
important implications for the characteristics and effects of migration and
integration processes, as well as for the production and uses of knowledge in
public policy debates about these issues. For example, the nature and charac-
teristics of the political system, political decision-making processes, and the
national ‘media culture’ affect whether and how research findings and ideas
are used in public debates. A problematicmedia culture,wheremedia is exploit-
ing the fears among the public for commercial purposes and politicians do the
same for political/electoral purposes, is of course a fertile soil for the abuse of
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research (cf. Chapter 4). If media are dominated by negative sentiments
towards researchers and experts, this is likely to magnify the problems.
Research can play an important role in promoting ‘virtuous’ polices that
consciously manage and minimize trade-offs and promote positive-sum
solutions for the concerned stakeholders. But, just to be clear, we do not
expect that research and knowledge will resolve all tensions between differ-
ent interests and values in policy-making on migration and integration.
While it may be possible to reduce some trade-offs, an important contribu-
tion of research is the identification of the real conflicts, thus paving the
way for an enlightened discussion about how to balance different goals and
interests.
Given these political and institutional contexts, what can the analyses and
case studies in this book tell us about the characteristics of, and strategies for
strengthening the links between research, public debates, and policy-making
on migration and integration?
Before identifying some of the key insights and lessons, it is important to
reiterate what we stated in the introductory Chapter 1, namely, that we have
not embarked on a systematic impact assessment exercise. The pragmatic
reason for this approach is that it is difficult to isolate the effects of research
onmigration and integration policies in practice, as evidenced by the growing
research literature on the societal impact of social science research (cf. Bastow
et al. 2014). When examining the findings of the various chapters in this
volume, we should also keep in mind that most of the contributors to this
book are actors who, in different ways, belong to the research community,
rather than policy-making or media circles. Furthermore, the contributors
themselves have often been involved in some of the initiatives analysed
in this book. Their research experience and personal involvement in some
of the case studies may be a source of bias in their reflections and assessments
of past experiences. Yet, this bias could potentially push the results in differ-
ent directions when it comes to assessing the relationship between research
and policy. For example, some researchers’ critical views may be based
on unrealistic expectations about what could be achieved; if only the policy-
makers listened more to researchers everything would be so much better! Other
researchers may be biased in the opposite direction, in the sense that there
could be a tendency to exaggerate their own importance. If our aim had
been to undertake systematic impact evaluations, these risks and potential
biases could have created a significant difficulty andmethodological problem.
However, since our aim has been different and more explorative, the scholars’
and experts’ personal involvement in some of the experiences they describe
does not necessarily weaken the analysis. In any case, it is clear from their
discussions in this book that the chapter authors are all acutely aware of
these challenges.
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Lessons Learnt
On a conceptual level, the case studies have not only illustrated that research,
public debates, and policies can all influence each other, but also that there
can be two-way causalities between each of these three components. For
example, the focus of research questions and the types of data collected can
be affected by politics, as well as by public debates inmedia and elsewhere (e.g.
Chapter 7 on Norway and Chapter 9 on Sweden). The book also includes
examples of researchers influencing public debates and policies by providing
new research, expert commentary, and expert advice to policy-making pro-
cesses (e.g. Chapter 5 on the UK, Chapter 7 on Norway, and Chapter 8 on
Germany). It is important to recognize that expert commentary and advice do
not necessarily require the production of new research. Given the very short
time lines that tend to dominate in policy-making, it is often impossible to
find the time to carry out new in-depth studies. Typically, policy advice has to
build on the existing body of research; this can be problematic to the extent
that the available research may have been produced in response to questions
other than the specific policy issue under consideration.
The chapters in this book have further demonstrated that research can
have an influence on policy-making both directly but also indirectly, through
public debate, via media as well as civil society organizations (e.g. Chapter 13
on Canada and Chapter 10 on the United States). Public opinion may be an
important and integrated factor in the development of new migration and
integration policies. Depending on the institutional context, some policy-
makers may find themselves constrained in their policy choices by public
opinion. Where the political salience and politicization of migration and
integration are high, politicians who seek election or re-election typically
cannot ignore these issues. Here, ‘evidence’ can be used for ‘legitimizing’ (cf.
Chapter 2) policy choices that have become polarizing and emotionally
loaded but can also be used for changing the mind-sets in the opposite
direction and making discussions more fact-based and less polarized. How
the interaction between our three types of actors work appears to be of critical
importance for how this plays out.
The case studies in Chapters 7, 8, and 10 have also shown that whether and
how research affects policy-making and public debate, will always be influ-
enced by institutions, interests, and the broader politics of immigration and
integration, as well as related policy areas such as education, labour markets,
welfare states, and so on. There can be important interactions between
research and other policy determinants, such as the economic interests of
employers and the political orientation of the government in power. In
addition to playing an instrumental role in policy-making, research can
have important political functions which are often more symbolic than
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instrumental. Chapter 2 distinguished two such symbolic functions of
research: a ‘legitimizing function’ where stakeholders use research to enhance
their legitimacy, and a substantiating function where expert knowledge and
research are used to give authority to particular policy positions. In addition,
Chapter 3 shows that the research–policy gap could widen due to the increas-
ing politicization of the policy issue.
We argue that it is crucial to think seriously about how research can play an
effective role beyond its substantiating and legitimizing functions. Although
there is much scepticism about its potential, we believe that research can
be of important instrumental or problem-solving value (cf. Chapter 2) as a
tool for improving the processes and outcomes of migration, and human
development more broadly. However, this is likely to require new research
that can respond to the challenges that policy-makers are facing today—and
tomorrow—in a more transformative way. We cannot limit the efforts of
‘bridge-building’ to communicating the existing body of research to policy-
makers. An important part of the problem is that we need more and new
knowledge about a large number of policy issues. If evidence is produced just
for the sake of reinforced policy-making, the research–policy interaction
would end up as an empty ritual and become ignored by policy-makers
(Ahlbäck Öberg 2011). The challenge is to provide the institutional context
that allows research to play a positive instrumental role in policy-making.
The book’s case studies of particular country experiences have clearly high-
lighted the importance of paying attention to cross-country differences in the
politics and institutions that mediate the interrelationships between research,
public debate, and policy-making on migration and integration. For example,
Chapter 9, on the Swedish experience, points to the different traditions of
organizing policy-related research in general, not merely when it comes to
migration. There are also major differences between countries when it comes
to the role of think tanks, which has had implications for how policy relevant
research and expertise is, and could be, organized (which the Swedish case also
serves to illustrate in Chapter 9). Recognizing these specific institutional con-
texts is a precondition for organizing and funding policy-relevant research in a
way that makes it credible and helpful for public debate and policy-making
processes. For instance, strengthening the links between research, public
debates, and policy-making in the United States would need to take account
of the particular role of think tanks. Philip Martin’s account of the US case in
Chapter 10 shows that, rather than resulting in a pluralism of perspectives, the
large number of politicized think tanks in the United States has contributed to
entrenched views and disagreements between the two camps of what Philip
Martin calls admissionists and restrictionists.
The importance of considering research as part of a three-way relation-
ship with public debates and policy-making is very clear in the description
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in Chapter 6 of the reception of the Máxima report from the independent
government advisory body, the Netherlands Scientific Council for Govern-
ment Policy (WRR). The chapter demonstrates that it is not possible to under-
stand the conflicts about this particular report without the role of the media.
There are interesting similarities and differences between Chapter 6’s discus-
sion of a publication of the WRR in the Netherlands and Chapter 7’s analysis
of the experiences with two Norwegian commissions on immigration and the
welfare state. The credibility of the institutions in the two countries was, at the
outset, quite similar. Both the Dutch WRR and Norwegian NOU system
generally enjoyed strong support and were seen as credible by more or less
all sides of the debate. Yet, theMáxima report stirred up considerable emotion,
while the Norwegian reports seem to have had the opposite effect and reduced
the emotional loading of the issues. The public responses and media coverage
of these reports in the two countries appear to have been dependent on the
specific foci of the studies carried out. The kinds of identity issue raised in the
Dutch report appear to be more sensitive than the cost–benefit analyses and
welfare state issues that had been put at the forefront in the two Norwegian
reports. That cultural issues around migration are more conflictual than eco-
nomic matters, is in line with the findings of Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), as
well as with a broader review of the field undertaken by Hainmuller and
Hopkins (2014), and this could be one explanation for the Dutch controversy.
Another explanatory factor for the different experiences in the two countries
could have been that, while there had been high awareness, before publica-
tion, of the potentially strong conflicts around the report in Norway, the
potential for controversy had not been anticipated, at least not to the same
degree, in the Netherlands.
Chapter 9 on the Swedish committees shows that, even though they are
meant to work independently from the government, their work can become
politicized. The media plays an important role in this process of politicization,
and it can be used by a range of different actors. The Swedish example
illustrates how researchers can use media to argue for their own positions
and conclusions, run their internal academic debates, and to criticize gov-
ernments. It also shows how opposition parties may use the output of
government-funded committees to criticize the work of governments. At the
same time, the discussion of the German case in Chapter 8 suggests that the
media can be highly effective in serving as a bridge between researchers
and policy-makers. In line with the chapters on Norway, Sweden, and the
Netherlands, the analysis of the German experience suggests that it can be
helpful for media to be associated with potential stakeholders from the outset
of the research process.
It is important to find ways of avoiding or minimizing the politicization of
research. It is clear from the various analyses in this book that media have an
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important role to play in any efforts to reduce the degree of politicization of
research on migration and integration. It is important to add that the aim of
reducing politicization does not imply that we should seek to take politics out
of migration and integration policy (cf. Chapter 5) but, rather, that politics
and policy preferences should not be confused with, or obstruct, the import-
ant task of research to describe and analyse ‘the state of the world’.
This book has given ample room for the analysis of national experiences. As
nation-states subscribe to various global or regional regimes for handling
international migration—such as those based on the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion or the ‘free movement’ of workers in the European Union (EU)—they
need to be engaged in decision-making processes on these international
levels. This makes bridge-building between research and policy-making
important also in these international contexts. The balancing act of handling
the three-way relationship between research, public debate, and policy-
making becomes even more difficult when international debates and policy
processes are added to national ones. In Chapter 11, on the use of research
and experts in EU policy-making on migration, Elizabeth Collet is clear about
her view: there has to be exchange and proximity between the worlds of
politics and research, otherwise the research will often be (or at least be
perceived as) policy irrelevant. There is also a risk that, without sufficient
contact between the two spheres, communication from the research side
will be overloaded with high ambitions to ‘speaking truth to power’.
Chapter 12 illustrates the complexities when involving research generated
outside European borders. The experience from the CARIM projects give
guidance for how barriers can be overcome—not only where language is
concerned, but also with regard to working with different research cultures.
The case study in Chapter 12 also illustrates the risks of making research overly
instrumental in attempts to export European norms and policy ideas to ‘part-
ner countries’. Fostering modes of cooperation should essentially be about
supporting virtuous circles in the three-way relationships between research,
public debates, and policy-making. This is also of key importance at the global
level. Chapter 14, on the role of researchers and experts in debates about the
global governance of migration, highlights the significance of who is sitting at
the table, for the content and legitimacy of migration research and policies.
An important insight from Long’s historical inquiry is that research can
matter a great deal by narrating the state of affairs, thereby contributing to
setting the political agenda on the global level. It is, however, easy to share
Long’s frustration about the difficulties for research in impacting on current
policy-designs and recent global policy debates, where the role of research
has been tightly constrained by agendas set by other actors. Chapter 13
reminds us of the fact that global is also local. The strong presence of cities
in the International Metropolis project discussed in Chapter 13 reflects a
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situation where cities are increasingly becoming policy-makers, not least in
the integration arena. This is recognized in EU-funded research and policy-
making, too, illustrating the dynamics of multi-level governance and how the
local level can help innovate migration and integration policies.
Ways Forward
A number of lessons can be learnt from the experiences reported in this book.
We argue that these lessons can give guidance for ‘ways forward’ in efforts to
make migration policy and public debates more informed by research. What
can we do better? The simple truth may be that all actors involved have to try
harder in order for policy-makers to gain the knowledge resources necessary to
act more wisely. A fruitful strategy will most likely have to be built on the
combination of a strong normative agenda, which specifies good codes of
conduct in organizing the three-way relationships, with an improved and
sound incentive structure for all of the pertinent stakeholders. At this stage,
we can only hint at where to find the building blocks for both the norms and
the incentives that can bring about the necessary changes.
Even if many individual researchers are highly effective in their public and
policy engagement, it is clear that the research community as a whole can
improve considerably in terms of its outreach beyond academia, which is
paramount to any strategy that intends to build stronger bridges between
research, public debates, and policy-making. Research can be more useful for
policy-making by getting involved in different kinds of policy studies. Policy
relevance can, however, be achieved in many different ways and does not
necessarily involve the direct study of policies. It can be enough to highlight
conditions that deserve to be addressed by policies. It is nevertheless true that,
the closer research analyses come to actual policy instruments, the closer
research gets to guiding policy-makers in the reform processes required to
improve existing institutions and conditions. To achieve this may require
greater involvement of different kinds of ‘brokers’ in the process, such as
policy institutes, commissions, committees, and/or think tanks.
To be instrumental, in the sense of the concept as offered in Chapter 2, the
independence of research needs to be safe-guarded. This suggests that public
funding and its conditions are critical. In Chapter 10, Phil Martin’s frustration
with the predictability of researchers should be taken seriously, and this issue
is certainly not only about think tanks. It is clearly difficult to make an
instrumental contribution if the results are completely predictable. Beyond
that, policy-makers and researchers, as well as media, need to be constantly
engaged in a serious discussion concerning the way in which questions are
asked to research, the analytical frames imposed, and the way in which data
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and results are interpreted. This must involve critical awareness of fundamental
methodological issues, especially about the consequences of choosing one
analytical frame for the analysis in favour of another. Some contradictory
research results are simply the outcome of choosing a particular model, and
the appropriate choice of analytical framework is at least partly dependent on
what questions we ask. Certainly, the kinds of questions we ask often follow
fromour values and politics.We cannot, and should not, take the politics out of
migration policy, but we should be very transparent about the political nature
of the questions we pose and how we evaluate the results.
Researchers can always improve in terms of making their work and results
more accessible. This is, however, easier said than done. Howard Duncan
(Chapter 13) is not alone in observing the poor incentive structure in academia
in this regard, and in noting that this is particularly true and problematic for
younger scholars.While funding and the way that career-paths are designed in
the academic world should be improved in a way that rewards policy-relevant
research, this is unlikely to be sufficient. There are issues around communica-
tion that require the kind of specialization that journalism represents.Weneed
many more ‘knowledge brokers’ embedded in the university/research system
and policy-oriented research institutes to be able to build solid bridges to
media, as well as other bridges to policy-making communities, also, where
appropriate, involving civil society and the private sector. Beingmore inclusive
and transparent in the research process (e.g. in the problemdefinition phase) is
another important way forward to fostering more cooperation within the
research community, but also with media and policy actors. As pointed out
in Chapter 14, part of being more inclusive is also about language: researchers
that aim to generate policy-relevant research have to be able to use concepts
and descriptions that translate easily to public debates and realities.
A number of contributors to this book argue that there is no better instru-
ment for bridging the gap between research and policy-making than the
media. Chapter 6 discusses how policy-oriented research (institutes) can play
the role of an ‘honest broker’ between (university-based) research and public
policy debates, but it also points to the necessity of getting media and other
critical voices on board to facilitate this brokerage. Clearly, engaging the
media to achieve policy impact carries many risks as well as opportunities,
and using media alone cannot be expected to deliver policy impact in the
intended way. We need to build a chain of ‘honest brokers’ from university-
based research all the way to the policy-making circles by means of applied
research institutes, commissions and the media. We also argue that the link-
ing of the various actors should be done in ways that do not compromise the
role of the media to keep a critical eye on both researchers and policy-makers.
Moreover, it is of decisive importance for members of media to scrutinize what
other media actors are doing, as well.
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To strengthen the links between researchers, public policy-makers, the
media and other contributors to public debates, it is critically important that
the different actors understand and appreciate each other’s primary aims and
constraints. This implies that much more needs to be done to foster such a
common understanding, which appears to be a vital condition for the promo-
tion of genuine cooperation between the key actors and a stepping stone for
the evolution of a good climate for research-based policy reforms.
Ultimately, whatever researchers and media do to improve, there will be no
change if politicians do not listen and reflect on what is being brought to the
table. The conceptual framework in Chapter 2 is a useful starting point for
such reflections. There will always be circumstances when research is used to
only legitimize or substantiate policy changes but themore politicians are able
to use research for instrumental reasons, letting policy reforms be directly
guided by research, the better. We know from Chapter 14 that, historically,
some transformative changes have been aided by ground-breaking research
efforts.We should ask ourselves if and how it is possible to repeat such positive
experiences.
In politics and policy-making, going with the flow and maintaining the
status quo is perhaps the least demanding political strategy. This also applies
to the policy field of migration and integration. However, such an approach
would lead to missed opportunities to make a difference as public policy
reforms carry the potential to greatly improve human conditions. The more
instrumental (or even transformative) the policy changes, the greater the
courage demanded on the part of political leadership. Another vision for the
role of research in policy-making that has guided this book is that we
constantly need to evaluate and re-evaluate our understanding of how the
policy world works. We argue that there is an important potential for
improvement of the performance of migration and integration policies if
existing institutions and policies are subject to recurrent evaluations. This is
about promoting a process that Hoppe (2005) has labelled ‘the learning
model’ of research—policy interactions, where policy-making becomes part
of social experimentation (see Chapter 9). However, such a process would
require that policy reforms and evaluations be guided by an underlying
normative agenda concerning the ultimate goals of policies (which is some-
thing different from the normative aspects of regulating the three-way
research/public debate/policy relationship). Migration is mentioned in
several of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals but is not a Leitmotif
in any of them. While it is clear that, together, migration and integration
have a very important role to play in promoting human development in
very broad terms, a more elaborate and explicit normative agenda for migra-
tion policy is needed and this certainly applies to policies at the national
level to.
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In this context, it is also important to ask if and how research in themigration
and integration field can be harmful. We know that the results of research,
including those of high quality research, can sometimes be used for a range of
different ends, some of whichmight generate negative consequences for at least
some groups. The risk of research creating harm is increased, however, if it is not
conducted properly (from a scientific perspective) and/or if it ismisinterpreted. If
research is not carried out properly, this is a problem for the research community
to resolve—a serious one, too. There is also an important responsibility resting
with the researchers to be clear in explaining the research results and their
implications. The misinterpretation of research results in public debates or dur-
ing policy-making processes may or may not be intentional. If they are unin-
tended, stronger bridges between research, public debates and policy-making
may reduce the problem. We argue that when policy-makers or contributors to
public debates deliberately misinterpret the results of research studies, there
should be strong demands on both media and researchers to scrutinize the
political and other relevant actors, including their interests and values. Pluralism
and political independence in the media landscape may help prevent deliberate
and gross misinterpretation and misuse of research results in media coverage.
To conclude, we believe that well-designed policies onmigration and integra-
tion carry the potential to make significant contributions to the reduction of
human insecurities and the promotion of human development. We also argue
that public policy designs will improve if they are founded on a research-based
understanding of how the world works. At the same time, failed policies can
generate great risks for human security anddevelopment. This iswhywewant to
increase the supply of policy-relevant research andwhywe are concerned about
the common failures to consider and feed relevant research into public debates
and policy-making processes. However, we strongly believe that matters can
improve and we hope that this book can help identify potential ways forward.
Any significant positive and sustainable effort to ‘bridge the gaps’ requires
changes by all actors involved in the three-way relationships between research,
public debates, and policy-making. All actors have the potential to influence
each other because of the two-way causalities between each of these three
elements. This suggests that any interventionor change can trigger both ‘vicious’
and ‘virtuous’ circles that either weaken or strengthen the links between
research, public debates and policy.
Our concluding suggestions for buildingmore and stronger bridges between
research, public debates and policy-making are as follows:
 All actors should recognize that migration and integration are complex
processes that require careful and multi-faceted policy interventions. This
sounds like a very basic argument, but it is one that appears to be increas-
ingly rejected in public policy debates that are often focused on ‘quick
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fixes’ and immediate policy ‘solutions’ to what are often complex policy
dilemmas. Researchers are often criticized for highlighting complexities
without offering clear policy answers. This critique is sometimes fair but,
in the case of the migration and integration issues analysed in this book,
ignoring issue complexities and inter-dependencies can become an
important reason for public misunderstandings and policy failures.
 To strengthen the links between researchers, public policy-makers, the
media, and other contributors to public debates, it is of critical import-
ance that the different actors understand and appreciate each other’s
primary aims and constraints. This implies that much more needs to be
done to foster such common understandings and this requires a constant
dialogue between the key actors.
 The political and socio-economic institutional context can shape the
effectiveness of specific interventions aimed at bridging the gaps in
important ways, thus limiting the transferability of particular experiences
and lessons across countries and over time. This does not mean that there
can be no learning across countries but that each intervention needs to be
tailored to the specific institutional environment (e.g. to the specific
political system and media culture).
 Migration is not beneficial for everything and everyone at all times. The
politics of immigration and integration are often dominated by distribu-
tional (rather than economic efficiency) issues as well as the perceived
impacts on culture, identity, and security. To be effective and credible in
what are often highly politicized and polarized debates, research that aims
to influence public policy debates must be—and must be seen to be—
independent of the politics of migration, at least at arm’s length from
power. At the same time, research that claims to be impartial and
evidence-based has a responsibility, and we would argue obligation, to
identify the benefits and costs of any specific policy intervention, or
entire policy regime, for all key stakeholders involved and affected. This
is of particular importance in a policy field that is plagued by simplifica-
tion and one-sidedness.
 Researchers who aim to engage with public policy issues need to interact
more closely with policy-makers, journalists, and actors from civil society
in order to become relevant, which has to do with both the way research
questions are asked by the researchers themselves and the way policy-
makers are helped to understand how the results from research may be
translated into the world of policy-making.
 Media organizations can play an important role in bridging the gaps
between research, policy and the public but, if they do not work with
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other ‘honest brokers’, the risk is that the media erodes the entire ‘bridge
construction’. We recommend including specialized journalists in both
research processes and the dissemination of research results.
 Our suggestion for politicians is that they should ask precise questions to
the research community, including questions regarding the effects and
trade-offs of specific policy interventions under consideration, but make
sure that their questions could actually be answered by more research. In
addition to turning to the research community to help address specific
policy questions, politicians can—and we argue should—also use research
and researchers to engage in bigger picture reflections on, for example,
the many interdependencies between migration and other issue areas,
and the longer-term consequences of migration and integration processes
and policies.
We hope that this book has shown that bridging the gaps between research,
public debates, and policy-making requires actions by a range of different
stakeholders, not just by researchers and policy-makers. It requires a collective
recognition of the importance of the issue, and a collaborative approach that
can promote the evolution of more effective institutions with the adequate
norms and incentives for all the relevant stakeholders to engage.We hope this
book can help promote debates that can generate more ideas about how this
can be done in practice.
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